Normes et liens culturels

This project explores changes in migration and conflict at the end of the Bronze Age (ca.1300-1000 BC) and their relevance for understanding the collapse of Europe’s first urban civilisation in the Aegean and proto-urban groups of the Balkans. The objective is to uncover the human face of this turning point in European prehistory by directly tracing the movement of people and the spread of new social practices across cultural boundaries. Hotly debated ancient tales of migrations are tested for the first time using recent advances in genetic and isotopic methods that can measure human mobility. Combined with mortuary research, this will precisely define relations between personal mobility and status, gender, identity and health to explore social scenarios in which people moved between groups. To better understand the context of mobility, the project also evaluates social networks through which cultural traditions moved within and between distinct societies. For this purpose, regionally particular ways for making and using objects are analysed to explore how practices were exchanged and how types of objects shaped, and were shaped by, their new contexts of use. Metalwork is chosen for this research because new forms came to be widely shared across the region during the crisis, and we can employ a novel suite of analytic methods that explore how this material exposes wider social changes. As personal and cultural mobility took place in social landscapes, the changing strategies for controlling access and mobility in settlement organisation are next explored. The character and causes of conflicts arising through these diverse venues for interaction are identified and we assess if they were catalysts for, or consequences of, unstable social systems. THE FALL uses new primary research to test how this interplay between local developments, cultural transmissions and movement of people shaped the processes and events leading to the collapse of these early complex societies.

The topic of this report is parenting and social control, with a particular focus on immigrant families from Pakistan, Somalia and Sri Lanka. The empirical analyses fall into three parts: A quantitative analysis of attitudes to gender roles, sexuality and relationships in immigrant families and the scope of parental restrictions, as well as analyses of the driving forces and development of social control. We ask questions about the attitudes that are found in various groups with regard to issues of gender roles and sexuality among adolescents. Furthermore, we identify those who are most at risk of being subject to strict parental restrictions, and what kinds of consequences these may entail for the life of young people. A qualitative analysis of the parents’ subjective concerns with regard to raising children and adolescents in Norway, based on individual and group interviews with parents. Here, we will focus on the parents’ perspectives and their experiences of and grounds for the way in which they exercise social control. A qualitative analysis of complexity and social change in family relationships in a migration context, based on interviews with parents, adolescents and young adults, as well as professionals in the assistance services. Here, we focus on the experiences of the young people and relationships within families, with a special emphasis on mechanisms of social change. Quantitative analyses of attitudes and social control Based on the adolescents’ assessments of their parents’ attitudes, we find that the parental generation from countries such as Pakistan, Somalia and Sri Lanka, as well as other immigrant groups from the global South, are far more conservative in issues concerning pre-marital sex, homosexuality and letting adolescents in upper secondary school age have boy-/girlfriends, when compared to the population in general. Attitudes to gender roles and sexuality are closely linked to religion—both the degree of religiosity and affiliation with specific religious communities have an effect. Muslim immigrants appear to be the most conservative, but other religious groups are also far more conservative in such issues than the general population. We also find major variations in attitudes between different groups among adolescents, but the young people tend to see themselves as considerably more liberal than their parents. A substantial minority within some immigrant groups reports what may be referred to as severe parental restrictions on their social life. For example, 29 per cent of all girls from a Pakistani background in the first year of upper secondary school in Oslo and Akershus report that it is very or fairly true that their parents object to them ‘being in the company of persons of the opposite gender in their leisure time with no adults present’. The degree of parental control is directly linked to the parents’ cultural orientation and degree of religious conviction. The more concerned the parents are to preserve the culture of their country of origin, the stronger the likelihood that the adolescents will be exposed to strict parental control. There is also a certain correlation with the parents’ socioeconomic status, but this effect is far weaker. Adolescents who receive good grades in school, however, tend to report fewer parental restrictions than peers with poorer school performance. Boys and girls tend to experience somewhat different forms of social control. While boys in fact more often report restrictions on being with friends, girls more frequently report that their parents object to them being with someone of the opposite gender without adult supervision. Among Muslims, girls report more parental restrictions than boys, whereas the opposite is the case in some other groups. We may assume that some boys have greater expectations regarding their own freedom and thus have a lower threshold for reporting parental restrictions. In addition, the qualitative interviews indicate that even though boys and girls may be subject to equally strict rules, violations made by girls are seen as far more serious. Adolescents who are born in Norway to immigrant parents are less exposed to parental restrictions than those who have immigrated themselves, and the degree of parental restrictions diminishes markedly in pace with increased length of residence in the family. This reduction in parental restrictions appears to also occur in families that retain a conservative attitude to adolescent gender roles and sexuality. The analyses indicate that parental restrictions have considerable consequences for the lives of young people. Reports of parental restrictions are associated with lower rates of participation in organised leisure activities and a higher likelihood of reporting mental afflictions and low self-esteem. Some young people appear to lead what may be termed ‘double lives’ in conflict with their parents’ wishes. For example, a considerable proportion of minority youths have a boy-/girlfriend, even though they believe that their parents would strongly disapprove of this. Parental perspectives on raising adolescents in a foreign culture In the second section of the empirical analyses we have attempted to give a voice to the generation of parents among immigrants from Pakistan, Somalia and Sri Lanka and their concerns linked to being a parent in Norway. We place special emphasis on older and relatively conservative parents, since they clearly articulate topics that to a greater or lesser extent are of concern for others as well. Many of the parents whom we interviewed report missing a larger social collective from which to seek support in raising children, and often feeling alone with the responsibility for the children. In their countries of origin, raising children tends to be more of a communal responsibility that involves the extended family, relatives and the local community, and where key norms are shared in all the different arenas that the children frequent. The loss of this community, the feeling of dissolution of family bonds and of being alone when facing a strange and foreign world were among the recurring topics in interviews with the parents. Some also express frustration over the fact that the children, in their opinion, fail to uphold the community norms that prevailed in their own youth. Individualism—often interpreted as egotism—and liberal attitudes to substance use and sexuality are perceived as especially threatening aspects of Norwegian society. In addition, some parents see that their traditional instruments for maintaining discipline and control, including corporal punishment, shared religious norms and support from the extended family, are unavailable here. Some therefore feel that they are unable to adequately exercise parental and social control. Some are also uncertain of what is considered acceptable in terms of setting boundaries for children in Norwegian society. Some parents feel that their religion, identity and culture are under pressure from the wider society. To some extent, this is a reflection of uncertainty and fear in the encounter with the unknown. However, this perception also reflects a real conflict between different ways of regulating social life: Should adolescents be regarded as citizens with independent rights and autonomy, or are their rights and duties primarily derived from their membership in a family collective with sovereign authority over its members? This conflict between a collectivist and religious family organisation on the one hand and secular-state individualism on the other is partly expressed in the form of an ambivalent relationship toward schools. Immigrant parents tend to have strongly positive attitudes to school and education, but in matters related to swimming lessons for boys and girls, summer camps, showering after PE classes etc. some parents feel that their wishes are being ignored. The state/family conflict emerges with particular clarity in the form of families’ fear of the child protection service, which some parents see as a constant threat and an invasion of the family’s sovereignty. The maintenance of traditional marriage institutions is perceived by many as the key to perpetuating family structure, faith and identity, and concern for the children’s future marriage is a main factor in the execution of social control. In the background lurks the fear of being sent to a nursing home, which for some is a symbol of the consequences should they fail to preserve traditional family structures. For some parents, there is thus a lot at stake in their parenting practices. There are major individual variations between different families and parents in all three groups with regard to the strength of these concerns. However, there are also systematic differences between the groups that are worth noting. The first difference concerns the ‘glue’ in the social networks that binds them together. Although the Pakistani, Somali and Tamil informants were all concerned with family dissolution as a result of migration, there were considerable differences with regard to their concrete social organisation. The Somali group stood out at one end of the scale, by having largely fragmented social networks and many families with dissolved family structures. As many as 6 out of 10 adolescents with a Somali background reported that they did not live with both parents together. The Tamil group with a background from Sri Lanka stood out at the other end, by having largely succeeded in reconstructing closely knit social networks that provide considerable support for individual families, organised within the framework of the Tamil diaspora movement. The second difference pertains to the perception of identity conflict. Some of the parents in both the Somali and Pakistani groups felt that, to some extent, their wish to perpetuate their cultural and religious identity conflicted with the intentions of the Norwegian state regarding their children. The Tamils were also concerned with preserving their own identity, but for them, this was a matter of language, rather than religion, and they far less frequently stated that this was antagonistic to their integration in the wider society. Inter-generational relations and social change The interviews with adolescents and young adults underscore the social complexity in relationships characterised by strong social control. Adolescents and parents are both part of networks and relationships in which many of the participants experience mutually incompatible demands and expectations—not only to their own lifestyle, but also in terms of how they should relate to that of others. It is thus not always so easy to identify those who exercise social control and those who are being controlled, since there are many—including parents, siblings and other relatives—who may feel that they are caught ‘between a rock and a hard place’, squeezed between the expectations of others. The way in which adolescents perceive being subject to strong social control will largely depend on their own attitudes and adaptations. For example, internalising the family’s expectations is one way to ensure avoidance of conflicts while being able to perceive autonomy and independence in daily life. Others choose to embrace a religious identity as a way to distance themselves from the family’s demands, while committing to a set of life rules that ensure acceptance and legitimacy. Some enter into conflict, in the form of breaking out and settling scores or fighting small everyday battles. Many live so-called ‘double lives’, shifting between varying expectations and demands in different arenas. However, one effect of such ‘double lives’ is that relationships become potentially vulnerable—the consequences are felt only when something ‘goes wrong’. Inter-generational conflicts in relationships characterised by strong social control cannot be understood only as value conflicts; they also take the form of negotiations, where various resources can be brought into the bargain. For many young people, however, conflicts of interest between different generations appear as internalised value conflicts, such as the parents’ concern regarding who will take care of them in their old age. We identify a number of social mechanisms that, over time, will bring about change in the direction of more liberal parenting practices. These are partly changes that follow from learning and adaptation, and partly changes that follow from conflicts. Over time, many families feel that their points of reference gradually change and the idealised images of the perfect family have a tendency to pale. In some communities, their notion of ‘scandal’ erodes, and the fear of what others might say loses some of its hold as time passes. Furthermore, many parents discover through trial and error that traditional authoritarian parenting styles function poorly in Norway. Many report that they have been ‘forced’ to change their methods in seeking to transfer their values to the children. In addition, we can see that the institutional frameworks in Norwegian society—which provide women and children with far better legal protection and access to resources—help give small and large internal family conflicts a different outcome than what would have been seen in the countries of origin. Increasing levels of education, especially among girls in the second generation, also help change the balance of power and the bargaining situation in ways that gradually change the rules of the game in the families. Religion plays an ambiguous role in these processes of change. Religion is the source of demands and restrictions related to gender segregation and chastity, and religious arguments lend weight and legitimacy to the execution of social control, with a conservative effect. At the same time, we can see that changes in family practices are accompanied by a more liberal and individualist interpretation of religion in the younger generation. For some, religiously based arguments may even provide a weighty case for liberation from the more culturally based expectations from the parents’ generation. The report is concluded with some reflections around the implications for policy-oriented work in this area.

To understand female migration and its interrelation with socio-economic development, a consideration of the selectivity of female migrants, their characteristics and differences with respect to female non-migrants as well as male migrants together with an analysis of the forces leading to such selectivity is an important first step. The general structural determinants of female migration have been categorized as: (i) those related to the economic development context and stemming mostly from government policies that influenced gender-based economic opportunities and constraints in areas of origin and destination; (ii) those determinants related to institutional factors that maintained gender inequalities; (iii) those determinants arising from the socio-cultural system of gender roles and relations operating in accordance with prevalent norms, values and expectations. The promotion of equal employment opportunities for men and women is needed: it is important to prevent the perpetuation of segmented labor markets. At the household level, migration might be treated as part of a household strategy of risk diversification wherein a member of the household is encouraged or helped to migrate so as to send back remittances. Finally, it should be noted that the outcome of migration for women varies considerably according to the socio-cultural and family contexts in which migration takes place.. / Pour comprendre le phénomène de la migration féminine et ses liens avec le développement socio-économique, il convient d’étudier, dans un premier temps, la sélectivité des migrantes, leurs caractéristiques et différences par rapport aux femmes non-migrantes et aux migrants de sexe masculin, ainsi que d’analyser les forces conduisant à une telle sélectivité. Les déterminants structurels généraux de la migration féminine ont été classés comme suit : 1) déterminants liés au contexte du développement économique et provenant principalement de politiques gouvernementales ayant influencé les opportunités économiques et les contraintes dans les zones d'origine et de destination dans une perspective de genre; 2) déterminants liés à des facteurs institutionnels maintenant les inégalités entre les sexes; 3) déterminants découlant du système socio-culturel des rôles et des relations entre les sexes et s’appuyant sur les normes et valeurs courantes. La promotion de l'égalité des chances entre les hommes et les femmes est nécessaire. Il est, de fait, important d'empêcher la perpétuation des marchés du travail segmentés. Au niveau des ménages, la migration peut également être considérée comme partie prenante d'une stratégie de diversification des risques des ménages au sein desquels un membre est encouragé à migrer afin de bénéficier des envois de fonds. Enfin, il convient de noter que le résultat de la migration pour les femmes varie considérablement selon les contextes socio-culturels et familiaux dans lesquels cette migration a eu lieu.

The central research question of this project is: how have different traditions of national identity, citizenship, and church-state relations affected European immigration countries’ incorporation of Islam, and what are the consequences of these approaches for patterns of cultural distance and interaction between Muslim immigrants and their descendants, and the receiving society? We answer this question by focusing on three specific research questions: (1) What are the differences between European immigration countries in how they deal with cultural and religious differences of immigrant groups in general, and of Muslims in particular? This question has two aspects. First, the more formal aspect of legislation and jurisprudence, which we will address by way of gathering a systematic set of cross-national indicators using secondary sources. Secondly, cultural relations are also affected importantly by how conceptions of national identity, citizenship, church-state relations, and the position of Islam in relation to these, are framed and contested in the public sphere. (2) To what extent do we find differences across immigration countries in cultural distance and patterns of interaction between various Muslim immigrant groups and the receiving society population? On the one hand, we will focus here on attitudes, norms, and values. On the other hand, we will look at cultural and religious resources and practices. (3) To what extent can cross-national differences in cultural distance and patterns of interethnic and interreligious interaction be explained by the different approaches that immigration countries have followed towards the management of cultural difference in general, and Islam in particular?

The project outlines an ambitious research agenda, addressing challenges to sustaining the welfare and working life model in an era of increasing immigration and ethnic diversity. The project is comprehensive, covering the essential elements of sustaining the welfare state in the diversified society: The economic integration of immigrants; the impacts of exposure to ethnic diversity; and the role of ancestry culture for integration across generations. The project is innovative. We combine state-of-the art econometric methods and analyses of data from large administrative registers, field and laboratory experiments, and surveys. The register data cover longitudinal records for the full population over 25 years, including residence, education, work, and welfare, augmented with novel microdata on political participation. We study effects of exposure on trust in field experiments coordinated with the army and in analyses of election outcomes. We examine the roles of ancestry culture and gender norms in incentivized laboratory experiments, survey data, and epidemiological analyses that combine register data for the second generation and cultural indicators from the parental ancestry country. The project has strong policy relevance. It investigates directly the effects of programs targeted at newly arrived refugees and income requirements for family reunification on long-term labor market integration, as well as political participation in the immigrant population. For each program, we have identified explicit strategies for causal analysis. The project is multidisciplinary, bringing together a team of leading Norwegian researchers and distinguished international scholars from the fields of Economics, Political Science, Psychology, and Sociology.

"Theoretical background and objectives Across many advanced democracies – albeit to varying extents and in different forms – we observe a growing distance between the positions taken by political elites, and those of mass publics and electorates. This elite-mass divide has crystallised in a limited number of issue areas, which are often related to globalisation and denationalisation, in their political, socio-cultural, and economic forms. It shows that the denationalisation of markets, governance structures, and migration flows entails not only an aggregate growth in opportunities and wealth, but also a reconfiguration of power, wealth, and status between different classes of actors within national political systems as well as between supranational and national institutions. In the national political arena, various globalisation processes led to tensions in many countries reflected in the rise of populist movements and parties on the left and right. On the international level, inter­national institutions are not any more seen as just functional agencies to foster coordination between governments, but increasingly as sites of political authority and arenas of political contestation. Against this background, we ask: (1) To which extent do these different conflicts follow a similar logic and can be described as a ""new political cleavage""? (2) Whether the positions of the two sides of such a cleavage are already embedded in encompassing normative foundations which we may label as cosmopolitanism and communitarianism? (3) To what extent does the appropriate handling of such a conflict require a significant change in the landscape of political institutions? This research project feeds into three themes with far-reaching implications for understanding new social conflicts in globalising societies: (1) Part of the success of the modern nation-state was its ability to successfully institutionalise social and political cleavages. To the extent that new political cleavages challenge the role of political institutions of the nation-state as such and that some players use political arenas outside of the traditional nation-state realm for their purposes, the classical patterns of legitimacy and decision-making in national democracies get undermined. (2) International institutions, such as the WTO or environmental regimes, were successful in acting as, more or less, technical agencies under firm control of the executives of the member states. To the extent that these international institutions exercise authority and thus become an arena of political contestation, their ""technical"" foundation of success gets challenged as well. This mechanism applies in general, albeit in different forms, to the EU as well. (3) Migration and integration have been seen for a long time as issues of social relevance, but only with limited impact on the core of national political institutions. To the extent that this cultural component of the new cleavage becomes dominant, migration and integration will move closer to the centre of political competition and will eventually change norms, rules, and procedures within the national political systems. Research design, data and methodology There are three empirical modules in this project: In Module 1 we will investigate the following aspects: ""objective"" representation deficits, the subjective perception of them, the emergence of populist parties and the consequences for political conflict as well as democracy's capacity to reproduce their legitimacy. Moreover, it will extend the cross-country comparison from Europe to Latin America, where a major reaction to globalisation and its socio-economic consequences is not exclusive against immigration, but rather inclusive towards the marginalised underclass of their countries. In Module 2 we address the question why elites tend to have and act according to a more cosmopolitan world view than their citizens/electorates. While it seems plausible to assume that modest cosmopolitan positions are more widespread among political elites than among citizens, it is less obvious that especially economic elites are also widely committed to more ambitious cosmopolitan positions such as the constitutionalisation of global governance. On the one hand, the project seeks to explain why political elites are more cosmopolitan than citizens/electorates but also what the determinants of the emergence of different forms of cosmopolitanism among different elites are and how it clashes with different variants of communitarian inclinations of many ""normal"" citizens. In Module 3 we undertake an inquiry into the question about the relative distribution of (different types of) cosmopolitanism and communitarianism across different political arenas (supranational, international, transnational, national and regional). We assume that cosmopo­litan positions dominate the political arenas beyond the nation-state and use them mainly for purposes of agenda-setting and compliance with international norms within nation-states. In this way, they can strengthen their position in national political arenas without being necessarily in the majority position. At the same time, communitarian political forces are put into the defence and appear parochial. We will develop a distinct type of political sociology covering cosmopolitanism and communi­tarianism along the three mentioned paths of enquiry. The first project component focuses mainly, but not exclusively, on the first research module and will rely primarily on secondary analysis of population surveys and party programme data. We can therefore take a large-N approach and investigate a wide range of countries. Components two and three of the research project require the creation of primary data. We plan to apply three types of analysis in order to investigate the issues mentioned in research modules two and three: (1) A content and frame analysis of pro-cosmopolitan and pro-communitarian opinion articles in elite newspapers and weeklies as well as in opinion articles in tabloid newspapers. (2) An online questionnaire among members of the political elite (local, regional, national politicians/party functionaries and European/international functionaries as well as NGO representatives) measuring cosmopolita­nism and communitarianism items that are also available in existing representative population surveys, allowing a comparison between elite and mass opinions. (3) An analysis of the major focus of political activity when pursuing the cosmopolitan agenda. The hypothesis to be tested here is that cosmopolitans and communitarians act on different playing fields thus making the direct political confrontation impossible."

One of the major challenges confronting new entrants to a country is how to manage their cultural identity as they are exposed to the competing values, norms, and behavioral expectations that exist between their culture of origin and the new local culture. Whether they arrive as sojourners or long-term immigrants, entrants are faced with a fundamental dilemma of whether and to what degree they should maintain their original cultural identity and in what part they should adopt the new host culture. Although many have touted the benefits of second-culture exposure, researchers have failed to consider how the differential patterns of cultural identification that individuals adopt may provide important traction in predicting performance advantages. Moreover, the process by which individuals absorb a cultural identity, the role played by second-culture exposure in shaping socio-cognitive skills, and the resulting implications for performance have also received little theoretical and empirical attention. By drawing on a diverse set of research methodologies and by working at multiple levels of analyses, the comprehensive research agenda outlined in this proposal is aimed at addressing these knowledge gaps in 3 ways. First, I will investigate the potential benefits of biculturalism, relative to other acculturation strategies, for social tolerance, creativity, decision-making, and negotiation outcomes. Second, I will explore the role of integrative complexity as the underlying mediating mechanism linking biculturalism and performance-related success. Finally, I will examine the antecedents of biculturalism and test the boundary conditions of biculturals’ advantage. The proposed research will afford psychologists with a greater understanding of the bicultural experience, its antecedents, and its consequences as well as present organizational scholars, practitioners, and policy makers with a comprehensive framework for how to successfully manage cultural diversity.

La connaissance de l’alimentation des migrants en France est encore très limitée. Pourtant elle constitue un enjeu important pour une meilleure compréhension mutuelle des populations, pour l’économie agroalimentaire et pour les politiques de santé publique et d’action sociale. Les objectifs de cette recherche sont de caractériser les styles alimentaires (systèmes de pratiques, d’attitudes, de normes et de représentations) et d’évaluer le bien-être alimentaire des Marocains et des Maliens, en France et dans leurs pays d’origine. Ces groupes sont largement représentés dans la population migrante vivant en France. Ils commencent à être étudiés, dans leurs pays d’origine, par deux des partenaires du projet, ce qui a contribué au choix de ces deux pays. Ils vivent des mutations rapides dans leurs modes de vie et d’alimentation, tant en France que dans leurs pays d’origine. Dans les deux cas, leurs conditions de vie sont souvent précaires, ce qui les rend particulièrement vulnérables à certains risques de santé (carences, obésité et pathologies). Au-delà des migrants, cette recherche vise à comprendre les mécanismes de recomposition, d’agencement, de métissage, voire d’abandon des normes dans un environnement caractérisé par leur multiplicité. Il s’agit également d’évaluer les effets d’une individualisation croissante des choix et des pratiques alimentaires, à l’œuvre au niveau global. Même si ces processus sont particulièrement visibles chez les migrants, ils sont aussi révélateurs des dynamiques alimentaires de la société française dans son ensemble. La complémentarité des approches qualitative (entretiens individuels, « focus group », observation in vivo) et quantitative (enquêtes par questionnaire auprès de 3000 individus au total en milieux rural et urbain au Maroc, au Mali et en France) permettra de couvrir une diversité de situations et autorisera des comparaisons à valeur de représentativité statistique. La démarche comparatiste entre pays d’origine et de résidence est en outre très peu courante en sciences sociales appliquées à l’alimentation. Le regard pluridisciplinaire de l’équipe, composée de sociologues, d’économistes et de nutritionnistes, spécialistes des pays du Nord et du Sud, renforcera la robustesse scientifique de la recherche. Les apports scientifiques sont doubles. D’une part, cette recherche viendra enrichir un corpus scientifique non constitué sur les liens entre alimentation et migration. D’autre part, le projet ambitionne de développer un questionnaire sur les représentations, les pratiques alimentaire et les indicateurs du bien-être alimentaire, intégrant à la fois des caractéristiques objectives (comme les indicateurs anthropométriques), mais aussi des indicateurs plus subjectifs, renvoyant aux affects associés aux expériences vécues en lien avec l’alimentation. Les résultats obtenus contribueront à la définition des politiques d’alimentation (attentes et besoins spécifiques en termes de produits, de qualité de l’offre, demande pour les aliments ou plats ethniques,...), de santé publique et de nutrition (éducation, communication) et d’action sociale (dialogue, intégration,..). Les enquêtes menées au Maroc et au Mali fourniront également des informations novatrices sur la sécurité alimentaire et ses déterminants, utiles à la fois pour les pouvoirs publics de ces pays et pour les institutions de coopération internationale et d’aide au développement.