International and intergovernmental organisations in travel & migration

This report aims to present findings of the research conducted in Poland within the Work Package 1 of the Welcoming Spaces project, namely “Welcoming spaces” in relation to economic viability, social wellbeing and political stability in shrinking regions. The main aim of the mentioned research was to examine how welcoming initiatives are organised and implemented in the selected shrinking localities in Poland. In particular, the creation of welcoming initiatives concerning social wellbeing, economic viability and political stability was assessed. To accomplish this objective, five localities were selected purposefully, namely Łomża (city with powiat status) and Zambrów (urban commune) in Podlaskie Voivodeship and Łuków (town), Wohyń (rural commune) and Zalesie (rural commune) in Lubelskie Voivodeship. Within these localities, 23 welcoming initiatives were identified, out of which 12 were chosen for in-depth research. The field research was conducted in all five localities between March and December 2021. During this period, the SGH Warsaw School of Economics team conducted 43 interviews with institutional stakeholders (representatives of local governments, schools, non-governmental organisations – NGOs, religious organisations and private companies) and individuals (both migrant newcomers and native residents). In addition, local government representatives were surveyed to compare their policies, measures and stances toward migrant inhabitants and local development. The research was also complemented with the literature review, policy documents analysis, and local media outlets discourse analysis. Until February 2022 and the outbreak of war in Ukraine, welcoming spaces in Poland were scarce and spatially limited to the big cities like Warsaw, Cracow, Wrocław, Gdańsk, Lublin or Białystok, governed by liberal mayors and city councils open to accept migrants and treat them as a valuable human asset of the city community. However, in smaller cities, towns and rural areas, especially in shrinking regions, welcoming spaces have been highly conditioned by welcoming initiatives carried out mainly by civil society organisations (CSOs). It is very likely that the war in Ukraine will completely change the situation we write about in this country report. However, this crisis and its consequences were not the subjects of our desk research and fieldwork in Poland, which ended in December 2021. As of late July 2022, the number of border crossings from Ukraine to Poland is almost 5 million and the number of forced migrants registered for temporary protection or similar national protection scheme concern 1.3 million people (UNHCR 2022). However, the number of those who have decided to stay in Poland is estimated at around 1.5 million (Duszczyk and Kaczmarczyk 2022). Such a large influx of forced migrants from Ukraine within five months already affects the demographic situation in the country and access to public services, mainly in large and medium-size cities1 . Depending on the development of events in Ukraine and the number of migrants who will decide to stay in Poland in the following months, the functioning of the domestic labour market, education, health service, and social assistance may significantly change. The following months may also bring new changes in the law relating to foreigners, aimed at their easier integration in the country. Access to housing in cities is already a considerable challenge, which may result in measures to encourage foreigners to settle in smaller towns and rural areas. Given these dynamic changes in the migration situation of the country, as well as in the area of admission and integration activities, Poland seems to be slowly becoming one great welcoming space. It is worth mentioning that the main institutional actors in this area have been NGOs and local governments since the beginning of the humanitarian crisis in Ukraine. An important supporting and coordinating role has also been played by international organisations such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which launched its inter-agency Regional Refugee Response Plan (RRRP) in early spring to address the most urgent needs of the population of forced migrants and their host countries in this part of Europe (UNHCR 2022a; UNHCR 2022b; UNHCR 2022c). Based on the number of newly emerged welcoming initiatives and the pace of this emergence, they will soon become an everyday reality for every municipality in Poland. Therefore, it is difficult to find more up-todate circumstances for the “Welcoming Spaces” project objective, which is “to rethink ways forward in creating inclusive space in such a way that it will contribute firstly to the successful integration of migrants in demographically and economically shrinking areas and simultaneously to the revitalization of these places”. Furthermore, the initiatives we selected as case studies for our research should be widely promoted and treated as a model of migrants’ inclusion into the new communities. On the other hand, we need to emphasize here that the empirical material was collected between March and December 2021, before the outbreak of war in Ukraine. As such, it does not reflect the new reality in Poland

According to UN assessments, there are 214 million international migrants worldwide and another 740 million internal migrants . The OECD highlights that there seems little likelihood of substantial reductions in numbers of international migrants in the current decade . Rises in global population, new demographic trends including ageing population, environmental deterioration and an increased globalisation of the economy are some of the factors which will encourage emigration flows in coming years. International migration, firmly at the top of the EU’s political agenda, must be analysed from the integration perspective as the key factor for the future cohesion of European societies. The INTEGRIM programme is developed by a sound and well established network of 8 full partner academic institutions and 6 non-academic associated partners from the private and public sector, civil society and international organisations with outstanding research and training credentials on migration and integration issues. The aim of this programme is to structure the existing high-quality research capacity on migration and integration policies and processes in Europe through 480 person-months of Early-Stage Researchers. INTEGRIM will consider processes and policies concerning integration of foreign nationals within EU countries, including third-country nationals and European nationals migrating to other European states when they face substantial integration difficulties. The existing fruitful collaboration among the Network’s partners through existing research networks such as the EC acknowledged network of excellence IMISCOE has evidenced the capacity and added value to pool the talent to the benefit of a common critical mass and enhancement of the academic knowledge. INTEGRIM aims to enhance academic research capacity, encourage policy-relevant research on integration and diversity management and facilitate the use of that research by governments and non-governmental organisations.

According to UN assessments, there are 214 million international migrants worldwide and another 740 million internal migrants . The OECD highlights that there seems little likelihood of substantial reductions in numbers of international migrants in the current decade . Rises in global population, new demographic trends including ageing population, environmental deterioration and an increased globalisation of the economy are some of the factors which will encourage emigration flows in coming years. International migration, firmly at the top of the EU’s political agenda, must be analysed from the integration perspective as the key factor for the future cohesion of European societies. The INTEGRIM programme is developed by a sound and well established network of 8 full partner academic institutions and 6 non-academic associated partners from the private and public sector, civil society and international organisations with outstanding research and training credentials on migration and integration issues. The aim of this programme is to structure the existing high-quality research capacity on migration and integration policies and processes in Europe through 480 person-months of Early-Stage Researchers. INTEGRIM will consider processes and policies concerning integration of foreign nationals within EU countries, including third-country nationals and European nationals migrating to other European states when they face substantial integration difficulties. The existing fruitful collaboration among the Network’s partners through existing research networks such as the EC acknowledged network of excellence IMISCOE has evidenced the capacity and added value to pool the talent to the benefit of a common critical mass and enhancement of the academic knowledge. INTEGRIM aims to enhance academic research capacity, encourage policy-relevant research on integration and diversity management and facilitate the use of that research by governments and non-governmental organisations.

The overall objective of EUROMED Migration IV (2016-2019), a programme financed by the European Union and implemented by ICMPD, is to support EU Member States and ENI Southern Partner Countries in establishing a comprehensive, constructive and operational dialogue and co-operation framework, with a particular focus on reinforcing instruments and capacities to develop and implement evidence-based and coherent migration and international protection policies and activities. In order to achieve this objective, EMM4 builds upon the results of the first three phases of the programme (2004-2015) and tailors its activities around two pillars: the first pillar facilitates an effective North-South and South-South regional co-operation dialogue in the area of migration and international protection-related issues (legal migration, irregular migration, migration and development and international protection). The second pillar focuses on capacity-building, applying a new outcome-oriented approach which includes sub-regional activities, tailor-made national training programmes and a targeted technical assistance package for small-scale concrete actions. Both pillars are supported by a horizontal and cross-cutting component, with a particular focus on communication through the dissemination of reliable information in order to contribute to a more balanced narrative on migration. The EMM4 is inclusive in its approach and actively engages with a broad variety of stakeholders including government authorities, international organisations and civil society representatives, academia, and the media in the implementation of its activities.

Providing international protection to people fleeing persecution, torture and other inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment is recognised both in the US and EU as an important international obligation. Both the US and the EU have ratified international instruments which require states to provide international protection for an ever wider group of persons. At the same time, non-governmental organisations, academics and even international organisations have decried the reluctance of both the US and EU Member States to afford protection to specific individuals. This policy paper will provide some proposals how to bridge the divide between the US and EU commitments to provide protection and an apparent reluctance actually to accord that protection to individuals.

Voor de periode 2015-2035, zo constateerde de Commissie Arbeidsparticipatie (commissie Bakker) in haar rapport van juni 2008,1 wordt een tekort aan arbeidskrachten op de arbeidsmarkt verwacht. Het Nederlandse beleid is er in de komende jaren primair op gericht om dat tekort met nationale (beleids-) inspanningen op te lossen. Volgens de commissie Bakker dient dit te gebeuren door een hogere arbeidsparticipatie en arbeidsproductiviteit alsook door het beter laten aansluiten van onderwijs op de arbeidsmarkt. Daarnaast wijst de ACVZ op de mogelijkheid om productie naar elders te verplaatsen zodat arbeidskracht vrijkomt voor die sectoren waar dat het meest nodig is (infrastructuur, zorg, bouw, onderwijs, horeca). Maar naast deze inspanningen zou volgens de ACVZ tijdelijke arbeidsmigratie, bijvoorbeeld in de vorm van de in de beleidsnotitie Internationale Migratie en Ontwikkeling 20082 bedoelde circulaire migratie, als aanvullend instrument nuttig kunnen zijn. Drie overwegingen ten aanzien van tijdelijke arbeidsmigratie zijn voor de ACVZ van belang. Allereerst dient de ‘tijdelijkheid’ van tijdelijke arbeidsmigratie centraal te staan. De terugkeer zal, hoe problematisch dat ook is, moeten worden gegarandeerd. Ten tweede, kan daar waar het gaat om bijvoorbeeld arbeidsvoorwaarden niet aan het beginsel van gelijke behandeling worden getornd. Ten derde acht de ACVZ het van belang, dat ondanks de benodigde reflectie op de huidige financiële crisis en de recessie die daar een gevolg van is, niettemin de mogelijkheden van langdurige tijdelijke arbeidsmigratie als arbeidsmarktinstrument voor de periode vanaf ongeveer 2015 zouden moeten worden bestudeerd en op bruikbaarheid te worden getoetst. In het advies richt de ACVZ zich op het vereiste raamwerk voor werving, binnenkomst, verblijf en terugkeer van tijdelijke arbeidsmigranten. Daarbij wordt niet alleen rekening gehouden met de belangen van Nederland. Uitgangspunt is ook om waar mogelijk tegemoet te komen aan de belangen van de migrant en het land van herkomst. Tijdelijke arbeidsmigratie wordt in dit advies als volgt gedefinieerd: Tijdelijke arbeidsmigratie is die vorm van migratie die onderdanen van derde landen de mogelijkheid biedt om voor een periode van maximaal vier jaar in Nederland te komen werken waarna zij aan het einde van die periode terugkeren naar hun land van herkomst dan wel vertrekken naar elders. In het advies wordt ingegaan op: • het organisatorische en juridische kader; • planning, besluitvorming, keuze van landen van herkomst, afspraken met landen van herkomst en de rol van internationale organisaties; • werving, arbeidsovereenkomst, inreis en verblijf waarbij de rol van marktpartijen aan de orde wordt gesteld; • werkgevers en vakopleidingen; • haalbaarheid en handhaving waaronder terugkeer en de daarbij te bieden faciliteiten; • (andere) randvoorwaarden, zoals gezin, opleidingen; • samenwerking binnen de EU en/of met individuele lidstaten.

The MIGGOV seeks to break new ground in the analysis of international organizations (IOs) as key objects of study in the broader research field of international migration governance and of international governance more generally. The key questions are: to what extent, how and why do IOs impact upon and shape international migration governance in the absence of a global migration regime. In order to address these questions the project shifts the focus from international governance as a (changing) structure to international governors as sources of agency and to the outcomes that flow from interactions between various agents. As most international migration governance takes place under conditions of uncertainty about future migration scenarios, this project will specifically explore the issues of the production and the use of expert knowledge by IOs striving to impact upon international migration governance. The project will study the involvement of eight IOs in migration governance in Central Asia, which has been selected for analysis because it has so far escaped the attention of scholars despite evidence of multi-layered migration governance in the region. The project will specifically look at four Central Asian countries: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan that share many similar features, but also exhibit some distinct political and socio-economic differences that make them highly relevant objects of study. The focus on Central Asia is also justified by the strategic importance that many international actors, including the EU, ascribe to the region. In addition to the Central Asian regional case study and intra-regional comparisons, the MIGGOV will produce overarching comparisons with the EU’s ‘Eastern Neighbourhood’. The project addresses topics on which the EU has called for further research in its 2013 Work Programme, namely those within activities 8.3 ‘Major trends in society and their implications’ and 8.4 ‘Europe in the World’.

The core intellectual aim of BIOSEC is to explore whether concerns about biodiversity protection and global security are becoming integrated, and if so, in what ways. It will do so via building new theoretical approaches for political ecology. Achim Steiner, UN Under-Secretary General and Executive Director of UNEP recently stated ‘the scale and role of wildlife and forest crime in threat finance calls for much wider policy attention’. The argument that wildlife trafficking constitutes a significant source of ‘threat finance’ takes two forms: first as a lucrative business for organised crime networks in Europe and Asia, and second as a source of finance for militias and terrorist networks, most notably Al Shabaab, Lord’s Resistance Army and Janjaweed. BIOSEC is a four year project designed to lead debates on these emerging challenges. It will build pioneering theoretical approaches and generate new empirical data. BIOSEC takes a fully integrated approach: it will produce a better conceptual understanding of the role of illegal wildlife trade in generating threat finance; it will examine the links between source and end user countries for wildlife products; and it will investigate and analyse the emerging responses of NGOs, government agencies and international organisations to these challenges. BIOSEC goes beyond the ‘state-of-the art’ because biodiversity protection and global security currently inhabit distinctive intellectual ‘silos’; however, they need to be analysed via an interdisciplinary research agenda that cuts across human geography, politics and international relations, criminology and conservation biology. This research is timely because in the last two years, the idea that the illegal wildlife trade constitutes a major security threat has become more prevalent in academic and policy circles, yet it is an area that is under researched and poorly understood. These recent shifts demand urgent conceptual and empirical interrogation.

'The SOCIALCATH research project deals with the intercultural connection between Socialism and Catholicism in two cases in which this meeting was very evident: the French 'Parti Socialiste Unifié' (PSU) and the Italian 'Partito Socialista Italiano di Unità Proletaria' (PSIUP). PSU and PSIUP put together Socialists and Catholics who did not accept the main strategy of their respective political families. PSU and PSIUP wanted represent a radically democratic form of modernity, giving great attention to social ferments and to defend all discriminated or under-represented categories: workers, women and young people. PSU and PSIUP were libertarian and they refused the hierarchical structures of a mass party, adopting a fluid organisation totally open to different cultural models. The political relationship between PSU and PSIUP, their ideological exchanges and the contacts between their members have never been explored within a scientific context. The SOCIALCATH project aims to fill this scientific gap, bringing to light many unedited documents. The interdisciplinary approach, the multi-methodological analysis and the comparative nature of the SOCIALCATH project are all new instruments to be used in these arguments. The SOCIALCATH project aims to reach three main objectives: 1. to describe the meeting between opposite cultural areas such as Socialism and Catholicism, in order to support the policies for intercultural dialogue promoted by the EU and other international organisations such as UNESCO. 2. to highlight alternative aspects of Socialist and Catholic cultures, in order to discover the anti-dogmatic spirit of the 60s and its today's inheritance in the collective European conscience. 3. to explore the relationship between the PSU and PSIUP's political class and the new social issues of the 60s (feminism, 'the young' issue, etc.), in order to compare those events with the present attitude of the European leading class towards society and collective issues.'

La mobilité globale fait aujourd’hui partie de la texture sociale de la mondialisation et des relations internationales. Elle est à la fois une cause et une conséquence de la mondialisation et les réponses des institutions politiques nationales et internationales sont un enjeu clef de l’analyse de la gouvernance et des transformations sociales à l’échelle globale. Elle est un des points de tension de la modernité politique à l’échelle nationale et internationale. En s’intéressant tout à la fois aux organisations internationales, aux politiques migratoires nationales et régionales des Etats, aux modes d’organisation des espaces de vie des migrants et des réfugiés et aux dynamiques sociales transnationales de structuration de la mobilité, on observe le phénomène migratoire sous plusieurs angles et à différentes échelles. Les chercheurs impliqués dans ce projet ont choisi de privilégier une démarche empirique associée à un effort de systématisation qui emprunte à la science politique, à la sociologie, à l’anthropologie et à l’économie politique. Ils ont aussi choisi de lier leurs objets de recherche fondamentale à des enjeux politiques et sociaux immédiatement contemporains et à s’ancrer dans une réflexion scientifique sur l’action publique nationale et internationale, ses normes et ses principes vis-à-vis de la mobilité. Ce projet a pour vocation de donner une description précise de la mobilité et de ses dynamiques politiques et sociales, notamment en s’intéressant à l’observation empirique des pratiques des acteurs de la gouvernance de la mobilité (Etats, organisations internationales, migrants, réfugiés, réseaux). Il a pour objet d’élucider les représentations à l’œuvre dans ces pratiques, les dispositifs normatifs, idéologiques et identitaires qui les structurent. Le premier axe de ce travail concerne les pratiques et les représentations de la gestion de la mobilité en politique internationale. Il a pour enjeu la mise en questionnement de la notion de gouvernance globale de la mobilité, incluant migrations économiques et flux de refugiés. Les organisations internationales, leur interaction avec les acteurs non gouvernementaux de la politique des migrations internationales et des flux de réfugiés sont au cœur d’un dispositif politique qui est à la fois fait de discours et de pratiques. Le deuxième axe de ce projet observe les enjeux politiques de la gouvernance régionale des migrations dans deux espaces différenciés mais fortement marqué par leur contexte régional, l’Europe et le Moyen Orient. Il s’agit de déterminer la place de l’Etat dans la gouvernance de la mobilité à l’échelle régionale notamment dans le cas européen entre la fin du vingtième et le début du vingt-et-unième siècle. La « gouvernance » oscille entre intégration et « retour de l’Etat » dans la gestion des migrations internationales notamment avec la crise économique et financière, et on étudie les manifestations de cette « réaction souverainiste » sur la mobilité des personnes. Le troisième axe de ce projet s’attache à l’étude ethnographique des lieux de vie des réfugiés, les camps en ‘intéressant aux transformations sociales à l’œuvre dans ce espaces sociaux transnationaux institutionnalisés. Il s’intéresse notamment aux modes de gouvernance mise en œuvre par les acteurs humanitaires dans des contextes de conflits ou de crise et à l’autonomie (agency) des populations concernées et analyse celle-ci à travers la structuration et la matérialité des espaces de relégation et/ou confinement des réfugiés à l’échelle globale. Le quatrième axe de ce projet présente un dispositif prospectif qui vise à décrire les dispositifs contemporains les plus visibles de limitation de la mobilité –les murs et explorer des scenarii politiques d’ouverture des frontières et de libéralisation de la mobilité. Il constitue un complément et un prolongement théorique de l’ensemble des connaissances et analyses déployées dans le cadre de ce projet.

(En) Understanding the legal framework in force in the SEM countries is of paramount importance in order to grasp the functioning of the labour market and the influence that it can have on migration. The analysis presented here focuses on 11 countries (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, Turkey) and deals with those aspects of the legal regulation in force which can be considered responsible for shaping the employment relationship in term of rigidity or flexibility. The Report is divided in a series of country-studies where the various legal components of the labour market are presented and critically analysed following the same structure for each one in order to enhance comparability: rules concerning hiring, flexible contracts, working time, dismissals, and work inspections. The results, which draw mainly upon international organisations’ sources and upon the analysis of legal texts and laws in these countries, are preliminary. In the concluding remarks, it is explained that if the most valuable research output of this report is to provide cross-comparative analysis to a vast legal material critically organised, the main limitation resides in the fact that it is mainly cantered on the black-letters of the rules and therefore further research must be done on the multifaceted aspects that contribute to shaping a labour market, namely the social dialogue, the case-law and the actual functioning of labour market institutions such as labour inspections, employment agencies, social security, in order to mange to paint the full picture of the SEM countries’ labour market. A preliminary critical assessment of the labour markets is however provided, combining the data on the legal framework in force with the analysis of the independent international reports prepared by various international institutions and NGOs on labour rights’ violations. (Fr)Il est de toute première importance de bien comprendre le cadre légal en vigueur dans les pays du Sud et de l’Est de la Méditerranée (SEM) afin d’y saisir le fonctionnement du marché du travail et son influence potentielle sur les flux migratoires. L’étude porte sur 11 de ces pays soit l’Algérie, l’Egypte, Israël, la Jordanie, le Liban, la Libye, la Mauritanie, le Maroc, la Syrie, la Tunisie et enfin la Turquie. C’est principalement, les éléments juridiques qui affectent les relations de travail en termes de rigidité et de flexibilité qui sont analysés. Ce rapport s’appuie sur une série de cas d’étude nationaux. Les aspects juridiques du marché du travail y sont décrits et analysés dans une perspective critique. Chacun des systèmes légaux nationaux a été soumis à la même grille d’analyse afin d’assurer la comparabilité des données. Sont donc envisagées de manière systématiques: les dispositions relatives à l’engagement, à la flexibilité des contrats, au temps de travail, aux préavis et aux inspections du travail. Les conclusions formulées, sont à ce stade tout à fait préliminaires. L’un des intérêts manifestes de cette recherche est de rendre accessible en Anglais, de manière systématique et critique, un large éventail de dispositions juridiques. La principale limite de cette étude est certainement son aspect formel puisque les modalités de mise en œuvre de ces dispositions et la pratique des relations de travail échappent, en grande partie à la perception son auteur. De plus amples recherches devraient être menées sur les divers facteurs qui contribuent à déterminer les dynamiques du marché du travail dans les SEM, soit le dialogue social, la jurisprudence et le fonctionnement réel des institutions de régulation du marché du travail telles que l’Inspection du Travail, les Agences pour l’Emploi et la Sécurité Sociale. Ce rapport suggère néanmoins une première évaluation critique résultant de la combinaison des données juridiques recueillies et de l’analyse des rapports internationaux élaborés par diverses institutions internationales et des ONG actives dans le domaine de la violation des droits du travail.

De toegang, toelating en uitzetting van vreemdelingen en het vreemdelingentoezicht is in Nederland geregeld in de Vreemdelingenwet 2000 (Vw 2000). Deze Vw 2000 is met de Wet biometrie in de vreemdelingenketen (Wbvk) per 1 maart 2014 gewijzigd. De wetgever achtte deze wetswijziging noodzakelijk om de betrouwbaarheid van de identiteitsvaststelling te verbeteren, waardoor fraude effectiever bestreden zou kunnen worden. Op verzoek van de Eerste Kamer is de wet voor het eerst geëvalueerd in 2016-2017. Toen bleek dat een vervolgevaluatie nodig was om de effecten van de Wbvk beter in kaart te krijgen. Die tweede evaluatie is in 2018-2019 uitgevoerd. Na de tweede evaluatie is de Wbvk verlengd met vijf jaar (tot in 2026). Daarbij is vastgelegd dat een nieuwe, derde evaluatie een verslag moet opleveren over de noodzakelijkheid, de doeltreffendheid en de effecten van de Wbvk. Dit rapport presenteert de resultaten van deze derde evaluatie. Daarbij zijn de volgende twee onderzoeksvragen gehanteerd: Hoe verhoudt de Wbvk zich tot relevante andere (Europese) wet- en regelgeving? Welke bijdrage levert de Wbvk aan de identiteitsvaststelling van de vreemdeling en daarmee aan de werking van de Vreemdelingenwet 2000?

The number of migrant children, including unac- companied minors, registered as present in the European Union (EU) rose between 2020 and 2021, then went on to rise significantly between 2021 and 2022. According to Eurostat, the 27 EU Member States (EU-27) and Norway1 received over 518 000 first time asylum applications from children under 18 years of age and 79 000 asylum applications from applicants considered unaccompanied minors in 2020-2022.3 This included 13 620 unaccompanied minor applicants in 2020, 25 290 in 2021, with a large jump to 40 175 in 2022. Not all unaccompanied minors arriving in the EU apply for asylum or are beneficiaries of temporary protection. Data are not collected systematically across the EU on those children who do not apply for, or benefit from, either regime and it is difficult to give a total number of those involved. However, unaccompanied children registered by child protection services can help to fill in the gaps in many EU countries (see Table 1). With increasing numbers of migrant children arriving in Europe and children’s rights on the agenda of different EU and national institutions, including as part of the negotiations of the new Pact on Migration and Asylum,4 the protection of children in migration remained an area of considerable development in legislation and policy throughout 2021-2022, at both EU and national level. Several EU Member States reported introducing policies and practices to better identify children in migration procedures, as well as detect and address any additional vulnerabilities they may have. Six EU Member States and Norway implemented meas- ures to safeguard vulnerable groups in reception centres in 20216 or 2022,7 while three others increased the provision of special accommodation places for families or unaccompanied minors. New alternative (non-institution- al) care options for unaccompanied children, particularly family-based care/care families, were introduced or improved by four Member States in 2021, and by Norway in 2022. In 2022, several EU Member States reported overall pres- sures on reception systems, which affected places for chil- dren, and/or higher numbers of unaccompanied children arriving, which impacted reception facilities generally. New provisions to strengthen guardianship systems were introduced, and the group of minors eligible for a care order or a guardian allocation was expanded during the reporting period. Procedural safeguards were strengthened in several Member States, including to ensure that the best interests of the child were examined in different procedures,15 or by including additional safeguards in procedures specifically for children. A majority of EU Member States started new initiatives to support unaccompanied minors transitioning to adult- hood, mostly in the areas of employment, education and accommodation

De eerste representatieve cijfers over Oekraïense vluchtelingen in Nederland laten het beeld zien van een groep mensen die proberen hun draai te vinden in een nieuw land. Zij voelen zich over het algemeen thuis in Nederland en de meerderheid is van plan te blijven, in ieder geval op de korte termijn. Een belangrijk probleem dat volledige deelname aan de Nederlandse maatschappij in de weg staat, is het gebrek aan beheersing van de Nederlandse taal onder deze groep.

Naar verwachting neemt het aantal mensen dat naar Nederland migreert de komende jaren toe. Overheden zullen zich daarom steeds beter moeten voorbereiden op de komst van migranten, bijvoorbeeld door opvang te regelen. Toegenomen migratie houdt ook in dat de zogenoemde irreguliere migratie toeneemt, dat wil zeggen: het oversteken van een landgrens zonder de daarvoor benodigde toestemming of het verblijven in een land zonder de benodigde documenten. Deze vorm van migratie gaat gepaard met relatief grote risico’s zoals smokkel en uitbuiting. Tegelijkertijd is er slechts beperkt zicht op zowel de aantallen als de reisroutes van irreguliere migranten. Dit leidt tot verhoogde risico’s op smokkel en uitbuiting en tot beperkte beheersbaarheid van migratie vanuit overheden. Verschillende ketenpartners in de Nederlandse migratieketen hebben te maken met verschillende aspecten van irreguliere migratie. Ze beschikken daardoor (slechts) over data met betrekking tot de eigen specifieke domeinen. Dit kan bijvoorbeeld informatie zijn over reisroutes van irreguliere migranten die over land Nederland binnenkomen, of juist via luchthavens. Ook de dataverzameling bij deze ketenpartners kan specifiek afgestemd zijn op de aspecten waarmee zij te maken hebben.

Het huidige onderzoek heeft het doel meer inzicht te bieden in welke aan huisvesting en de woonomgeving gerelateerde zaken voor mensen afkomstig uit Syrië en Eritrea belangrijk zijn geweest voor het opbouwen van hun leven in Nederland, nadat zij een woning in een gemeente toegewezen hebben gekregen. Daarnaast wordt beoogd meer kennis te verkrijgen over ervaringen met het huisvestingsproces en opvattingen over het huisvestingsbeleid. Daartoe zijn de volgende onderzoeksvragen opgesteld: Welke factoren gerelateerd aan huisvesting en de woonomgeving zijn volgens mensen gevlucht uit Syrië en Eritrea zelf van belang voor het opbouwen van hun leven in Nederland? a Verandert het belang van deze factoren over de tijd? Hoe hebben mensen gevlucht uit Syrië en Eritrea het huisvestingsproces ervaren? Hoe kijken mensen gevlucht uit Syrië en Eritrea aan tegen het huidige huisvestingsbeleid (in algemene zin)?

Dit onderzoek komt voort uit de wens van de Nederlandse overheid om in kaart te brengen hoe en op welke gronden andere EU-lidstaten een lijst van veilige landen van herkomst hanteren in hun asielbeleid. De onderzoeksvragen luiden als volgt: 1. Hoe selecteren andere lidstaten de te beoordelen landen? 2. Op grond van welke bronnen en criteria voeren andere lidstaten de eerste beoordeling uit en hoe is die procedure vormgegeven? 3. Zijn de beoordelingen en herbeoordelingen openbaar? 4. Op grond van welke bronnen en criteria voeren andere lidstaten de periodieke herbeoordeling uit en hoe vaak verrichten zij die? 5. Worden er groepen en/of gebieden uitgezonderd binnen de aanwijzing veilig land van herkomst? Zo ja, op grond van welke criteria en is er een limiet aan het aantal uitzonderingsgroepen? 6. Hoe ziet de asielprocedure eruit voor personen afkomstig uit een veilig land van herkomst? Veilige landen van herkomst 7. Gelden er andere voorwaarden voor de opvang en terugkeer en hoe verloopt de terugkeer van asielzoekers uit veilige landen ten opzichte van die van andere afgewezen asielzoekers? 8. Is er relevante jurisprudentie beschikbaar, houdt het beleid stand voor de rechter en wat zijn de kwetsbaarheden? 9. Wat zijn de verschillen van deze lidstaten met Nederland waar het gaat om veilige landenbeleid?

EU-detachering – soms ook wel de A1-constructie genoemd – kent verschillende vormen. Van het detacheren van experts en specialisten tot het inzetten van arbeidskrachten tegen zo laag mogelijke kosten, ook wel concurrentiedetachering genoemd. Deze laatste vorm wordt in toenemende mate door Nederlandse werkgevers toegepast, vooral binnen sectoren als de bouw, productiewerk, transport, landbouw en de vleesverwerkende industrie. Werkgevers en uitzendbureaus in deze sectoren gebruiken via detacheringsconstructies arbeidsmigranten van binnen en buiten de EU als een manier om te besparen op arbeid. In vergelijking met werkgevers in andere Europese landen maken Nederlandse werkgevers veelvuldig gebruik van een flexibele schil van personeel. Hierbij kan gedacht worden aan tijdelijke contracten, nulurencontracten, oproepkrachten, uitzendkrachten en zzp'ers. EU-detachering is een variant van zo’n flexibele arbeidsrelatie. Ondoorzichtige constructies maken controles lastig De Adviesraad Migratie vindt concurrentiedetachering problematisch. De (lange) detacheringsketen van verschillende partijen in het zendende en ontvangende land met een wirwar aan regels en arbeidscontracten, zorgt ervoor dat het onduidelijk is wat de rechten van mensen zijn. De complexe regelgeving van EU-detacheringwordt gebruikt voor ontduiking van verantwoordelijkheden. Dat maakt het lastig om vast te stellen wie precies waarvoor verantwoordelijk is. Daarbij pakt regelgeving in elk EU-land net weer anders uit en bilaterale verdragen met niet EU landen bepalen bijvoorbeeld of iemand een uitkering voor arbeidsongeschiktheid ook daadwerkelijk ontvangt. Het is haast onmogelijk voor een gedetacheerde arbeidsmigrant om precies te weten waar hij of zij recht op heeft, laat staan dat er wordt overgaan tot actie bij het niet nakomen van arbeidsvoorwaarden of bij slechte arbeidsomstandigheden. Dat geldt ook voor de gemeenten waar deze mensen wonen als voor de Nederlandse Arbeidsinspectie. Zij kunnen door een gebrek aan capaciteit, opsporingsbevoegdheden en het ontbreken van gegevens, niet goed handhaven. Werkgevers kunnen zich op hun beurt achter complexe regelgeving verschuilen en hier misbruik van maken.

Dit kennisbericht gaat over het toegenomen aantal alleenstaande minderjarige vreemdelingen (AMV’s) dat in Nederland asiel aanvraagt. In 2022 en in 2023 lag dat aantal hoger dan in de voorgaande jaren (respectievelijk 4.205 en 4.803 (tot en met oktober). Vanuit beleid werd de wens geuit te onderzoeken waarom deze aantallen stijgen, aangezien deze verhoogde instroom veel druk legt op de opvangcapaciteit en uitvoerende instanties als COA en NIDOS. De centrale vragen van dit onderzoek zijn: Wat kan er gezegd worden over de redenen van de recente toename in de instroom van AMV’s en de veranderingen in de samenstelling van de groep? Wat zijn de redenen voor AMV’s om in Nederland terecht te komen? Is het aannemelijk dat deze redenen anders zijn voor de huidige piek dan die voor in 2015? Dit vooronderzoek is gebaseerd op inzichten uit een quick-scan van de recente literatuur en een kennistafel.

This report presents the main findings of the European Migration Network (EMN) study on the application of the Temporary Protection Directive (2001/55/EC) in 2023. The study explores some developments, challenges, and good practices relevant to the application of the Temporary Protection Directive (TPD) in EMN Member Countries in the first half of 2023. Since 24 February 2022, Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has created a situation of mass arrivals of displaced people from Ukraine to the European Union (EU) and other countries surrounding Ukraine. The war caused large flows of people to leave Ukraine in search of safety, with crossings at EU external borders peaking at 800 000 weekly entries from Ukraine and Moldova during the early months of the war.4 The EU Member States bordering Ukraine and Moldova were the first to respond to the crisis. Following the call of Minis- ters for Home Affairs, on 2 March 2022, the European Commission proposed to activate the TPD. On 4 March 2022, the Council adopted an Implementing Decision7 establishing temporary protection for displaced persons from Ukraine, activating the TPD for the first time since its adoption in 2001. This was a key component of the EU’s unified response. As per Article 2(2) of the Council Decision, temporary protection covers not only displaced Ukrainian nationals re- siding in Ukraine on or before 24 February 2022 and their family members, but also stateless persons and nationals of third countries other than Ukraine who benefitted from international protection or equivalent national protection in Ukraine before 24 February 2022 and their family members. As per Article 2(2) of the Council Decision, EU Member States should provide either temporary protection or adequate protection under national law to stateless persons and nationals of third countries other than Ukraine legally residing in Ukraine before 24 February 2022 on the basis of a valid permanent residence permit issued in accordance with Ukrainian law, and who were unable to return in safe and durable conditions to their country or re- gion of origin. Article 2(3) gives Member States the option to provide temporary protection to other persons, including stateless persons and nationals of third countries other than Ukraine who were residing legally in Ukraine and who are unable to return in safe and durable conditions to their country or region of origin. Several EU Member States also extended the scope by providing temporary protection to Ukrainian nationals already legally present in that EU Member State and to those who moved shortly before 24 February 2022. In accordance with Article 4(1) of the TPD, the duration of temporary protection is of a period of one year. Unless ter- minated under the terms of the Directive, the duration may be – and indeed has been – automatically extended by six-month periods for a maximum of one year, i.e. to March 2024. The European Commission’s Operational Guidelines9 recommended that EU Member States issue residence permits for the full possible duration of two years, i.e. until March 2024. After the first automatic extension until March 2024, the Council of the European Union announced on 28 September 2023 that temporary protection would be extended until 4 March 2025 and on the 25 September 2024 another extension was granted until 4 March 2026

Investigative report on the relationship between border practices, spatial changes in migrant trajectories, and the increased danger of crossing Niger's Sahara desert following the implementation of Law 2015-36. Given the methodological challenges posed by the existing literature on desert deaths and disappearances, the report developed innovative geospatial analysis and remote sensing methods.

This EMN study documents the labour market access of applicants for international protection between 2017 to 2022, complementing an earlier (2019) EMN study on labour market integration of third-country nationals excluding asylum seekers.1 This involves an up-to-date and in-depth analysis of legislation, policies and practices in EMN Member Countries on integration of applicants for international protection into the labour market, and the key actors involved in that implementa- tion. It also provides examples of challenges and good practices. This study understands the minimum required ‘access to the labour market’ as regulated under the recast Recep- tion Conditions Directive (2013/33/EU), which ensures that “applicants have access to the labour market no later than nine months from the date when the application for international protection was lodged, if a first instance decision by the competent authority has not been taken and the delay cannot be attributed to the applicant

Key Messages 1. Greece’s two systems of social assistance for the displaced – the humanitarian assistance they receive immediately and the social protection they are eligible for once recognised as refugees – are poorly integrated. Humanitarian assistance is funded by the European Union and was developed as distinct from the national social protection system. 2. Administered until 2021 by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and now run by the Ministry of Migration and Asylum, humanitarian assistance has addressed the emergency needs of the displaced only to the level of their most basic survival requirements, and sometimes not even those. 3. A coverage gap exists when moving from one system to the other. Asylum seekers stop receiving financial assistance as soon as they are recognised as refugees and lose access to accommodation within a month of being granted asylum, with many remaining without legal documents for several months. 4. Social protection is subject to strict eligibility criteria and complicated administrative requirements, making access difficult for recognised refugees. This leaves them in a worse position than asylum seekers and facing a high risk of social exclusion. 5. No matter how social assistance to the displaced population is organised – whether parallel, aligned or fully integrated into the national social protection system – the explicit or implicit political choices that shape social assistance determine outcomes. Within this context, it is premature to suggest a full integration of the social assistance systems in Greece without an in-depth review of integration and social inclusion policies.

1. Most seasonal workers in Member States are from neighbouring regions and the majority have been admitted under the Seasonal Workers Directive. Ukraine is the most common country of origin. The most common sectors where seasonal workers are employed include agriculture, tourism and manufacturing. 2. In most Member States seasonal workers are important to fill shortages in certain sectors and several Member States have measures in place to attract seasonal workers. These include shorter and simplified procedures, shortening of processing times and cooperation with third countries. 3. Some Member States have made use of the option to limit the rights and protection of seasonal workers, in particular regarding access to unemployment benefits and family benefits. 4. Across the Member States, several agencies are responsible for monitoring of working conditions. Still, cases of abuse might go undetected, as seasonal workers are highly dependent on employers and often do not know their rights. Several Member States have run information campaigns to provide seasonal workers with information on their rights. 5. Several Member States have introduced measures to mitigate the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. These include extension of authorisations for seasonal workers already in the Member States, lifting of travel restrictions for seasonal workers, but also a mobilisation of domestic labour to fill the gaps. In some Member States seasonal workers have gained more visibility and recognition from the public during the COVID-19 pandemic.

1. Policies on the acquisition of citizenship have evolved over the past five years, with Member States reporting trends that have had the impact of making access to citizenship either more liberal or more restrictive. Trends in the numbers of individuals granted citizenship of an EU-28 Member States have shown an overall decline in the period of time covered by the study. 2. The criteria for granting citizenship and the procedures in place are broadly similar across the Member States but the specific conditions and requirements that apply vary considerably, depending on whether more liberal or restrictive policies are in place. Processing times, the costs to applicants and available support were found to all vary significantly. 3. For many aspiring citizens, naturalisation can be a lengthy and costly process, with limited available support, and a positive outcome is in general not guaranteed, even where all conditions have been met. 4. The majority of Member States now allow for dual citizenship, which may acknowledge the demographic reality that many migrants have ties to more than one country. Other Member States - in practice - apply exemptions where the renunciation of a previous citizenship cannot reasonably take place. However, dual citizenship brings both benefits and challenges. 5. Citizenship is seen by Member States as either the culmination of the integration process or as facilitating the integration process. However, in most Member States, third-country nationals are not actively encouraged to apply for citizenship, and support is limit

This Synthesis Report presents the main findings of the European Migration Network (EMN) study ‘Comparative overview of national protection statuses in the European Union (EU) and Norway’. The study explores the key characteristics of non-harmonised protection statuses and the types of national statuses granted by Member States and Norway to address a protection need not covered by international protection statuses as set out in the Qualification Directive or temporary protection in the Temporary Protection Directive. The report includes an overview of national statuses granted by particular protection ground, reviewing the conditions and rights associated with each. It also considers commonalities and differences with the minimum standards established at EU level for the EU-harmonised statuses (refugee status, subsidiary protection and, in one case, temporary protection). This assessment is timely, in light of efforts undertaken since 2016 to strengthen the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) to complement existing legal pathways to admit those in need of protection to the EU, including the proposed Union Resettlement Framework Regulation and, increasingly, other legal pathways for persons in need of protection.

The HEUNI report "Unseen Victims" presents the manifestations and consequences of gender-based violence and the challenges in assisting victims of violence in the migration context. With this report the authors aimed to increase the understanding of policymakers on the structural challenges asylum-seeking and refugee women who have experienced gender-based violence face.

1. Fostering innovation and entrepreneurship is a national policy priority in the vast majority of Member States. This is due to the perceived beneficial impact of entrepreneurship on economies, including job creation; fuelling economic growth and investment; and boosting competitiveness in the globalised knowledge economy. 2. In 17 Member States, attracting innovative entrepreneurs and start-ups from non-EU countries forms part of a general strategy to promote a vibrant entrepreneurial culture. In the rest of the Member States, although fostering innovation and entrepreneurship is a general priority, they do not focus on attracting entrepreneurs from third countries. 3. Thirteen Member States have specific admission schemes in place (mainly residence permits and/ or visas) for start-up founders and innovative entrepreneurs from third countries. With the exception of Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom, the majority of the schemes are still in their infancy, having been introduced in the last three years. 4. A special visa and residence permit to admit third-country national start-up employees currently exists in Cyprus, Estonia, France and Portugal. In the Netherlands, a pilot scheme for key personnel will be introduced in 2020. 5. The design and set up of the start-up schemes differ significantly across the Member States, with a wide variation of admission conditions relating to both the business and the start-up founder. Common to all schemes, however, is that they target a specific type of business, i.e. those that are innovative, scalable and/or with an added value for the national economy and business environment. 6. From those thirteen Member States which have a specific scheme in place, eleven Member States require submission of a business plan. The business plan typically includes information related to the business activity, product or service, market analysis and sources of financing, and is evaluated by a special committee. 7. In 2018, the highest number of applications for start-up schemes was recorded in Estonia (783), followed by Spain (305); Lithuania (178); the Netherlands (127); Finland (108); Italy (92); Ireland (42) and Cyprus (7). In terms of the number of residence permits/visa issued, in 2018, the number was the highest in the UK (1,160 entrepreneur long-term visas issued and 315 graduate entrepreneur visas); followed by France (524 ‘talent’ passports issued), Estonia (422 visas and residence permits issued for entrepreneurs or start-up employees), Spain (104) and the Netherlands (92). The remaining eight Member States issued less than 50 permits each. 8. The existence of a special visa or residence permit to facilitate the immigration of start-up founders and innovative entrepreneurs from third countries has been considered a good practice in some Member States. Although most of the schemes are in their infancy, having a specific admission channel is considered to have helped to attract international start-ups and talent. 9. Member States without a specific scheme use other channels to admit start-up founders. Member States that do not have a specific start-up scheme in place reported that they most commonly admit start-up founders from third countries through long-term visas and residence permits for self-employment and business activities; followed by employment and gainful activities; investor permits and/or for the purposes of studies and research. Due to lack of statistics, there is limited quantitative evidence on the extent to which Member States without a specific scheme are successful in attracting innovative start-ups from third countries. Some qualitative evidence suggests that some Member States, such as Germany and Sweden, attract entrepreneurial individuals via existing admission channels. 10. One of the most important ‘pull’ factors for founders/ employees is the Member State’s start-up scene and the presence of hubs and locations with well-developed ecosystems where start-ups can develop and grow. Socio-economic factors at play include cost of living, salary levels, housing and quality of life. Cultural differences, however, are reported in some Member States to act as a deterrent, for example, due to third-country nationals not being used to the business culture of the Member State. 11. Migration-specific incentives to attract start-up founders and innovative entrepreneurs include: online application systems, fast-track and shortened processing times, reduced documentary requirements, and assistance and support from relevant institutions with the immigration process. 12. Access to funding and investments (e.g. micro-loans) is available for start-ups in most Member States. Funding is available through both state and private sector actors, often provided in cooperation. 13. Common challenges in attracting start-ups and entrepreneurs experienced at macro level by Member States include global competition for talent, comparable opportunities in domestic and other markets, and lack of incubators and accelerators. Challenges at micro level include burdensome administrative procedures and lengthy application times

1. Authorities in several Member States, Norway and Switzerland observed travels of beneficiaries of international protection (hereafter BIPs) to their country of origin. To date, the exact extent of the number of BIPs travelling to their country of origin remains difficult to estimate. In addition, available data in a few States of the number of decisions to withdraw international protection motivated by travels to the country of origin shows these numbers are low overall. Between 2015 and 2018, increased attention given to this issue in some Member States, as evidenced in national parliamentary debates and media reports, contributed to changes to national policies and practices, as well as changes in legislation to provide national authorities with supplementary means to address and monitor such travels and contacts. 2. Where some evidence of contacts with authorities of and travelling to the country of origin become known, they are weighed differently by competent authorities in the Member States, Norway and Switzerland. In a majority of States, contacting authorities of and/or travelling to the country of origin can be considered as an indication that international protection may no longer be required. However, the act alone would not automatically lead to cessation. This type of evidence could lead national authorities to examine the purpose of the contact(s) and/or travel(s). 3. There are numerous reasons BIPs contact the authorities of their country of origin or travel there. As observed by national authorities, the most commonly invoked motives to travel related to: visiting family members, illness, and attending weddings or funerals. Generally BIPs contacting the authorities of their country of origin (in the State of protection) was not contentious, except in cases whereby the contact led to the allocation or renewal of a passport. Other circumstances have also been taken into account to verify whether re-availment of protection or re-establishment could be concluded, including: voluntariness of these acts, length of stay in the country of origin, and frequency of contacts or travels. Thus the circumstances of each case and criteria set out in EU and national asylum law need to be jointly assessed to justify the cessation of protection. 4. The assessment of a BIP’s travel and of its impact on his/her protection status is generally a challenging task for national authorities, as is obtaining undisputable and objective evidence that the person had travelled to his/her country of origin. Even where national authorities are aware of the travel, they may still face challenges in verifying information on the motives of the travel and other circumstances relating to the nature of activities pursued by BIPs during their stay in the country of origin. 5. A majority of States informed BIPs about the potential consequences of travelling to their country of origin by including travel limitations on the refugee travel document, indicating that it was not valid for travel to the country of origin. Additional channels used to inform about consequences on the protection status included delivering this information orally or in writing, at the moment of issuing the protection status decision or upon request. 6. In all States, the withdrawal of protection status also can have consequences for the right of residence of a (former) BIP on the territory of the State concerned. While in some States, the withdrawal of protection status was automatically followed by a decision to end their right of residence, most States examined the individual circumstances of the person concerned. National authorities thus generally consider whether the conditions for other legal grounds to stay (subsidiary or national protection status, residence based on legal migration reasons) would be fulfilled by the individual concerned. 7. A reassessment of international protection status, withdrawal of protection and/or end of right to stay of a (former) BIP could also affect the international protection status and right of residence of his/her family members and/ or dependants. In most States, this depends on how family members obtained their status. Where the right of a family member derives from the protection status of a BIP, the right to stay generally ends at the same time as the BIP’s loss of status and residence permit. Where family members were granted their own protection status separately, withdrawal of protection status of a BIP would not automatically lead to the withdrawal of protection of his/her other family members. However, reassessment of the BIP’s protection status on cessation grounds could lead national authorities to check whether circumstances granting protection status of the family member were still valid.

Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) have been part of the “Balkan route” for smuggling people, arms and drugs for decades, but also a migrant route for people who have been trying to reach Western Europe and the countries of the EU in order to save their lives and secure a future for themselves. While in 2015, when millions of people arrived in Europe over a short period of time, BiH was bypassed by mass movements, the situation started changing after the closure of the EU borders in 2016, and later on, in 2017, with the increase of violence and push backs in Croatia, and other countries at the EU borders. This report offers insight into the situation on the field: is there a system responsible for protection, security, and upholding fundamental human rights? What has the state response been like? What is the role of the international community?

1. Almost half of all Member States consider attracting and retaining international students a policy priority, although the degree to which this is a priority significantly differed across Member States. Other policy priorities such as preventing misuse of this legal migration channel for third-country nationals were also identified. 2. The number of international students coming to the EU to undertake their studies has increased steadily over the recent years. In 2017, over 460 000 first residence permits were issued for study reasons in the EU. The most popular destinations for international students coming to the EU in 2017 were the United Kingdom, France and Germany which issued around half of all first residence permits for study reasons in the EU. In terms of the share of third-country nationals of all students, data for 2017 for 14 Member States showed that the highest share of international students from all students was in Cyprus (18 %), Germany (10 %), Hungary (9 %), Ireland (8 %) and Latvia (8 %). 3. The highest number of international students came to the EU from China, the United States and India. 4. The main policy drivers for attracting and retaining international students included the internationalisation of HEIs and increasing financial revenue for the higher education sector, contributing to economic growth by increasing the national pool of qualified labour and addressing specific (skilled) labour shortages plus tackling demographic change. 5. Both national governments and HEIs alike were found to implement comprehensive promotional activities and campaigns in many Member States to attract international students, often combining their efforts. The most common approaches in place to attract international students were promotional activities and dissemination of information targeted at prospective international students, in some cases, taking place directly in selected countries of origin. 6. Member States identified a number of common challenges in attracting international students. These included: limited availability of courses taught in foreign languages, especially in English; lengthy processing times of applications for visas and residence permits, especially for Member States with insufficient representation in third countries; insufficient promotional activities and scholarship opportunities; as well as (affordable) housing shortages. 7. Post study retention measures were found to be in place in the majority of Member States and were mostly policy-related, seeking to facilitate access to the labour market by eliminating certain restrictions to labour market access for international graduates. 8. Some factors which significantly contributed to student attraction did not necessarily benefit student retention. Programmes taught in English have had positive impacts on attracting international students to Member States but can hamper the longterm integration of international students into the labour market, unless language learning and other integration measures take place during the period of study. 9. Member States aim to balance policies to attract and retain international students with measures to prevent abuse of the student route for other migration purposes by ensuring opportunities to study and work are made available only to those with a genuine intention to pursue higher education in the EU. 10. Bilateral and multilateral agreements with third countries have created important frameworks for cooperation, including in relation to student mobility. The majority of these agreements were aimed at exchanging experiences and practices, teachers, students and researchers, as well as the establishment of fellowships

The purpose of this handbook is to describe a counselling method for assisting refugee women who have been victims of gender-based violence (GBV). The handbook was developed during 2017-2019 in a project titled “Co-creating a counselling method for refugee women GBV victims (CCM-GBV)” funded by the European Commission through the Rights, Equality and Citizenship (REC) Programme.