Libya

The 2011 Libyan civil war, part of the wider Arab Spring, triggered considerable population displacements. These displacements included both Libyans and third-country nationals fleeing the country by land, air and sea. Data available for spring/summer 2011 shows that an estimated 1,128,985 people left Libya to seek shelter in Tunisia, Egypt, Niger, Algeria, Chad and Sudan as well as in Malta and Italy. Research has, thus far, mainly focused on the response of the international community (UNHCR and IOM, above all), the European Union and individual countries in dealing with large numbers of displaced persons (Kelly and Wadud 2012, Fargues and Fandrich 2012, Tucci 2012, Forced Migration Review 2012). Less attention has been given to those regional entities of which Libya has been a member. These include: the African Union (AU), the League of Arab States (LAS), the Community of Sahel Saharan States (CEN-SAD), the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the Organization for the Islamic Conference (OIC). The aim of this paper is, therefore, to shed light on the (actual and potential) role of these regional organizations in alleviating those fleeing from Libya.

As part of the East Africa Migration Route Initiative (EAMRI), the United Kingdom Home Office, with the support of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, had tasked the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) to implement the East Africa Migration Route Gaps and Needs Analysis project, to establish a clearer picture of migration flows and trends as well as migration management capacities and frameworks in place in East Africa. The project consisted of two phases: a desk research phase, concluded with the “East Africa Migration Route Report”, and a field research phase to validate and complete the findings of the preceding desk analysis. The “East Africa Migration Route Report” had recommended focussing the field research on three countries placed along the East Africa migration route – Ethiopia, Kenya and Libya - stating that they merited “further attention in the EU’s effort to understand migration flows in East Africa.”1 The report at hand is the result of the field research missions to Ethiopia, Kenya and Libya, which took place between December 2007 and February 2008. During the missions a broad range of stakeholders were consulted on the migration flows to/through/from, and migration trends in, Ethiopia, Kenya and Libya. Migration management capacities and needs of relevant authorities were also assessed.

Libya, a country that gained independence in 1951, has known only two contradictory regimes: a monarchy from 1951-1969, and a revolution since 1969. With oil as its main source of revenue, and after ten years of UN backed-sanctions, in addition to a decade of public sector dominance, Libya suffers from both brain drain and brain waste. The active Libyan market of today, after its return to the international community, and given decades of economic and administrative instability, requires skilled and unskilled labour. Libya’s labour policies have always been motivated by politics. There has not been a labour strategy, and the need for skilled labour has been a constant in a rich country with only six million inhabitants.Libya today is country full of promise that offers opportunities to its own citizens. It is still, however, unable either to contain brain waste, or to stop brain drain, especially in the medical field. The private sector which has been reactivated after years of public sector dominance is hungry for labour and regulation is imminent. Economic activities, in infrastructure and building for example, need the labour market, private and public, to be properly regulated. La Libye, devenue indépendante en 1951, n’a connu que deux régimes opposés : une monarchie de 1951 à 1969 et une révolution depuis 1969. Avec le pétrole comme principale source de revenu, après dix ans de sanctions onusiennes, et une décennie de prédominance du secteur public, la Libye subit à la fois une fuite et un gaspillage des cerveaux. Le marché du travail libyen actuel requiert de la main d’oeuvre qualifiée et non qualifiée depuis son retour sur la scène internationale après des décennies d’instabilité économique et administrative. Les politiques de l’emploi libyennes ont toujours été motivées par la politique. En l’absence de stratégie de l’emploi, le besoin de main d’œuvre est une constante dans ce pays riche pourvu de seulement six millions d’habitants.La Libye d’aujourd’hui est un pays plein de promesses, porteur d’opportunités pour ses citoyens. Elle est cependant encore incapable de réduire le gaspillage des cerveaux et de stopper la fuite des cerveaux, surtout dans le domaine médical. Le secteur privé, réactivé après des décennies de domination publique, a faim de main d’œuvre et la régulation est imminente. Les activités économiques, dans les infrastructures ou le bâtiment par exemple, ont besoin d’un marché du travail, public comme privé, réglementé.

Libya with its 4,000 km of land and 1,700 km of coast frontiers is one of Africa’s main hubs for irregular migrants, especially those en route to Europe. A rich country with high oil revenues, Libya has, on its southern borders, poverty-stricken and unstable sub Saharan countries; and is an attractive destination for neighboring Arab states workers, seeking employment. Libyan foreign policy during the late eighties and the nineties, encouraged African and Arab irregular workers to come to Libya. Their presence was permissible. However, once Libya became an irregular migration hub and certain internal problems came to the surface relating to irregular migration, Libya discovered its lack of legal instruments to face this reality. Moreover, the reactivation of the Libyan private sector after more than a decade of a dominant public sector, led to disorder in the rapidly developing labour market. In labour market terms, Libyan legislative policy was reactive rather than strategic. The Libyan government, including the Ministry of Manpower, issued decisions to better organize the work market, while laws issued in the 1970s and 1980s are still in force and clogging up the system. Moreover, decisions dating from periods of Arab and African enthusiasm remain operative. All this led to discrepancies in Libyan legislation. Libya today is in need of strategic long-term legislative policy towards foreign workers in general, and those in the private sector in particular. Résumé Avec ses 4 000 kilomètres de frontières terrestres et 1 700 kilomètres de frontières côtières, la Libye est un pivot pour les migrants irréguliers, en particulier pour ceux en partance vers l’Europe. Pays riche du fait de ses revenus pétroliers, ses frontières méridionales sont bordées par des Etats subsahariens instables et enserrés dans la pauvreté, et elle constitue une destination attractive pour les travailleurs des pays arabes voisins à la recherche d’un emploi. La politique étrangère libyenne des années 80 et 90 encouragea les travailleurs irréguliers africains et arabes à venir dans le pays. Leur présence était tolérée. Cependant, lorsque la Libye devint un nœud de la migration irrégulière et que certains problèmes internes remontèrent à la surface en ce qui concerne la migration irrégulière, elle découvrit son manque d’instruments juridiques pour faire face à la réalité. De plus, la réactivation du secteur privé libyen après plus d’une décennie de domination du secteur public créa un désordre sur le marché du travail alors en développement rapide. En termes de marché du travail, la politique législative libyenne était plus réactive que stratégique. Des décisions visant une meilleure organisation du marché du travail ont été adoptées par le gouvernement libyen, y compris le ministère de la main d’œuvre, tandis que les lois des années 70 et 80 restent en vigueur et grèvent le système. Les décisions datant des périodes d’enthousiasme arabe et africain demeurent elles aussi opérantes. Tout ceci conduisit à des contradictions dans la législation libyenne. La Libye a aujourd’hui besoin d’une politique législative stratégique sur le long terme concernant les travailleurs étrangers en général, et ceux du secteur privé en particulier.

This paper provides a statistical assessment of migration before and after the uprisings in the Southern Mediterranean. It will review European and Arab state policies regarding migration and will ultimately encourage the factoring of the outcomes of the Arab Spring within migration policies on both shores of the Mediterranean. The assessment is based upon the most recent statistical data gathered directly from the competent offices in European Member States; from policy documents emanating from the European Union and concerned States; and from first-hand accounts from surveys conducted in Spring 2012 by scholars in six Arab countries (within Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon) in collaboration with the Migration Policy Centre (MPC). Notably, migration to Europe has not been accelerated by the Arab Spring, apart from a short-lived movement from Tunisia, but has simply continued along previous trends. In sharp contrast, migration within the Southern Mediterranean has been deeply impacted by the events as outflows of migrants and refugees fled instability and violence in Libya and Syria.

This report covers migration in 18 EU neighbouring countries, including: Algeria; Armenia; Azerbaijan; Belarus; Egypt; Georgia; Jordan; Lebanon; Libya; Mauritania; Moldova; Morocco; Palestine; Russia; Syria; Tunisia; Turkey and Ukraine. Each country report provides the most recent update on the demographic, legal, and socio-political aspects of both inward and outward migration stocks and flows.

Since the mid 1990s, the media have directed our attention to the thousands of Southern Sahara Africans who take life threatening risks crossing the Mediterranean Sea and Atlantic ocean. Their numbers on migratory routes leading to Europe are increasing, joining up, especially in the “Libyan crossroad” with North Africans, Egyptians and even Asian migrants on the same quest. This image reflects reality, but only partially so, for it leads one to believe that these migrants cross the Sahara in the hope of reaching Europe. It should be pointed out that one of the main misunderstandings when evoking these migrations flows is to reduce them to the act of crossing the straits of the Mediterranean Sea. Since the 1990s, the Libyan case exemplifies the way the multilateral (EU-Maghreb) or bilateral (Libya-Italy) political negotiations between the two shores of the Mediterranean sea rapidly focus on the figure of the “illegal sub-Saharan migrant in transit”. This simplistic view is dangerous because it erases the historical dimension of the movement of people and its consequences. The Sahara is not merely a desert to be crossed; it is an area that has been shaped for more than half a century by the various migrant, trader or pastoral communities who have contributed to its massive urbanisation and economic development. At the same time, the reorganization of African migration is affected by the inflation of tensions, border and police controls, the diversification of routes between Niger, Chad Sudan and Libya consequently contributes to the perpetuation of transit spaces. There are tens of thousands of these migrants who settle down more or less durably in these new transit areas dependants on opportunity, status controls, and expulsions. But these transit areas have also become places where migrants seek employment, create new economic activities, or develop new skills while working, studying or practicing other tongues. As migration patterns across the Sahara are reconfigured, the impact is more visible in some places. But their durability should not be taken for granted. Villages specialised in the transit economy may easily decline as new diplomatic relations are formed between countries of immigration and third countries.

Europe’s response to the so-called ‘migration crisis’ has been driven almost exclusively by a border control agenda. This has significantly reduced the number of refugees and migrants arriving in Greece, for the time being at least, but has done nothing to address the drivers or causes of migration to Europe, including the movement of people from Libya which continues unabated, or the protection and integration needs of those who are already here. The research aims to: • Shed light on the dynamics (determinants, drivers and infrastructures) underpinning the recent unprecedented levels of migration across, and loss of life in, the Mediterranean; • Provide insights into the interaction of refugees and migrants with a multitude of non-State actors (for example smugglers, facilitators, and Non- Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and State actors (for example, the navy / coastguard) in order to better understand their decision making processes; and • Explore how the decisions made by refugees and migrants on their journeys interact with dramatically changing global economic, security and political contexts.

Europe’s response to the so-called ‘migration crisis’ has been driven almost exclusively by a border control agenda. This has significantly reduced the number of refugees and migrants arriving in Greece, for the time being at least, but has done nothing to address the drivers or causes of migration to Europe, including the movement of people from Libya which continues unabated, or the protection and integration needs of those who are already here. Several years into the ‘crisis’, there is still no sign of a coherent long-term response. Both the reception infrastructure and the asylum system in Greece have failed to adapt to the needs of the refugees and migrants. This is partly a Greek failure but it is also a failure of the EU. Meanwhile escalating conflicts in Syria, Yemen, Afghanistan and Iraq continue to displace hundreds of thousands of people from their homes every day. The assault on Mosul (Iraq) which began in mid-October 2016 is expected to displace 1.5 million people, many of whom are likely to cross the border into Eastern Turkey just a few hours away. Understanding the dynamics of migration to Europe and why some of these people might decide to risk their lives crossing the Mediterranean remains a pressing concern.

Avant la révolution tunisienne de janvier 2011, les deux principaux axes de la politique migratoire, dans le cadre le Plan économique et social 2010-2014, étaient les suiavnts : la promotion de la migration légale à travers la signature d’accords avec des pays européens et non européens (Canada, Australie, etc.) ; et le renforcement des liens avec les émigrés tunisiens afin d’encourager leur participation au développement local. Après la chute de l’ancien régime, le gouvernement de transition a fait face à deux évènements importants, en relation avec les migrations : la recrudescence de l’émigration clandestine vers l’Italie et les retours massifs des Tunisiens de Libye. Par ailleurs, les associations d’émigrés tunisiens demandent à participer à la redéfinition de la politique migratoire. Abstract Until the Tunisian revolution of January 2011, the two main axes of the Tunisian migration policy, in the frame the Economic and Social Plan 2010-2014, were the followings : promoting legal migration through agreements with European and non European countries (Canada, Australia, etc.) ; and strengthen links with the Tunisian migrants abroad in order to support their participation in local development. After the fall of the ancient regime, the transition government faced two important events, in relation with migration : the upsurge of irregular migration to Italy and the massive return of Tunisian migrants from Libya. Moreover, the associations of Tunisians migrants demand to participate in the redefinition of migration policy.

During the Arab Spring, some of the Arab peoples decided to take a stand against their leaders as a result of many factors that accumulated over decades. These reactions and uprisings occurred from Tunisia in December 2010, followed by Egypt, Yemen and Libya, and originally started in peaceful civilian protests against their governments and some led to widespread violence and civil war. Likewise, in Syria, there is a continuation of these trends. In the Syrian context, however, the nature of the struggle against the regime and its leadership is complicated by the fact that the opposition is backed from abroad and exploited by Islamists, and the regime continues to act with full force against these fighters and its own citizens. Fighting and destruction continues to this day, prompting the Syrians to flee at home or resorting to flee to neighboring countries to escape the oppression and the effects of the fighting. Signs of the impending movements of Syrian asylum seekers to the Kurdistan Region started from March of 2011, and have continued day after day since then for these reasons and others. The total number of Syrian refugees registered within Iraq was most recently counted at 45,849 individuals (by 31 October 2012) and the vast majority (28,790 individuals) was registered in the Duhok governate of the Kurdistan region. Within the Kurdistan region, the majority of Syrian refugees reside in Duhok governate (28,790)- particularly within the Domiz camp with approximately 15,000 individuals registered by 24 October 2012 - while smaller numbers have also sought shelter within Erbil (6,857 individuals) and Sulaymaniyah (1,784 individuals). This places the total number of registered Syrians within the Kurdistan region at 37,431 (31 October 2012).

The Migrants in Countries in Crisis project aims at providing accessible, methodologically robust and policy relevant data on the migration implications of crisis situations in host countries. It does so with the broader objective of informing efforts to strengthen the preparedness of countries of origin, transit and destination and of other relevant actors to address and respond to future crises. Research objectives: Crisis situations investigated include natural disaster, violent conflict or civil unrest, which have led to a breakdown of or serious challenges to public order, and, as a result, entail a serious threat to the personal safety, physical and psychological integrity and protection of migrants. While focusing on longer term impacts of and responses to crises in countries of destination, origin and transit, the research will also investigate the availability of relevant mechanisms ensuring the protection of migrants before, during and after crisis in countries covered by the research. Six crises situations have been selected as case studies for in-depth research: Central African Republic (civil unrest 2014); Cote d'Ivorire (civil unrest 2000-2011); Lebanon (2006-today, impact on migrant domestic workers); Libya (civil unrest 2011); South Africa (xenophobic violence 2008-2015); Thailand (natural disaster 2011). The research is conducted as part of a wider project led by ICMPD supporting the global Migrants in Countries of Crisis Initiative. It is coordinated by the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) and is conducted in partnership the International Migration Institute (IMI) of Oxford University. In addition, local research partners are involved in the fieldwork and analysis for the case studies. The Research employs an interdisciplinary approach to assess the impact of crises on migrants in the countries under study. The research will combine secondary desk research and primary research in the field with relevant stakeholders, including migrants, policy makers and public officials, representatives of international organisations, civil society stakeholders and humanitarian organisations, diaspora organisations, academics and journalists, and employers and recruitment agencies Project Partners: International Migration Institute (IMI), University of Oxford

(EN)Libya is situated at a cultural and geopolitical crossroads with its roots in the Sahara, Mediterranean, Machrek and Maghreb. Its long borders are the result of a rich and eventful history. Here the Libyan borders are specifically examined from Colonel Kadhafi’s rise to power in 1969. The new head of State was to situate borders at the core of his foreign policy, be that policy pan Arabism or pan Africanism. And despite the failure of attempts at union with neighbours and Tripoli’s isolation from the international community, Kadhafi has continued to call for the overturning of borders and states. At present, the migratory issue, subjected to new diplomatic dilemmas, is juggled together with the political idea of the free movement of persons and the need for control over territorial limits. And though still managed chaotically migration policy is, in the stream of rapprochement with the EU, nevertheless going through a rationalization phase, particularly as far as border management is concerned. (FR)Située à un carrefour géopolitique et culturel, plongeant ses racines dans le Sahara, la Méditerranée, le Machrek et le Maghreb, la Libye est dotée de frontières longues issues d’une histoire riche et mouvementée. Les limites libyennes sont abordées de manière spécifique depuis l’arrivée au pouvoir du Colonel Kadhafi en 1969, qui les place au coeur de sa politique extérieure orientée vers le panarabisme puis le panafricanisme. Malgré l’échec des tentatives d’union avec ses voisins puis l’isolement de Tripoli sur la scène internationale, Kadhafi maintient une diatribe valorisant le dépassement des frontières et des Etats. La question migratoire, confrontée aujourd’hui à de nouveaux enjeux diplomatiques, est soumise à une approche acrobatique tiraillée entre la proclamation de la liberté de circulation des personnes et la recherche d’une maîtrise des limites territoriales. Toujours gérée de manière chaotique, elle semble faire actuellement l’objet d’une certaine rationalisation, notamment dans ses aspects liés à la gestion des frontières, dans le cadre d’un rapprochement avec l’Union européenne.

This paper explores how the revolts taking place in the Arab World would affect the migratory outcomes within the region and internationally. The impact of the uprisings on migration will depend on whether the country is a country of origin or of destination. The paper focuses on two cases-studies: Egypt, being the main sending country in the region, and Libya, a main country of destination for migrants from the North African region as well as from Sub-Saharan Africa. The Arab countries are still going through the transition between an old regime and a new one, with major economic and political unrest and episodes of protests and sit ins as well as military actions and, what is more, this period of unrest is likely to last for some time. The impact of the revolutions on the economic and political status of the country is still to be debated and understood. With the lack of clarity in economic and political policies, migration will continue to be unpredictable. Cet article s’intéresse aux conséquences des révolutions arabes sur les migrations régionales et internationales. L’impact des révoltes diffère dans les pays d’émigration et les pays d’immigration. Ce texte traite de deux exemples : l’Egypte, qui est le principal pays d’émigration dans la région, et la Libye, qui est un important pays de destination pour des migrants nord-africains et subsahariens. Les pays arabes traversent une période de transition, qui risque de durer, entre un ancien et un nouveau régime, avec d’importantes protestations politiques et économiques, des manifestations, et des actions militaires. L’impact des révolutions sur la situation politique et économique des pays arabes doit encore être débattu et analysé. L’évolution des mouvements migratoires est difficile à prévoir en l’absence d’une vision claire des choix politiques et économiques à venir.

La présente étude vise essentiellement, sur la seule base des données des recensements de la population et de l’habitat (RGPH) recueillis en 1988 et en 2001, à approfondir les connaissances sur les caractéristiques des migrants internationaux nigériens de retour. Aux termes des multiples analyses produites, l’étude relève que la proportion de migrants retournés au Niger n’a pratiquement pas changé entre les deux dates et qu’elle compte toujours parmi ses rangs une majorité d’hommes. De même, la plupart des migrants reviennent toujours de l’Afrique de l’Ouest vers laquelle les départs sont également les plus nombreux. Cependant, l’étude a noté des changements importants. En premier lieu, le schéma géographique de la migration de retour a quelque peu changé. En effet, les retours d’Afrique du Nord (notamment de la Libye) et de l’Asie (en l’occurrence de l’Arabie Saoudite) ont pris un peu plus d’importance entre 1988 et 2001. En second lieu, les migrants se sont davantage urbanisés (ou encore on retrouve un peu plus d’urbains), même s’ils retournent vivre en majorité en milieu rural. En troisième lieu, leur niveau d’instruction a sensiblement augmenté entre les deux dates de recensement - même si la majorité d’entre eux ne dispose d’aucune instruction moderne et travaille dans le secteur primaire traditionnel (agriculture et élevage). Abstract This paper analyzes international return migration patterns in Niger as well as the profiles of return migrants. To this end, the two national censuses of 1988 and 2001 are employed and results are compared so as to examine the evolution of the phenomenon. Some characteristics are found to have remainremained unchanged between the two dates, e.g. the proportion of return migrants in the population as a whole, migrant profile by sex and last country of residence abroad – for the vast majority are men who resided in other Western African countries. However, some features have varied. So some countries of last residence acquired importance among return migrants in this period including Libya and Saudi Arabia. Then even if the majority of return migrants lived in a rural milieu in 2001 the proportion of those who returned to an urban setting increased slightly. Finally, recent return migrants show a higher level of education despite the fact that most are still illiterate.

La migration économique vers l’Arabie Saoudite et les Emirats Arabes Unis a pris de l’importance principalement à partir du « boom pétrolier » de 1973. Cette migration intéresse pratiquement toutes les régions du Maroc ; elle est favorisée par les mesures restrictives prises par l’Europe et les similitudes culturelles avec ces pays. Les secteurs d’emploi des migrants dans ces pays couvrent une gamme très variée de branches dans le secteur des services, avec une prédominance de l’emploi féminin en particulier aux EAU, mais aussi dans les petits métiers tels l’artisanat, la mécanique, l’électricité et l’électronique, etc. Globalement, l’approche politique à cette question est menée sous le signe du paradoxe : « le besoin en main-d’œuvre et le non désir des étrangers» Cette peur d’être absorbés par les étrangers s’explique par le fait que les pays du Golfe enregistrent les taux de migration les plus élevés au monde. Si avec l’Arabie Saoudite, le Maroc n’a pas signé de convention de main-d’œuvre, il est lié par un accord avec les EAU et le Qatar signés en 1981 (et avec la Libye signé en 1983). Cette migration dans les pays du Golfe rapporte au Maroc une manne financière substantielle, il enregistre dans la région un fort taux des transferts. Abstract Since the 1973 oil crisis, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates have evolved into important receiver countries of labour migration flows. One of the main sender countries has been Morocco, due both to the limitations put in place by the traditional receiving countries in Europe and the similarity of cultural habits. As to their economic profile, Moroccans emigrants have been employed in a huge variety of sectors, e.g. services, handcrafts, electricity, electronic, and so on. On the whole, the political approach towards immigration issues in the Gulf countries can be summarized by the paradox “wanting labour but not foreigners”. This concern about migrants is partially explained by the fact that the Gulf countries register, today, the world’s highest net migration rates. From a legal perspective, Morocco signed bilateral labour migration agreements with United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Libya. Finally, in terms of migrants’ remittances, immigration in the Gulf countries represents a very important resource for the Moroccan economy.

The so-called migration and refugee crisis is one of the most contentious topics on the EU agenda in the current context. The recent events related to the Syrian civil war, political turmoil in Libya and the subsequent influx of refugees and other migrants towards Europe as well as perceptions caused by internal migration that led to ‘Brexit’ have had a polarsing effect on Europe. Therefore, territorial evidence on the flows of asylum seekers and refugees, their distribution between and within EU countries, regions and cities, impact on socio-economic development as well as information on crisis management and integration is in high demand. The ESPON applied research activity “Impacts of refugee flows to territorial development in Europe” addresses these issues and aims to provide relevant territorial evidence and policy recommendations. The research aims to answer the following questions: How does the distribution of asylum seekers and refugees look like at regional and urban level and how has this been changing over time as a result of European and national policy decisions in recent decades? What skills and qualifications do the refugees possess and how does the influx of refugees impact the recipient countries´ regional and local labour markets and demographic imbalances (especially concerning regions which are facing the challenges of losing population and ageing)? Do the skills and qualifications meet the needs of local labour markets and how do they compete with local population and regular migrants? How are different European regions and cities located in arrival, transit and destination countries responding to the refugee crisis in terms of providing humanitarian aid, services (accommodation, material support, healthcare provision, education, language courses, labour market programmes), community building, internal distribution of refugees and medium and long term integration? How does the diversity within Europe in terms of integration policies at regional and local levels look like? What are the main challenges and what are the good policy responses and the best practices for successful integration of refugees into the local communities, societies and labour markets at regional and local levels? What kind of support do they need? How successful have the integration measures been in the past? How to improve the use of existing funding opportunities? Is there a need to improve the legislation? What kind of impacts would the implementation of the proposal of European relocation scheme generate to European countries regions and cities? How are countries redistributing refugees internally? What are the main concerns for the host countries and communities? Consortium: VVA Europe, IT (lead contractor), Istituto per la Ricerca Sociale, IT, InTER - Insitute for Territorial Economic Development, SRB Central European University, HU International Centre for Migration Policy and Development (ICMPD), AT Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, BE Bernd Parusel, SE Bastian A. Vollmer, DE Richard Williams, UK Gianni Antonio Carbonaro, UK

Au début des années soixante-dix, la Tunisie connaissait sa première vague migratoire de main d’œuvre masculine, de jeunes et de moins jeunes, de célibataires et de non-célibataires vers les pays d’Europe occidentale, notamment vers la France et la République Fédérale d’Allemagne, ainsi que vers certains pays arabes dont la Libye. Cette vague a été suivie quelques années plus tard par des départs beaucoup moins massifs de jeunes femmes vers les pays d’accueil de leur époux, dans le cadre de ce qui fut appelé le « regroupement familial des immigrés dans les pays d’accueil ». Au cours des trois dernières décennies, la Tunisie n’a cessé d’observer ces mouvements migratoires de et vers ces mêmes pays d’accueil, mais avec une intensité plus ou moins importante d’une période à l’autre. Il s’agit d’une émigration d’hommes, dans les trois quarts de cet ensemble de cas, qui s'expatrient pour le travail et les études, et d’une émigration de femmes, dans un quart des cas, notamment pour le mariage et le regroupement familial dans le pays d’accueil, mais aussi pour les études et le travail. La présente note a pour premier objet la description des caractéristiques démographiques et socio-économiques des migrants, des pays de destination et des pays de provenance des flux migratoires des femmes et des hommes tunisiens de et vers la Tunisie au cours de la période 2001-2008. Elle donne, ensuite, un aperçu du stock des migrants tunisiens résidant à l’étranger par sexe et selon les pays d’accueil. Une tentative de caractérisation des femmes mariées restées en Tunisie, et dont les époux résident à l’étranger, est enfin traitée dans un troisième paragraphe. / In the early seventies of the last century, Tunisia experienced its first wave of emigration among male workers, mainly young and directed towards Western European countries, especially France and Germany, as well as towards some Arab countries including Libya. Later, this wave was followed by a corresponding if less strong wave of departure on the part of young women in the framework of so-called ‘family reunification schemes’. Over the past three decades, Tunisia has continued to have migration flows that fluctuate with circumstances. For the most part male migrants leave the country for work and study reasons : three out of four cases. But there are also women who have emigrated for marriage, family reunification as well as to study and work abroad. This note aims at describing the demographic and socio-economic characteristics of migrants and the destination and origin countries of migration flows from 2001 to 2008. Then, the stock of Tunisians abroad today will be more carefully examined from the perspective of gender. Finally, the characteristics and conditions of those women left behind in Tunisia will be scrutinized.

This synthesis report aims to provide an overview of the national legal frameworks of 11 Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries addressing irregular migration taking place to and from their territories. The countries under examination are Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, and Turkey. The unique position in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) is also analyzed. The irregular migration flows into and out of these countries are complex. Most of the countries in question are, to a certain degree, countries of origin, transit and destination. In some instances, irregular migration flows are intertwined with refugee movements, especially from Iraq and sub-Saharan Africa. The legal status of asylum seekers and refugees is far from transparent in a number of these countries and consequently they are often considered to be in an irregular situation. Their status is also bound up with the presence of a large number of Palestinian and Iraqi refugees, especially in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. The residence status of Palestinians in the OPT is also unstable. It is worthy to underline that a number of countries in the region have relatively complex and restrictive provisions regarding the access of foreign nationals to the labour market, with the result that migrants are at greater risk of irregularity. Ce rapport de synthèse offre un aperçu des cadres législatifs nationaux pertinents en matière de migration irrégulière en vigueur dans 11 pays du Sud et de l’Est de la Méditerranée. Les pays analysés sont l’Algérie, l’Egypte, Israël, la Jordanie, le Liban, la Libye, la Mauritanie, le Maroc, la Syrie, la Tunisie et la Turquie.1 1 Il faut noter qu’aucun rapport national n’a été transmis pour l’Algérie et la Libye. La situation très spécifique des Territoires occupés palestiniens est également envisagée. Les flux migratoires au départ et à travers cette région sont complexes. La plupart de ces pays sont, à des degrés divers, à la fois des pays d’origine, de transit et de destination. Dans certains cas, les flux de migrations irrégulières sont mixtes, c'est-à-dire également composés de mouvements de réfugiés, principalement en provenance d’Irak et d’Afrique sub-saharienne. Dans les divers pays d’accueil, le statut légal de ces réfugiés est loin d’être transparent de telle sorte qu’ils sont souvent considérés comme des migrants en situation irrégulière. Leur situation est également influencée par la présence numériquement importante de réfugiés palestiniens et irakiens, principalement en Egypte, en Jordanie, au Liban et en Syrie. Le titre de séjour des Palestiniens dans les Territoires occupés est également précaire. Il faut par ailleurs souligner que la complexité et la sévérité des législations relatives à l’accès au marché du travail d’un certain nombre de pays couverts par le rapport concourent à l’accroissement des situations d’irrégularité.

L’émigration internationale des Nigériens se fait pour l’essentiel dans les pays de l’espace CEDEAO où il existe des règles communes prévues pour tous les ressortissants de cet espace en matière de libre circulation, d’établissement et de résidence. Le séjour des Nigériens à l’étranger devient une préoccupation majeure en cas d’expulsions collectives massives dont ils sont quelquefois victimes dans certains pays d’accueil. Ces expulsions ne sont accompagnées d’aucune indemnisation. Cette situation pose avec acuité le problème de la protection des migrants et de leurs biens. Il faut déplorer le vide juridique en matière d’expulsions collectives et les textes régissant les expulsions collectives ainsi que ceux régissant les expulsions ou rapatriements individuels sont faibles et ineffectifs. Les immigrants qui séjournent au Niger doivent se conformer aux dispositions réglementant leurs conditions d’entrée et de séjour. Les étrangers résidents ont les mêmes droits que les nationaux tels qu’ils sont décrits par les textes en vigueur. Cependant certaines restrictions existent en matière électorale, d’accès à la fonction publique, d’hébergement, d’activité salariée et non salariée. Les migrants en transit majoritairement ressortissants de l’espace CEDEAO utilisent le Niger comme pays de transit (aucun visa n’est exigé). Le principe de libre circulation est un bon instrument d’intégration régionale, mais il s’arrête aux frontières des pays du Maghreb qui ont des exigences différentes en la matière (instauration généralisée de visas, expulsions massives notamment en Libye) ; du coup les migrants en transit se retrouvent dans une situation irrégulière très préjudiciable pour eux. / Nigeriens generally emigrate to ECOWAS member states, where common rules enable free circulation, establishment and residence to all citizens. The stay of Nigeriens abroad becomes a worry in case of massive collective expulsions, as occurs from time to time in some receiving countries. These expulsions involve no financial compensation and call into question the protection of migrants and their property. We regret the lack of regulations regarding collective expulsion, and the texts governing collective expulsion as well as individual expulsion and repatriation are weak and ineffective. Immigrants in Niger have to respect provisions concerning entrance and stays in the country. Foreign residents have the same rights as nationals, with some exceptions regarding elections, access to the civil service, accommodation, access to employment and self-employment. Transit migrants, mostly from ECOWAS countries, often pass through Niger as no visa is required. Free movement is a means of regional integration, but it stops at the borders of Maghreb countries, which have different rules in this regard : generalized visa requirement, collective expulsions, especially from Libya. As a matter of fact, transit migrants find themselves in an irregular and thus difficult situation.

(En) Understanding the legal framework in force in the SEM countries is of paramount importance in order to grasp the functioning of the labour market and the influence that it can have on migration. The analysis presented here focuses on 11 countries (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, Turkey) and deals with those aspects of the legal regulation in force which can be considered responsible for shaping the employment relationship in term of rigidity or flexibility. The Report is divided in a series of country-studies where the various legal components of the labour market are presented and critically analysed following the same structure for each one in order to enhance comparability: rules concerning hiring, flexible contracts, working time, dismissals, and work inspections. The results, which draw mainly upon international organisations’ sources and upon the analysis of legal texts and laws in these countries, are preliminary. In the concluding remarks, it is explained that if the most valuable research output of this report is to provide cross-comparative analysis to a vast legal material critically organised, the main limitation resides in the fact that it is mainly cantered on the black-letters of the rules and therefore further research must be done on the multifaceted aspects that contribute to shaping a labour market, namely the social dialogue, the case-law and the actual functioning of labour market institutions such as labour inspections, employment agencies, social security, in order to mange to paint the full picture of the SEM countries’ labour market. A preliminary critical assessment of the labour markets is however provided, combining the data on the legal framework in force with the analysis of the independent international reports prepared by various international institutions and NGOs on labour rights’ violations. (Fr)Il est de toute première importance de bien comprendre le cadre légal en vigueur dans les pays du Sud et de l’Est de la Méditerranée (SEM) afin d’y saisir le fonctionnement du marché du travail et son influence potentielle sur les flux migratoires. L’étude porte sur 11 de ces pays soit l’Algérie, l’Egypte, Israël, la Jordanie, le Liban, la Libye, la Mauritanie, le Maroc, la Syrie, la Tunisie et enfin la Turquie. C’est principalement, les éléments juridiques qui affectent les relations de travail en termes de rigidité et de flexibilité qui sont analysés. Ce rapport s’appuie sur une série de cas d’étude nationaux. Les aspects juridiques du marché du travail y sont décrits et analysés dans une perspective critique. Chacun des systèmes légaux nationaux a été soumis à la même grille d’analyse afin d’assurer la comparabilité des données. Sont donc envisagées de manière systématiques: les dispositions relatives à l’engagement, à la flexibilité des contrats, au temps de travail, aux préavis et aux inspections du travail. Les conclusions formulées, sont à ce stade tout à fait préliminaires. L’un des intérêts manifestes de cette recherche est de rendre accessible en Anglais, de manière systématique et critique, un large éventail de dispositions juridiques. La principale limite de cette étude est certainement son aspect formel puisque les modalités de mise en œuvre de ces dispositions et la pratique des relations de travail échappent, en grande partie à la perception son auteur. De plus amples recherches devraient être menées sur les divers facteurs qui contribuent à déterminer les dynamiques du marché du travail dans les SEM, soit le dialogue social, la jurisprudence et le fonctionnement réel des institutions de régulation du marché du travail telles que l’Inspection du Travail, les Agences pour l’Emploi et la Sécurité Sociale. Ce rapport suggère néanmoins une première évaluation critique résultant de la combinaison des données juridiques recueillies et de l’analyse des rapports internationaux élaborés par diverses institutions internationales et des ONG actives dans le domaine de la violation des droits du travail.

Le 17 février 2011 le peuple libyen se révolte contre une dictature de 40 ans. Les rebelles, soutenus par les forces de l’OTAN, et les fidèles du Colonel Kadhafi se livrent une guerre sans merci, laissant des milliers de morts et de blessés et des dégâts matériels implorants. Près de 900.000 personnes quittent le pays pour fuir les combats sanglants qui s’y déroulent et, durant plusieurs semaines, des milliers de personnes traversent les postes frontières de Ras Jdir et de Dhéhiba. Afin de faire face à cette arrivée massive de personnes, des camps sont montés dans l’urgence par l’armée tunisienne pendant que l’aide internationale s’organise. Une opération humanitaire d’urgence est décrétée par l’ONU et confiée au HCR, chargé de protéger les réfugiés et de leur apporter une aide humanitaire, et à l’OIM chargée d’aider à leur rapatriement vers leur pays d’origine. Une part de ceux qui sont entrés sur le territoire tunisien est de nationalité libyenne. Peu d’entre eux restent dans les camps. Ils logent chez des familles tunisiennes, dans des logements qu’ils louent ou dans des hôtels. Ils vont et viennent entre les deux pays au gré de l’évolution de la guerre dans leur pays. Avec la prise de Tripoli par les rebelles et la fuite de Kadhafi, le 1er septembre, le flot de Libyens entrant en Tunisie ne tarit pas pour autant. Les autres personnes sont ce qu’il est convenu d’appeler des "Nationaux de pays tiers", selon une terminologie utilisée par le HCR. Ils résidaient en Libye avant le déclenchement de la crise. La plupart d’entre eux ont été rapatriés vers leur pays d’origine avec l’aide de leurs gouvernements respectifs et/ou de l’OIM. Cependant, plusieurs réfugiés n’ont pas pu être rapatriés, et ne pourront probablement pas l’être, en raison des graves crises qui secouent leurs pays : guerre en Irak, en Somalie, au Soudan, entre l’Erythrée et l’Ethiopie... Le présent rapport, après quelques brèves précisions sur les notions de migrants et de réfugiés, tentera de décrire leur situation et les grandes difficultés qu’ils vivent et de faire le point sur le droit qui leur est applicable. On 17 February 2011, the Libyan people rose up against a forty–year-long dictatorship. The rebels supported by NATO, on the one side, and Colonel Gaddafi’s partisans, on the other, fought each other which meant thousands of deaths, injuries not to mention extensive material destruction. Around 900,000 people fled the country and, for several weeks, many poured across the border posts of Ras Ajdir and Dhebiba. To deal with this situation, emergency camps were set up by the Tunisian army awaiting for international aid. A humanitarian operation was decided upon by the United Nations with UNHCR in charge of protecting refugees and providing humanitarian aid, and the IOM was put in charge of repatriation. Many of those who fled to Tunisia have Libyan nationality. Very few are in the camps, most are hosted by Tunisian families, some rent out flats or hotel rooms. They come and go between the two countries as the war fluctuates. Once Tripoli was taken by the rebels and Qaddafi fled on 1 September, the flow did not decrease. The others are “third-country nationals” according to UNHCR terminology. They used to reside in Libya before the war. Most of them have been repatriated to their home country with the support of their respective governments and/or the IOM. Yet, some refugees were not repatriated and will not be repatriated in the foreseeable future because of serious crises in their country: war in Iraq, in Somalia, in Sudan, between Eritrea and Ethiopia… After some points of definition on migrants and refugees, this report describes their situation and the great difficulties that they face, and suggests the legal framework that could be applied here.