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In the first half of the 1990s, Belarus saw large migration flows, which since then have become considerably more moderate. The main destination countries for Belarusian emigrants are Russia, Poland, Germany, the US, and Canada. Over the last decade, temporary labour migration of Belarusians to the European Union has remained rather limited. At the same time labour migration flows of Belarusians towards Russia have increased. Belarus is a highly centralized state with regional authorities playing a marginal role in elaborating state policies, including in emigration matters. In order to curb emigration, Belarus authorities have resorted to the adoption of laws that discourage mobility. Taking into account growing labour shortages, the state policy to attract immigrants has been largely ineffective. At the same time, by September 2014 Belarus had reportedly hosted more than 25,000 Ukrainian migrants as a result of the military conflict in the Donbass region. Diaspora policy in Belarus is largely incoherent and selective. The long-awaited diaspora law is set to be adopted soon, but it fails to take into account the aspirations of diaspora members.

In Serbia, migration, and particularly labour migration, has been of little importance to state institutions and the public. However, migration management has become important in the context of European integration. Unfortunately, Serbia still lacks independent migration studies at its universities. The lack of interest among the Serbian academic community has been reflected in a muddled national policy approach towards Serbian emigration and the diaspora. Although there have been improvements in the legal and strategic framework, the implementation of these acts and the results of these policies are still missing. In 2009, as part of the visa liberalisation between Serbia and the EU, the Serbian Government adopted the Migration Management Strategy. The Migration Management Strategy was followed by the Law on Migration Management, adopted in November 2012. The public debate in Serbia is now more focused on obstacles related to the recognition of foreign diplomas. Highly-skilled returnees are faced with very expensive and long procedures for diploma recognition. Although readmission has become very important during the EU integration process, returnees are still faced with obstacles in the reintegration process.

Is immigration on the Bolivian political agenda? If we only analyze the official census figures and focus on laws, decrees and public policy initiatives, we should probably answer ‘no’. However, as we shall see, we have to consider another reality after integrating various statistical estimates that increase official numbers and after acknowledging the work of some governmental departments as well as non-governmental social research and advocacy organizations and Bolivian migrants associations abroad. To understand the difference in the response to migration questions in Bolivia, we now present the policy and institutional foundations on which the immigration debate is held in Bolivia. Some public policy, civil right defense and research initiatives have been proposed and established, but these initiatives would be best judged after considering how much political and economic support they will receive in future.

The main goal of the present position paper is to create an interpretative framework for the role of origin countries and societies in influencing the political participation of immigrants. Considering that we are opening a new line of research within the literature on political participation of immigrants and integration, we first consider the more classic methodological approaches in this field: this is to understand better any gaps. Second we consider other fields in the literature, namely diaspora policies and transnational politics. This is to allow a deeper identification of the influence of the countries and societies of origin. Then, we map state and non-state actors implicated in the countries of origin, their strategies, and how they overcome difficulties in their actions. On the one hand, we consider state actors’ strategies and interactions with emigrants, both in conventional and unconventional forms of political participation: as well as the issue of external voting, as a paradigmatic example of conventional political participation towards origin countries. On the other hand, we look at non-state actors and their strategies to influence migrant political participation, both towards origin and destination countries. In parallel, we introduce some relevant case studies underlining and exemplifying the role and the impact of origin countries’ actors on the political participation of migrants, both in their host and home countries. Afterwards, we propose a framework to interpret the relations between the different actors in origin countries and migrants in the field of political participation. Finally, we identify gaps in scientific knowledge that deserve to be covered in the next steps of the Interact project, we point out the key factors influencing migrants’ political participation that deserve more research, and we set out the specific questions to fill gaps in our knowledge of those interactions.

The main goal of the present position paper is to create an interpretative framework for the role of origin countries and societies in influencing the political participation of immigrants. Considering that we are opening a new line of research within the literature on political participation of immigrants and integration, we first consider the more classic methodological approaches in this field: this is to understand better any gaps. Second we consider other fields in the literature, namely diaspora policies and transnational politics. This is to allow a deeper identification of the influence of the countries and societies of origin. Then, we map state and non-state actors implicated in the countries of origin, their strategies, and how they overcome difficulties in their actions. On the one hand, we consider state actors’ strategies and interactions with emigrants, both in conventional and unconventional forms of political participation: as well as the issue of external voting, as a paradigmatic example of conventional political participation towards origin countries. On the other hand, we look at non-state actors and their strategies to influence migrant political participation, both towards origin and destination countries. In parallel, we introduce some relevant case studies underlining and exemplifying the role and the impact of origin countries’ actors on the political participation of migrants, both in their host and home countries. Afterwards, we propose a framework to interpret the relations between the different actors in origin countries and migrants in the field of political participation. Finally, we identify gaps in scientific knowledge that deserve to be covered in the next steps of the Interact project, we point out the key factors influencing migrants’ political participation that deserve more research, and we set out the specific questions to fill gaps in our knowledge of those interactions.

The project breaks new ground in the study of migration governance by looking at the so-called immigration countries from the perspective of emigration governance. The main underlying theme of this research is that emigration and immigration are two sides of the same coin and thus European migration governance should be approached from two angles to understand its full dimension. European Union is in fact still a region of emigration, with majority of flows staying within its boundaries, but important numbers leaving EU every year. Following the current global trends emigrants should be perceived as a potential asset. ÉMIGRÉ analyses emigration and diaspora policies of four EU Member States (UK, France, Spain and Poland) as well as EU-level responses to emigration to understand what are the drivers of the emigration governance in Europe and how the policies actually work. Key objectives are: 1) To close the knowledge gap on migration from the EU. 2) To enrich international migration governance studies by providing comparative analysis of actions of EU States in regards to emigration management, over time. 3) To ask what is the relation between State identity formation/shifts and success of policy learning/policy transfer processes between levels of governance. 4) To contribute to evidence-based policy making at the EU level. The project focuses especially on EU emigration to other OECD countries and in particular Canada. It employs a wide range of interdisciplinary methods to collect and analyse data. It also offers an intensive training programme.

Azerbaijan did not adopt any legal acts that would specifically deal with reintegration. In various normative acts one can only find some norms related to reintegration of certain groups of people. Thus, for instance, according to the Law “On combat against human trafficking”, social rehabilitation of human trafficking victims aims to encourage their integration into society and their return to normal life. It envisages measures aimed at providing legal assistance, educational opportunities, psychological, medical and professional rehabilitation, employment and housing1 . The Law “On the status of refugees and forced migrants (persons forced to move to the country)” creates conditions in which refugees can adapt to the local environment, undergo naturalization, learn the language and learn about their rights and obligations2 . As for immigrants, Azerbaijani legislation offers them an opportunity to study the Azerbaijani language, as well as the Constitution and laws of Azerbaijan

The issue of combat against human trafficking is very pressing for Ukraine, just like for most postSoviet countries. As it is indicated in the Migration Profile of Ukraine compiled in 2011 by Ukrainian migration experts based on research and on statistical data provided by Ukrainian national authorities and international specialists in the field of migration, Ukraine is primarily a state of origin for human trafficking victims1. Ukraine is also a country of transit for foreigners who became human trafficking or smuggling victims on their way to other countries, primarily Turkey or United Arab Emirates, from Moldova, Russia, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.The issue of combat against human trafficking is very pressing for Ukraine, just like for most postSoviet countries. As it is indicated in the Migration Profile of Ukraine compiled in 2011 by Ukrainian migration experts based on research and on statistical data provided by Ukrainian national authorities and international specialists in the field of migration, Ukraine is primarily a state of origin for human trafficking victims1. Ukraine is also a country of transit for foreigners who became human trafficking or smuggling victims on their way to other countries, primarily Turkey or United Arab Emirates, from Moldova, Russia, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.The issue of combat against human trafficking is very pressing for Ukraine, just like for most postSoviet countries. As it is indicated in the Migration Profile of Ukraine compiled in 2011 by Ukrainian migration experts based on research and on statistical data provided by Ukrainian national authorities and international specialists in the field of migration, Ukraine is primarily a state of origin for human trafficking victims1. Ukraine is also a country of transit for foreigners who became human trafficking or smuggling victims on their way to other countries, primarily Turkey or United Arab Emirates, from Moldova, Russia, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.The issue of combat against human trafficking is very pressing for Ukraine, just like for most postSoviet countries. As it is indicated in the Migration Profile of Ukraine compiled in 2011 by Ukrainian migration experts based on research and on statistical data provided by Ukrainian national authorities and international specialists in the field of migration, Ukraine is primarily a state of origin for human trafficking victims1. Ukraine is also a country of transit for foreigners who became human trafficking or smuggling victims on their way to other countries, primarily Turkey or United Arab Emirates, from Moldova, Russia, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.The issue of combat against human trafficking is very pressing for Ukraine, just like for most postSoviet countries. As it is indicated in the Migration Profile of Ukraine compiled in 2011 by Ukrainian migration experts based on research and on statistical data provided by Ukrainian national authorities and international specialists in the field of migration, Ukraine is primarily a state of origin for human trafficking victims1. Ukraine is also a country of transit for foreigners who became human trafficking or smuggling victims on their way to other countries, primarily Turkey or United Arab Emirates, from Moldova, Russia, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.

emigration policy, unlike policy with regards to immigration, still needs refinement. Policy with regards to emigrants, just as in case of diaspora, is still to large extent theory-, rather than practice-oriented. The same is not true for the current immigration policy. Unlike previous programs, the current one implies not only assistance in settlement of immigrants and their integration into Belarusian society, but also a differentiated approach to migrants’ categories, based on national interests. This means that, first of all, one of the measures is to develop target-oriented regional programs, aimed at migrant influx to the geographic areas experiencing workforce deficit. Second, preference is given to persons under the age of 40 and having higher or secondary education. Besides, the Department of Citizenship and Migration of the Ministry of Interior identified countries from where migration is desirable: Ukraine, Russia, Baltic and CIS countries with Russian-speaking population, as well as undesirable donor countries: Africa and most of South East Asia

Russia is a country attracting migrants, migration policy is focused on the immigration and labour migration, the challenges of emigration are considered minor. In the 1990s emigration was conceptualized as a “brain drain” problem and the main goal of the migration policy was the restraint of the outflow of the high-qualified personnel. In the 2000s, due to the decrease of the emigration, the major aim is seen as return of emigrants, though the mechanisms of its implementation have not been created.

Policy in the field of migrants’ integration is a relatively new task for practically all CARIM-East countries. Integration has an impact upon demography, including the composition and structure of the country’s population, namely gender ratio, mortality, marriage structure, birth rate, ageing etc. While integrating into society migrants become a part of the same, which affects the demographic security of the recipient country. As was noted above, integration is a twofold process, i.e. it is linked both to the adaptation of migrants and the adaptation of the recipient society [16]. If one takes Russia as an example of a recipient country, then, in the first half of the 1990s, its actions were primarily directed towards assistance to refugees and forced migrants from the former USSR republics, most of whom were ethnic Russians in need of economic, social and household integration: assistance in getting housing, jobs, and legal status. In the late 1990s and the early 2000s the situation changed: forced migration gradually gave way to large-scale labor migration from practically all CIS countries and this, of course, required a drastic change in policy. The absence of migrants’ integration policy increases their social exclusion and segregation. This absence make them vulnerable to different forms of rights violations, labor and other types of exploitation, even extreme forms of violence, such as forced labor and human trafficking: all of these, it should be noted, are to be found in CARIM-East countries.

The work here is of both a theoretical and an applied character. The authors pay particular attention to understanding what the integration of migrants means and how it corresponds to the terms assimilation and adaptation. They also offer a classification of complete and partial integration. For Russia, the paper retraces how the disregard of migrant integration in the 1990s and the first half of the 2000s was gradually replaced – after a delay – by an understanding that these were closely interrelated spheres of State activities. This was particularly true for a country like Russia, which annually receives millions of migrants, both for permanent and temporary stays. The experience of Russia clearly demonstrates that the dissociation of the State from this important sphere of internal policy leads to ethnic tension, erosion of tolerance in society, alienation of migrants from Russian society, self-isolation, and open conflicts between migrants and local residents. Therefore, now that the integration of migrants has been understood to be an important issue in Russia, the elaboration and realization of the policy of integration of migrants is complicated by an extremely unfavorable atmosphere of xenophobia and a politically-loaded perception of migration. The Russian policy of migrant integration is evaluated in respect of the most privileged category of immigrants: Russian “compatriots”. The adaptation policy of temporary labour migrants is analyzed in the context of the Russian State’s 2012 initiatives. The authors also argue out the integration and the anti-integration potential of ethnic diasporas when – as in present-day Russia – the infrastructure for the admission and integration of migrants has not been properly developed.

How do migrants develop the competence to successfully operate within a new society, and will these newly acquired intercultural skills and attitudes transfer between individuals and geographical locations? Can migration, and to what extent, trigger a shift towards more tolerance and respect for ethnic and cultural diversity in the countries sending migrants? And how are these effects mediated by particular conditions? These are the questions the TRANSFORmIG project seeks to answer by investigating recent massive migration between Poland and Great Britain and Germany. The ‘Polish case’ is highly instructive because of diametrically opposed contexts between which the transnational migrants regularly ‘switch’: Britain and Germany are characterized by a level and kind of multi-cultural complexity that is unknown to immigrants from Poland which is recognized as one of the most ethnically homogeneous country in the world. The TRANSFORmIG project puts the hypothesis that contact with diversity – socializing with people of diverse backgrounds – leads to (a positive) change of attitudes both among migrants and their peer groups in the communities of origin, and that these effects are mediated by the particular configurations and representations of diversity. The TRANSFORmIG project entails interdisciplinary, multi-method research in selected localities in Great Britain, Germany and Poland. Spanning sociology, anthropology, history and media studies, the project investigates with the help of a longitudinal qualitative study, individual and group interviews, ethnography and discourse analysis how people’s attitudes and skills to act in diverse societies change over time and in dependence with historical and contemporary conditions. Findings will significantly advance social scientific understanding of the processes of transnational transfer of values and attitudes and the spread of intercultural competences under the condition of growing diversification of societies.

Family migration in general, and more specifically migration for the purpose of family formation, has become one of the most important forms of immigration to European countries. Consequently, family migration and family formation receive increasing attention, particularly in the field of migrant integration. This is reflected not only in recently introduced programmes in many countries which link admission and integration, but also in examining the role of the family in integration processes. For example, bi-national or inter-ethnic marriages and partnerships can be understood as an expression of successful integration, assuming that these relations require a high level of intercultural interaction, social contacts outside their own group and the acceptance of different values. Existing literature indicates that this and similar conclusions are much too simplistic and refers to the variety of considerations, motives and ambitions that influence partner choices. Particularly in German-speaking countries, the state of knowledge on partner choice, marriage and family formation patterns of migrants is poorly understood. Existing studies are often limited to specific aspects of the phenomenon, such as "forced marriages" or "arranged marriages", which neglect a comprehensive analysis and an informed debate on the impact of these patterns on the integration of third country nationals in general. Objectives of the study: The study will examine: • marriage patterns and motives in major immigrant groups in Austria over time; • the effects of changing marriage patterns and marriage structures on the integration characteristics of immigrant spouses and their children in Austria; • whether integration policies support the needs of immigrant spouses and their children; • options for policy development in the respective areas.

Up to the late 1990s, discourse around mass emigration from Azerbaijan had to do, above all, with mass post-Soviet labour migration. During the last two decades (1990-2009) 266,000 arrived in the country as permanent migrants and 707,500 departed from Azerbaijan according to official statistics. According to official statistics the balance of migration was negative for Azerbaijan (though never massively negative) almost every year. But in the last two years more people arrived in the country than left it. On the grounds of these figures the authorities announced that Azerbaijan has become attractive for immigrants. President Ilham Aliyev’s stated: “The number of foreigners intending to visit the Republic of Azerbaijan will increase while Azerbaijan is developing. This can be considered a positive factor for our country. However, we must prefer the interests of our state, people, citizens and this must be the priority for our migration policy” on the home page of the Internet Site of the “State Migration Service of Azerbaijan Republic” in fact, there is the official declaration of changes in the migration process. These ideas have been set in state law in the “Decree by the president of the Azerbaijani Republic on the use of the ‘single window’ principle in the management of migration processes” (4th of March 2009).

Contrary to official statistics, a number of estimates, employing census data and population loss due to natural causes, and based on bilateral migration stocks, show that Belarus, since its independence, has had a negative net migration: the numbers come in at about 130,000. Population loss due to external migration is even more considerable (700,000) if one counts migration on the basis of the migrants’ place of birth: many Belarus-born emigrants left the country before 1990 and did not return, and a large number of immigrants after 1990 were Belarus-born repatriated from other former USSR countries. Official statistics for the external net migration rate and labour migrants have been distorted by poor migration accounting, while political considerations have deterred some academic institutions from taking a more critical approach. External migration is negative in demographic terms in quantitative but also in qualitative terms as emigrants are, on average, younger and better educated, while immigrants are less-skilled, with a larger proportion of people past working age. The positive demographic impact of the 1980s high fertility rate has recently ended. Since 2008, the pool of labour resources has been gradually diminishing. The share of people below working age has been falling while the share of those above working age has risen. Thus unfavorable demographic trends in terms of population loss and age distortion are aggravated by external migration. With all the negative demographic impact that external migration implies, labour migration has an ambiguous economic impact. It contributes to sizable human capital losses and a deficit in some sectors (e.g., construction) due to the labour migration to Russia. But it also eases unemployment and provides remittances from the migrants to their communities.

L’émigration algérienne se caractérise à travers une feuille de route de destination de plus en plus diversifiée, bien que la France demeure le principal pays d’accueil. Le regroupement familial représente l’une des raisons principales sous-jacente les flux d’admission vers la France, alors que la migration professionnelle revêt un caractère désormais marginal. La reconnaissance implicite de la double nationalité et l’entrée en vigueur du nouveau Code de la nationalité algérien concourent à la massification de la diaspora algérienne résidant à l’étranger, alors même que celle-ci reste difficile à appréhender d’un point de vue statistique. L’évolution des taux du chômage et les variations ressortant de la participation au marché du travail au sein du pays d’accueil démarquent une intégration plus rapide parmi les femmes d’origine algérienne par comparaison avec les hommes, expliquée dans une large mesure au regard d’une situation économique initiale déséquilibrée au détriment des femmes. Il ressort de l’observation courant sur la période récente que les mesures adoptées par les autorités algériennes attestent d’une volonté manifeste d’impulser une nouvelle politique migratoire tournée vers la promotion de l’impact de la communauté algérienne résidant à l’étranger sur le développement économique de l’Algérie. A noter dans le même temps que les phénomènes de l’émigration et de l’immigration illégales font l’objet de mesures législatives civiles et pénales soutenues et renforcées par le gouvernement algérien. Algerian emigration has seen a gradual diversification in terms of destinations, though France remains the preferred option. Family reunification is today the main motivation pushing Algerians to France, while labor migration has only a marginal role. Both the implicit recognition of dual citizenship and the new Code on Algerian Nationality have tended to increase the size of the expat Algerian community, though this is not evident in the statistics. In terms of economic integration, the evolution of unemployment and of labor market participation in the destination country reflects the faster integration of Algerian women than of Algerian men, probably because of the large initial gap between the two sexes. The recent measures put in place by the Algerian authorities may show the start of a new policy attitude towards migration which gives more relevance to the contribution of the expat Algerian community in terms of economic development at home. Meanwhile, Algerian policies for the fight against undocumented outward and inward migration have been strengthened by the adoption of new civil and penal law arrangements.

The overarching objective and expected impact of this project is to provide alternative and deepened understanding based on empirical evidence of how to handle conflicts in intercultural contexts within democratic societies in order to set up security solutions for communities, which are carried by the active participation of the citizens. ALTERNATIVE has at its core 4 intensive case studies (which mainly take the form of action research) built around, supported by and mutually feeding into 3 more theoretically oriented work packages. These parts together produce a spectrum of theoretically grounded and empirically tested models of dealing with conflicts in intercultural settings by RJ processes. The theoretically oriented work packages deal mainly with alternative epistemologies of justice and security, conflict analysis, and RJ models application and their relevance for European policies. The action research is dedicated to different levels of intercultural conflicts in a few selected security sensitive areas: at the micro-level - everyday conflicts between local residents and residents with migrant background in public/social housing (Vienna); at the meso-level – conflicts in a small town with Roma and non-Roma inhabitants (Hungary); at the meso- and macro-level – interethnic conflicts within 3 multi-ethnic and multicultural regions: conflicts between Serbs and Albanians, Serbs and Muslims, and Serbs and Croats (Serbia); and at the meso- and macro-level - civil conflicts at 3 different sites: conflicts between a local community and gangs of youths; between long term residents and recent immigrants; and inter-community sectarian conflict (Northern Ireland). Our proposal is fully in line with the main objectives of the “Security Theme Work Program”; its expected impact is also fully in line with the impact expected in the “Topic SEC-2011.6.5-1 Conflict resolution and mediation”: To provide alternative understanding of how to handle conflicts within democratic societies.

This project will study the formation of the Arbëresh minority, currently one of the twelve officially recognized linguistic minorities in Italy. This proposal aims to address the problem of identity construction as started by diverse immigrant groups that, notwithstanding their common origin roughly corresponding to present-day Albania, were at first very different from one another in terms of religion, culture and language. In particular, this research will allow to critically reconsider the concept of diaspora. Scholars have so far analyzed diaspora phenomena as coherent units of geographically dispersed people bound by sentiment, culture and history. On the contrary, this project aims to demonstrate that the cultural identity of a diaspora is not necessarily formed by the dispersion of ethnically homogeneous groups, but it is rather the result of a long-term process that can take place in the host countries. The project is divided into three parts. The first part studies the Albanian emigration to Southern Italy in the fifteenth and sixteenth century and the foundation of rural communities on Italian territory by immigrants. The second part examines the period of the Counter-Reformation. The Albanian colonies became part of the Catholic Church, but at the same time they adopted a particular religious rite, the so-called Greek rite, which has distinguished them from the Catholic majority. The result was the birth of a Uniate Catholic Church in 1595, which brought together the various Albanian colonies in Italy. The third part studies the achievement of ethnic identity in the seventeenth century, on the basis of the religious identity. The project will be carried out at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales in Paris, which is currently engaged in several international and European research projects focused on the history of diasporas. The main expected result is the preparation of a book that will be the fourth monograph of the researcher

The objective of this project is to complete my research into prejudiced representations of the Other (hostility) vs cultural initiatives to create welcoming representations (hospitality) in Britain and Poland. There are significant differences in the approaches to the Other between and within the two countries of the European Union. My study will examine the representations of Jews, Roma, Muslims and other national, ethnic and religious minorities, the LGBT community, refugees and other immigrants, people with disabilities, the economically excluded as alienated in the UK and Poland. Because of the abortion ban, women are among the most vulnerable in Poland and are, therefore, the Beauvoirean Other in this country. A variety of prejudices converge on the ‘Others’ who are devoid of subjectivity and visibility. Therefore, it is important to examine the problematics of alterity and visibility alike, in order to empower the excluded. My research project aims to examine the phobias directed at supposed strangers and attempts to fight this intolerance as an opposition is strengthening against the prejudiced perceptions. This project examines linkages among sexism, anti-Semitism and other phobias – and, above all, opposition to them. It focuses on the picture of the Other when Europe is witnessing the rise of an uncivil society with its sexist, racist, anti-Semitic, homo- and xenophobic as well as Islamophobic ideology and iconography. This project explores the ideas and images of the Other produced by the far right, as well as initiatives that oppose them in a civil society: political philosophy and visual culture. An impact of this action is to maximise my contribution to society through a diagnosis of the cultural representations to the Other and recommendations to adopt an ethics of hospitality (according to Jacques Derrida ethics, culture and hospitality are synonymous). This advanced training will also enhance my competence diversification.

Studying and Evaluating the Role of the Media in Migrant Integration: Introductory remarks for the MEDIVA project Europe has experienced important tensions between national majorities and ethnic or religious minorities, more particularly with migrants and their offspring during the past ten years. These tensions largely understood as an ethnic or religious issue have been however exacerbated by the global financial crisis that has hit all EU countries (even if at varying degrees) since 2008. Indeed at these times of economic crisis, rising unemployment and increasing insecurity, non EU citizens who reside in EU countries tend to become the target of xenophobic and racist attitudes. In this context, the question of third country nationals’ (TCN) integration becomes all the more pressing to preserve social cohesion and also to help EU societies overcome the crisis. The media have a role to play under these circumstances in promoting policy discourses and media representations that are pro-integration and not immigrant-phobic. The importance of this role is acknowledged by politicians, policy makers, scholars and migrants/minorities themselves. There have been several initiatives initiated by European institutions such as the Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA), Directorate General for Employment and Social Affairs (DG EMPL), the European Broadcasting Union (EBU), the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ), which have aimed at strengthening the capacity of the media to reflect diversity. Several studies have identified best practices and have presented these with a view to raising awareness among media companies and media professionals. Hard facts and figures are needed to assess and plan pro-integration policies and practices. These should be derived from both qualitative and quantitative measurements. Regular and thorough analysis of different aspects of media production can lead to re-balancing of the output in favour of negatively stereotyped immigrant groups. The MEDIVA project adopts this view and capitalizes on the work done so far by combining it with a series of in-depth interviews with senior journalists across six member states (Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, the UK) with a view to understanding better how journalists and other media professionals assess the tools they have so far in dealing with migrant diversity (recruitment/employment conditions, training provided, codes of ethics, knowledge about diversity and how all these are combined in everyday work in news making and programme production). The MEDIVA project will use this added knowledge to create a set of Indicators of Media Capacity to Reflect Diversity and Promote Migrant Integration. This project builds on the existing work but also goes a step further from the studies that exist so far which have generally provided for best practice knowledge, training tool kits and media content analysis but have notyet created a tool for self-/otherassessment and monitoring of the media on reflecting diversity and promoting TCN integration. This paper provides definitions for key terms used in the project, demarcating the field of study and clarifying the project’s objectives.

In the hope of regulating migratory flows, the European Council endorsed a “global approach” to migration in December 2005, an approach which is based on the correction of the “deep causes of migration”: poverty, unemployment and development gaps between North and South. Besides liberalising economies and trade systems, a set of measures are advocated in order to enhance home countries’ development by using “migration [as a] medicine against migration”: stimulating the remittance of funds back to the country of origin; expanding the role of diasporas settled in member states; reinforcing circular migration schemes and facilitating return movements; and improving the management of the emigration of the highly-skilled in order to curb “brain drain”. The paper focuses on the Arab South and East Mediterranean (SEM) countries. It challenges the views, implicit in EU migration policies, that migration is entirely rooted in economics and that migrants’ agency alone is able to spur development in the origin country. Using the theoretical background of political economy with a neo-institutional approach to migration, it explores the stakes, the outreaches and the outcomes of the migration and development nexus. By so doing, it re-politicizes migration and development and emphasises the structural and contextual dimension of factors pushing on migration and hampering development: unemployment and high professional turn over; economic liberalisation and deregulation policies, and socio-political “blockages” (gender inequalities, patronage, clientelism and corruption, lack of public expression). Moreover, the analysis of SEM country practices in the field of migration management and engineering migration for development shows how the design of policies and the channelling of flows respond to political and demographic stakes in the various national contexts. Migration patterns act as a political shield for regimes in the region that: allows these regimes to monitor political opposition; renews socio-cultural elites; and decreases the economic opportunities in national economies, due to corruption and patronage. Current policies also reconstruct state-society/expatriates relations, through (controlled) economic participation and socio-cultural solidarity. They do not, however, lead to political participation. The paper thus concludes that amendments to macro-political contexts in the SEM countries are more likely than liberalisation policies to curb emigration flows, by engineering global social and political development. As a matter of fact, the onset and patterns of the Arab revolutions since December 2010 aptly confirm the need for political reform in the region. Adoptée par le Conseil européen en décembre 2005, l’Approche globale des migrations est axée sur la correction des « causes profondes de la migration » (la pauvreté, le chômage, les écarts de développement entre nord et sud) afin d’en réguler les flux. Parmi les mesures préconisées figurent la facilitation de l’envoi de fonds vers les pays d’origine (transparence des coûts, développement de l’accès aux services financiers), l’encouragement du rôle des diasporas implantées dans les États membres (aider les pays en développement à identifier leur diaspora et à établir des liens), le renforcement de la migration circulaire et la facilitation du retour, une meilleure gestion des migrations de personnes hautement qualifiées afin de limiter la « fuite des cerveaux ». Cette étude traite des pays arabes du sud et de l’est de la Méditerranée (SEM). Elle met en question les représentations, contenues dans les politiques migratoires de l’UE, de la migration comme facteur purement économique, mais aussi des migrants comme agents d’un développement à grande échelle dans leurs pays d’origine. Le cadre théorique de l’économie politique et les approches néo-institutionnelles des migrations, utilisés ici, permettent de dégager les enjeux et la portée du lien entre migration et développement sur le terrain arabe. L’étude ‘re-politise’ ces deux processus. Elle met en relief la dimension structurelle des facteurs déclenchant l’émigration et entravant les processus de développement : les caractéristiques du marché du travail, les politiques de libéralisation des économies et les « blocages » sociopolitiques (inégalités hommes-femmes, clientélisme et corruption, obstacles à l’expression publique). En outre, l’analyse des politiques migratoires menées dans les pays du SEM montre que ces mesures répondent aux enjeux politiques et démographiques particuliers aux divers contextes nationaux de la région. Elles permettent aux régimes en place de contrôler l’opposition politique, le renouvellement des élites socioculturelles et les conséquences de la contraction des opportunités économiques, due à la corruption et au clientélisme. Les politiques migratoires participent également d’une restructuration des relations États-sociétés-expatriés autour d’une participation économique (étroitement contrôlée) et d’une solidarité socioculturelle, mais excluant toute participation politique. L’étude conclut donc que des réformes des contextes sociaux et politiques dans les pays du SEM seraient plus à même d’agir sur les flux migratoires que les réformes néolibérales. Le déclenchement des révoltes arabes en décembre 2010 confirme d’ailleurs l’urgence de ces réformes politiques.

In the hope of regulating migratory flows, the European Council endorsed a “global approach” to migration in December 2005, an approach which is based on the correction of the “deep causes of migration”: poverty, unemployment and development gaps between North and South. Besides liberalising economies and trade systems, a set of measures are advocated in order to enhance home countries’ development by using “migration [as a] medicine against migration”: stimulating the remittance of funds back to the country of origin; expanding the role of diasporas settled in member states; reinforcing circular migration schemes and facilitating return movements; and improving the management of the emigration of the highly-skilled in order to curb “brain drain”. The paper focuses on the Arab South and East Mediterranean (SEM) countries. It challenges the views, implicit in EU migration policies, that migration is entirely rooted in economics and that migrants’ agency alone is able to spur development in the origin country. Using the theoretical background of political economy with a neo-institutional approach to migration, it explores the stakes, the outreaches and the outcomes of the migration and development nexus. By so doing, it re-politicizes migration and development and emphasises the structural and contextual dimension of factors pushing on migration and hampering development: unemployment and high professional turn over; economic liberalisation and deregulation policies, and socio-political “blockages” (gender inequalities, patronage, clientelism and corruption, lack of public expression). Moreover, the analysis of SEM country practices in the field of migration management and engineering migration for development shows how the design of policies and the channelling of flows respond to political and demographic stakes in the various national contexts. Migration patterns act as a political shield for regimes in the region that: allows these regimes to monitor political opposition; renews socio-cultural elites; and decreases the economic opportunities in national economies, due to corruption and patronage. Current policies also reconstruct state-society/expatriates relations, through (controlled) economic participation and socio-cultural solidarity. They do not, however, lead to political participation. The paper thus concludes that amendments to macro-political contexts in the SEM countries are more likely than liberalisation policies to curb emigration flows, by engineering global social and political development. As a matter of fact, the onset and patterns of the Arab revolutions since December 2010 aptly confirm the need for political reform in the region. Adoptée par le Conseil européen en décembre 2005, l’Approche globale des migrations est axée sur la correction des « causes profondes de la migration » (la pauvreté, le chômage, les écarts de développement entre nord et sud) afin d’en réguler les flux. Parmi les mesures préconisées figurent la facilitation de l’envoi de fonds vers les pays d’origine (transparence des coûts, développement de l’accès aux services financiers), l’encouragement du rôle des diasporas implantées dans les États membres (aider les pays en développement à identifier leur diaspora et à établir des liens), le renforcement de la migration circulaire et la facilitation du retour, une meilleure gestion des migrations de personnes hautement qualifiées afin de limiter la « fuite des cerveaux ». Cette étude traite des pays arabes du sud et de l’est de la Méditerranée (SEM). Elle met en question les représentations, contenues dans les politiques migratoires de l’UE, de la migration comme facteur purement économique, mais aussi des migrants comme agents d’un développement à grande échelle dans leurs pays d’origine. Le cadre théorique de l’économie politique et les approches néo-institutionnelles des migrations, utilisés ici, permettent de dégager les enjeux et la portée du lien entre migration et développement sur le terrain arabe. L’étude ‘re-politise’ ces deux processus. Elle met en relief la dimension structurelle des facteurs déclenchant l’émigration et entravant les processus de développement : les caractéristiques du marché du travail, les politiques de libéralisation des économies et les « blocages » sociopolitiques (inégalités hommes-femmes, clientélisme et corruption, obstacles à l’expression publique). En outre, l’analyse des politiques migratoires menées dans les pays du SEM montre que ces mesures répondent aux enjeux politiques et démographiques particuliers aux divers contextes nationaux de la région. Elles permettent aux régimes en place de contrôler l’opposition politique, le renouvellement des élites socioculturelles et les conséquences de la contraction des opportunités économiques, due à la corruption et au clientélisme. Les politiques migratoires participent également d’une restructuration des relations États-sociétés-expatriés autour d’une participation économique (étroitement contrôlée) et d’une solidarité socioculturelle, mais excluant toute participation politique. L’étude conclut donc que des réformes des contextes sociaux et politiques dans les pays du SEM seraient plus à même d’agir sur les flux migratoires que les réformes néolibérales. Le déclenchement des révoltes arabes en décembre 2010 confirme d’ailleurs l’urgence de ces réformes politiques.

La femme possède un statut bien avancé au sein de la société libanaise : la Constitution libanaise proclame l’égalité entre les citoyens. Quelques lois et pratiques restent, toutefois, discriminatoires à l’égard de la femme, notamment la loi sur la nationalité et la loi sur le statut personnel. Une discrimination sociale très grave existe en ce qui concerne les femmes travaillant à domicile; elles subissent plusieurs formes de racisme et d’exploitation, et leur protection juridique est très faible - une situation qui encourage la traite et a poussé plusieurs Etats à interdire à leurs citoyens de travailler au Liban en tant que domestiques. La réglementation distingue quatre catégories d’étrangers travaillant au Liban ; seulement deux catégories peuvent y faire venir leurs familles. Pour améliorer le statut de la femme, beaucoup d’efforts sont encore à fournir, notamment au niveau de la justice et de la ratification de nombre de conventions internationales. Le statut de la femme au Liban est acceptable pour les femmes immigrées, à l’exception des femmes qui travaillent en tant que domestiques : une situation qui nous permet de dire qu’elles ne constituent pas un groupe social opprimé au sens de la Convention de 1951. Abstract : Women have good status in Lebanese society: the Lebanese constitution insists on equality between citizens. Some laws and practices, however, remain discriminatory, especially the law on nationality and the law on personal status. Women working as domestic workers are grossly discriminated against; they suffer from racism and exploitation and they have little legal protection. This situation fosters trafficking and has led several states to forbid their nationals from working as domestic workers in Lebanon. Regulation distinguishes four categories of foreign workers in Lebanon; only two categories can have their family join them. Much still needs to be done to improve the status of women, in particular in the justice sector and several international conventions have not yet been ratified. The status of women in Lebanon is acceptable for immigrant women with the exception of domestic workers. Women are not an oppressed social group in the sense of the 1951 Convention.

Although female migration is on the rise, research studies with a gender perspective are scarce and fragmentary. Therefore, this paper represents a pioneer work aimed at analyzing female migration from Sudan. The emigration of Sudanese women to neighboring countries is addressed as it represents the largest share in Sudanese female emigration. Being historically family-driven, female emigration from Sudan is today increasingly characterized by independent women leaving the country with the hope of improving their work and life conditions. The recent shift from family- to labor-driven emigration is due mainly to the increase in the proportion of women enrolled in formal education, which in turn has meant a rise in their participation in the labor market. The scarcity of opportunities for newcomers in the Sudanese labor market is today the main reason for outward migration from Sudan. Meanwhile, war and civil conflicts have been an important trigger to female emigration creating, in most cases, refugees. The paper also discusses female emigration in non-African countries and argues that the push factors give impetus to migratory processes that cut across the regional and ethnic boundaries of Sudanese society. / Bien que le phénomène de la migration féminine s’inscrive en pleine croissance, les analyses intégrant une dimension genre sont rares et fragmentaires. A ce titre, cette note représente un travail pilote visant à dresser une analyse de l’émigration féminine soudanaise. Cette émigration vers les pays du voisinage attire l’attention du chercheur, dans la mesure où elle représente la proportion la plus large parmi l’émigration féminine soudanaise. Fondée, dans un premier temps, sur des motifs d’ordre familial, l’émigration féminine soudanaise est aujourd’hui davantage caractérisée par le profil d’une femme indépendante quittant le pays d’origine avec pour objectif double l’amélioration des conditions de travail et de vie. Le glissement récemment opéré d’une émigration essentiellement fondée sur des motifs d’ordre familial à une émigration motivée par des impératifs lies à l’emploi s’explique essentiellement au regard de l’augmentation de la proportion de femmes éduquées avec un impact conséquent sur leur participation accrue au marché du travail. La rareté des opportunités pour les nouveaux immigrés au sein du marché du travail soudanais justifie hautement l’émigration en partance du Soudan. Parallèlement, les guerres et conflits civils ont constamment représenté un levier encourageant l’émigration féminine, allant jusqu’à acquérir le statut de réfugié. Cette note analyse, en outre, l’émigration féminine à destination de pays non-africains, et part du postulat que ces différents facteurs sous-jacents les mouvements migratoires agissent sur les processus migratoires à échelle régionale, et peu important les frontières ethniques traversant la société soudanaise.

This paper tackles the socio-political aspects of gender and migration in Jordan. Our concern is to figure out whether and, if so, how public debate, institutional setup and specific governmental or government-approved policies targeting migrant women are gendered, i.e., how gender policies articulate with migratory policies, how gender determines migrants’ experience, in terms of, for instance, life cycle and employment. We also inquire about the purposes of such policies. Our main conclusion is that, though public debate is indeed gendered, migration policies are not. On immigration, gender does not have priority over other characteristics of the migrant in the overall policy-making process on migration. However, there exists an economic sector-selective gendering of policies targeting female migrants in Jordan. This process is rooted in the political necessity of engineering female and migrant issues to respond to Jordanian nationals’ concerns. As for females’ emigration and, especially, a new trend involving mainly unmarried skilled young women directed at the Arab Gulf States, it has been so far ignored in the public debate, caught between the ‘open door’ policy and the institutional setup of Jordan’s ‘blocked society’. In the Jordanian context, migration, indeed, hardly allows female empowerment let alone female immigrants in Jordan. Therefore the paper advocates a stronger involvement on the part of sending countries’ in the defence of their nationals employed abroad, especially given the situation of female English domestic workers. / Cet article traite des aspects sociopolitiques de la relation entre genre et migration en Jordanie. Nous cherchons à comprendre si et comment le débat public, le contexte institutionnel et les politiques gouvernementales (ou soutenues par le gouvernement) visant les femmes migrantes sont genrées. Comment les politiques dans le domaine du genre s’articulent-elles aux politiques migratoires ? En quoi le genre détermine-t-il l’expérience des migrants, en termes de cycle de vie, de travail et d’emploi, par exemple ? Nous nous intéressons également aux objectifs de ces politiques. La conclusion principale de ce rapport est la suivante : le débat public prend en compte la question du genre mais les politiques migratoires l’ignorent le plus souvent. Concernant l’immigration, nous montrons que le genre ne pèse pas plus que d’autres facteurs dans le processus global de conception et de mise en œuvre des politiques migratoires. Cependant, on peut repérer une sélection par le genre dans certains secteurs économiques ouverts aux travailleurs immigrés, dont l’exemple le plus emblématique est l’emploi domestique. Ce processus a pour origine la nécessité politique d’instrumentaliser les questions de la femme et de la migration en réponse aux préoccupations des citoyens jordaniens. La question de l’émigration des femmes, en particulier le récent mouvement de femmes jeunes et célibataires vers les pays du Golfe, est pour sa part absente du débat public. Celui-ci reste en effet prisonnier de la politique de la « porte ouverte » mais surtout du contexte institutionnel d'une société jordanienne « bloquée ». Le contexte jordanien n’est donc pas toujours propice à l’autonomisation (empowerment) des femmes jordaniennes mais encore moins à celle des migrantes étrangères. Notre étude appelle donc les autorités des pays d’origine des migrantes à s’investir plus fortement dans la défense des intérêts de leurs ressortissantes expatriées, et de manière urgente dans celle des domestiques asiatiques.

Migration and return migration are challenging phenomena of creativity and adaptation, both in past and contemporary Africa. They cause changes in local structures and induce conflicts, which propel further cycles of adaptation and creativity by locals and migrants.The project focuses on the political dimension of such changes by analyzing the case of returning Angolan refugees after years or decades in Zambian refugee camps. More specifically, it studies the return of refugees who held political positions prior to their flight from Angola, either as neo-traditional chiefs or as functionaries of the UNITA party/rebel group. The project addresses a twofold question. Firstly, it is asked what kinds of repercussions are invoked by the return of such refugees and their re-immersion into the local political structures which will have changed during their years of absence. What kind of political order emerges from the interaction between returned political leaders and those who stayed? Secondly, it is asked how this new political order is influenced by the experiences of the returnees during their time as camp refugees. In particular, the project will examine the influence, if any, of their exposure to the international refugee regime, which propagates humanitarian and democratic values (often seen as Western values) in the camps. Has this experience shaped the new political engagement in Angola of local leaders, who have returned after staying in the refugee camps of Zambia?

L’émigration internationale des Nigériens se fait pour l’essentiel dans les pays de l’espace CEDEAO où il existe des règles communes prévues pour tous les ressortissants de cet espace en matière de libre circulation, d’établissement et de résidence. Le séjour des Nigériens à l’étranger devient une préoccupation majeure en cas d’expulsions collectives massives dont ils sont quelquefois victimes dans certains pays d’accueil. Ces expulsions ne sont accompagnées d’aucune indemnisation. Cette situation pose avec acuité le problème de la protection des migrants et de leurs biens. Il faut déplorer le vide juridique en matière d’expulsions collectives et les textes régissant les expulsions collectives ainsi que ceux régissant les expulsions ou rapatriements individuels sont faibles et ineffectifs. Les immigrants qui séjournent au Niger doivent se conformer aux dispositions réglementant leurs conditions d’entrée et de séjour. Les étrangers résidents ont les mêmes droits que les nationaux tels qu’ils sont décrits par les textes en vigueur. Cependant certaines restrictions existent en matière électorale, d’accès à la fonction publique, d’hébergement, d’activité salariée et non salariée. Les migrants en transit majoritairement ressortissants de l’espace CEDEAO utilisent le Niger comme pays de transit (aucun visa n’est exigé). Le principe de libre circulation est un bon instrument d’intégration régionale, mais il s’arrête aux frontières des pays du Maghreb qui ont des exigences différentes en la matière (instauration généralisée de visas, expulsions massives notamment en Libye) ; du coup les migrants en transit se retrouvent dans une situation irrégulière très préjudiciable pour eux. / Nigeriens generally emigrate to ECOWAS member states, where common rules enable free circulation, establishment and residence to all citizens. The stay of Nigeriens abroad becomes a worry in case of massive collective expulsions, as occurs from time to time in some receiving countries. These expulsions involve no financial compensation and call into question the protection of migrants and their property. We regret the lack of regulations regarding collective expulsion, and the texts governing collective expulsion as well as individual expulsion and repatriation are weak and ineffective. Immigrants in Niger have to respect provisions concerning entrance and stays in the country. Foreign residents have the same rights as nationals, with some exceptions regarding elections, access to the civil service, accommodation, access to employment and self-employment. Transit migrants, mostly from ECOWAS countries, often pass through Niger as no visa is required. Free movement is a means of regional integration, but it stops at the borders of Maghreb countries, which have different rules in this regard : generalized visa requirement, collective expulsions, especially from Libya. As a matter of fact, transit migrants find themselves in an irregular and thus difficult situation.

Si la problématique de la migration hautement qualifiée n’est pas centrale en Mauritanie, elle s’y pose pourtant de façon incidente au détour d’autres questions importantes telles que la compétitivité du marché du travail, les problèmes du système de formation, les contre-performances de l’économie nationale et du système de gouvernance etc. D’ailleurs, la République Islamique de Mauritanie ne constitue pas une destination ou une zone de transit pour des élites qualifiées en migration. En revanche, elle produit une élite religieuse immigrée dans les pays musulmans et sur laquelle peu d’informations statistiques existent réellement. De même, un personnel éduqué dans des domaines de pointe est en cours de constitution dans les pays du Nord. Des exilés politiques, parfois en nombre important au regard de la population du pays, se sont retrouvés à l’étranger dans des conditions précises qui les conduisent à grossir précisément les rangs des cerveaux en immigration en l’occurrence forcée. Cette diaspora participe souvent de façon active aux débats politiques et sociaux nationaux et y pèse parfois d’un certain poids. C’est ce qui conduit d’ailleurs les différentes autorités à s’intéresser aux élites mauritaniennes installées hors du pays. Ces dernières cherchent également, au-delà de l’implication politique, à s’organiser et à coordonner leurs actions en vue de participer au développement de leur patrie d’origine, sans grand succès pour l’instant. Although highly-skilled migration is not a central issue in Mauritania, it nonetheless attracts attention because of its bearing on the competitiveness of the labour market there, the poor performance of national economic policies and the prevailing governmental system. Whilst Mauritania is not a transit or destination country for qualified migrants, educated Mauritanian religious elites in several Muslim countries are certainly worth mentioning. Statistical information for these trends remains, however, scarce. Another category of qualified expatriates is the skilled Mauritanian Diaspora in high-tech sectors in northern countries. A significant number of politically-exiled Mauritanian immigrants, who might be said to be part of a national brain drain, should also be taken into account. These categories of qualified nationals actively participate in political and social debates in the homeland and have, at times, an impact there. This has led Mauritanian government officials to express growing interest in skilled nationals settled abroad. Due to the country’s political instability, this interest remains though sporadic. Mauritanian elites residing abroad strive, with limited success, to coordinate their activities with a view to contributing to the country’s development.

The concept of tolerance and the practice of toleration were the lenses through which the project ACCEPT PLURALISM developed between 2010 and 2013. It explored a set of contemporary diversity challenges, mainly in the fields of education and politics in 15 European countries. A plurality of concepts and terms exist as regards the possible ways of dealing with cultural diversity and the challenges that it raises in Europe today. Toleration is a contested concept subject to disputes that change over time. There is general consensus that a society needs to be clear about what it does and does not tolerate, and what it agrees to accept, respect and accommodate within the public sphere. There are things that we should not tolerate but we should be able to discuss publicly. These include racism and sexism, but also more specific concerns that have been at the forefront of public debates on cultural or religious diversity over the past few years, such as marriage at the age of puberty, polygamy and so on. There are also issues that should be tolerated, and hence should not be outlawed, but about which it is not necessary that we all come to an agreement. Finally, the limitations of tolerance also need to be acknowledged. Tolerance involves power: the power of the majority over a minority. And it also implies non-acceptance or non-respect. ‘To tolerate’ can mean to live and let live but it may also mean to look down upon, and disapprove. In other words, in some cases tolerance hides inequality and domination. Muslims and the Roma The case studies undertaken in the ACCEPT PLURALISM project have shown that there are mainly two groups in Europe that attract negative attention in the public sphere because of their presumed inability to integrate into mainstream European secular, modern, democratic societies: Muslims and the Roma. Interestingly, while Muslims are for their most part a post-immigration minority, the Roma are natives of Europe (or indeed are supposed to have immigrated to Europe from India about a thousand years ago). But what matters most here are the ways in which they are perceived to be culturally, ethnically or religiously different thus putting to the test society’s dominant norms and practices. Both Muslims and the Roma acquired a renewed significance in the post-1989 period in Europe. With the implosion of the Communist regimes and the re-unification of Europe, particularly after the 2004 Enlargement, there was a need for new ‘Others’ against whom to reassert a positive identity relating to this reconnected and enlarged Europe. These two Europe-wide minorities, present in most EU countries, offer a mirror against which Europe can assert its common values. This is particularly important as these values are relatively universal (peace, human rights, equality, freedom) and hence do not offer a strong enough emotional basis on which to forge a political community. Religious Diversity Our research suggested that the most challenging form of cultural diversity is religious diversity. In all of the 15 European and moderately secular countries that were studied, it became evident that the presence of a dominant religion unavoidably frames discourses and institutional structures. However, the question of secularism arises mainly in relation to minority religions, but also particularly in relation to Islam, and not in relation to the expression of a majority, institutionalised religion, given as a default option. The study of different countries showed that not all minorities demand the same type of solutions. While some Muslim or Roma students in Sweden, Germany, the UK or Bulgaria may ask for their religious dress code to be accommodated for, in France or Greece immigrants ask to be treated on the basis of equality and secularism, asking however that no concessions would be made for any religious faiths. Our research also showed that it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between ethnic or religious discrimination and socio-economic disadvantage. In the case of the Roma for instance, the question of alleviating poverty, and improving access to basic services and employment appear as a necessary step before any other policy aiming at combating discrimination and segregation can or should be introduced. Policies aiming to address the situation need to tackle both dimensions simultaneously. Levels of Diversity Governance: Local, National, European Cultural, ethnic and religious diversity challenges play out at local, national and EU levels, but integration takes place at the local level, even if policies are national and guidelines are European. Equally, our case studies also showed that intolerance and exclusion are promoted at local level by local political groups, often with the aim of gaining votes by blaming immigrants for urban decay or insufficient welfare resources, and hence hampering national policy efforts of integration. Despite repeated decrees and programmes for the integration of Roma children in mainstream schools, both local authorities and parents associations have strongly resisted such de-segregation efforts in Greece, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Poland. The national level remains the most important one for addressing cultural diversity challenges and proposing sound legislative solutions, while the EU offers opportunities to civil society actors and public administrations for networking and funding, it also represents an additional political arena for mobilisation. Best Practices and Tolerance Indicators One of the aims of the ACCEPT PLURALISM project was to compare tensions arising in different countries by different types of minorities, notably native historical minorities vs. migrant populations, with a view to highlighting common practices and policies. Good practices were identified, albeit in a small number of countries. For instance, a tradition of autonomy in education, and the possibility of setting up ‘free schools’ in Denmark or the Netherlands that satisfy the request of parents to have their children educated according to their own philosophy and beliefs, opened up the possibility of setting up Muslim faith schools in both countries. The project clearly suggested the need not only for exchanging good practices and policy learning among countries and between the wider fields of migrant and native minority integration policies. It also pointed to the need for effective monitoring and assessment on how each policy measure, targeted programme or grassroots initiative contributes to a more tolerant and more cohesive society. The project thus created the Tolerance Indicators Toolkit, a set of indicators that can be applied in specific policy areas (mainly in school life and in politics), for specific periods of time and/or on specific issues, providing an overview of how a country is doing in that specific field, by comparison to other countries or to itself in the past.

La migration économique vers l’Arabie Saoudite et les Emirats Arabes Unis a pris de l’importance principalement à partir du « boom pétrolier » de 1973. Cette migration intéresse pratiquement toutes les régions du Maroc ; elle est favorisée par les mesures restrictives prises par l’Europe et les similitudes culturelles avec ces pays. Les secteurs d’emploi des migrants dans ces pays couvrent une gamme très variée de branches dans le secteur des services, avec une prédominance de l’emploi féminin en particulier aux EAU, mais aussi dans les petits métiers tels l’artisanat, la mécanique, l’électricité et l’électronique, etc. Globalement, l’approche politique à cette question est menée sous le signe du paradoxe : « le besoin en main-d’œuvre et le non désir des étrangers» Cette peur d’être absorbés par les étrangers s’explique par le fait que les pays du Golfe enregistrent les taux de migration les plus élevés au monde. Si avec l’Arabie Saoudite, le Maroc n’a pas signé de convention de main-d’œuvre, il est lié par un accord avec les EAU et le Qatar signés en 1981 (et avec la Libye signé en 1983). Cette migration dans les pays du Golfe rapporte au Maroc une manne financière substantielle, il enregistre dans la région un fort taux des transferts. Abstract Since the 1973 oil crisis, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates have evolved into important receiver countries of labour migration flows. One of the main sender countries has been Morocco, due both to the limitations put in place by the traditional receiving countries in Europe and the similarity of cultural habits. As to their economic profile, Moroccans emigrants have been employed in a huge variety of sectors, e.g. services, handcrafts, electricity, electronic, and so on. On the whole, the political approach towards immigration issues in the Gulf countries can be summarized by the paradox “wanting labour but not foreigners”. This concern about migrants is partially explained by the fact that the Gulf countries register, today, the world’s highest net migration rates. From a legal perspective, Morocco signed bilateral labour migration agreements with United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Libya. Finally, in terms of migrants’ remittances, immigration in the Gulf countries represents a very important resource for the Moroccan economy.