Ukraine

The issue of combat against human trafficking is very pressing for Ukraine, just like for most postSoviet countries. As it is indicated in the Migration Profile of Ukraine compiled in 2011 by Ukrainian migration experts based on research and on statistical data provided by Ukrainian national authorities and international specialists in the field of migration, Ukraine is primarily a state of origin for human trafficking victims1. Ukraine is also a country of transit for foreigners who became human trafficking or smuggling victims on their way to other countries, primarily Turkey or United Arab Emirates, from Moldova, Russia, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.The issue of combat against human trafficking is very pressing for Ukraine, just like for most postSoviet countries. As it is indicated in the Migration Profile of Ukraine compiled in 2011 by Ukrainian migration experts based on research and on statistical data provided by Ukrainian national authorities and international specialists in the field of migration, Ukraine is primarily a state of origin for human trafficking victims1. Ukraine is also a country of transit for foreigners who became human trafficking or smuggling victims on their way to other countries, primarily Turkey or United Arab Emirates, from Moldova, Russia, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.The issue of combat against human trafficking is very pressing for Ukraine, just like for most postSoviet countries. As it is indicated in the Migration Profile of Ukraine compiled in 2011 by Ukrainian migration experts based on research and on statistical data provided by Ukrainian national authorities and international specialists in the field of migration, Ukraine is primarily a state of origin for human trafficking victims1. Ukraine is also a country of transit for foreigners who became human trafficking or smuggling victims on their way to other countries, primarily Turkey or United Arab Emirates, from Moldova, Russia, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.The issue of combat against human trafficking is very pressing for Ukraine, just like for most postSoviet countries. As it is indicated in the Migration Profile of Ukraine compiled in 2011 by Ukrainian migration experts based on research and on statistical data provided by Ukrainian national authorities and international specialists in the field of migration, Ukraine is primarily a state of origin for human trafficking victims1. Ukraine is also a country of transit for foreigners who became human trafficking or smuggling victims on their way to other countries, primarily Turkey or United Arab Emirates, from Moldova, Russia, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.The issue of combat against human trafficking is very pressing for Ukraine, just like for most postSoviet countries. As it is indicated in the Migration Profile of Ukraine compiled in 2011 by Ukrainian migration experts based on research and on statistical data provided by Ukrainian national authorities and international specialists in the field of migration, Ukraine is primarily a state of origin for human trafficking victims1. Ukraine is also a country of transit for foreigners who became human trafficking or smuggling victims on their way to other countries, primarily Turkey or United Arab Emirates, from Moldova, Russia, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.

National statistics (official data) in Ukraine on migration issues include state statistics, such as information collected by the State Statistics Service of Ukraine and ministerial statistics, and data collected by the ministries and state agencies on given aspects of migration. Here and below all the institutional establishments in Ukraine are listed under their current names: in April 2011 a complete reorganisation of these authorities was made, and a number of establishments were renamed or combined with other establishments. In 2012, the Ministry of Revenue and Duties of Ukraine was established by a merging of the State Tax Service and the State Customs Service of Ukraine. In 2013, the Ministry of Education and Science, Youth and Sports of Ukraine was divided into the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine and the Ministry of Youth and Sports of Ukraine.

The national migration-related legislation in Ukraine comprises the Constitution of Ukraine, Ukraine?s international treaties, laws and regulatory by-laws.

Under article 26 of the Ukrainian Constitution, foreigners and stateless persons who are staying in Ukraine on legal grounds enjoy the same rights and freedoms and have the same obligations as Ukrainian citizens, with the exception of certain cases envisaged by Ukrainian legislation. In the meantime, the scope of socio-economic rights of foreigners in the territory of Ukraine is determined by the legal status that they obtain according to the procedure established by the national legislation. In order to analyze the socio-economic rights of migrants and persons who were granted refugee status or supplementary protection in Ukraine, let us divide them into the following categories based on the Ukrainian law “On legal status of foreigners and stateless persons”and the law “On refugees and persons in need of supplementary or temporary protection”: persons temporarily staying in Ukraine; persons temporarily residing in Ukraine; persons permanentlyUnder article 26 of the Ukrainian Constitution, foreigners and stateless persons who are staying in Ukraine on legal grounds enjoy the same rights and freedoms and have the same obligations as Ukrainian citizens, with the exception of certain cases envisaged by Ukrainian legislation. In the meantime, the scope of socio-economic rights of foreigners in the territory of Ukraine is determined by the legal status that they obtain according to the procedure established by the national legislation. In order to analyze the socio-economic rights of migrants and persons who were granted refugee status or supplementary protection in Ukraine, let us divide them into the following categories based on the Ukrainian law “On legal status of foreigners and stateless persons”and the law “On refugees and persons in need of supplementary or temporary protection”: persons temporarily staying in Ukraine; persons temporarily residing in Ukraine; persons permanentlyUnder article 26 of the Ukrainian Constitution, foreigners and stateless persons who are staying in Ukraine on legal grounds enjoy the same rights and freedoms and have the same obligations as Ukrainian citizens, with the exception of certain cases envisaged by Ukrainian legislation. In the meantime, the scope of socio-economic rights of foreigners in the territory of Ukraine is determined by the legal status that they obtain according to the procedure established by the national legislation. In order to analyze the socio-economic rights of migrants and persons who were granted refugee status or supplementary protection in Ukraine, let us divide them into the following categories based on the Ukrainian law “On legal status of foreigners and stateless persons”and the law “On refugees and persons in need of supplementary or temporary protection”: persons temporarily staying in Ukraine; persons temporarily residing in Ukraine; persons permanentlyUnder article 26 of the Ukrainian Constitution, foreigners and stateless persons who are staying in Ukraine on legal grounds enjoy the same rights and freedoms and have the same obligations as Ukrainian citizens, with the exception of certain cases envisaged by Ukrainian legislation.

During 2011 the visa-immigration legislation of Ukraine was radically changed. New decrees and laws of Ukraine were adopted, visa procedures as well as procedure of entry-exit were simplified. For instance, instead of twenty-two types of Ukrainian visas there are now three types (short and long stay, transit visa). In case a foreigner needs to prolong his/her stay in Ukraine (for instance his/her working contract has been prolonged) he/she may do it without leaving Ukraine with a view to applying for a new long-stay visa ?D? at Ukrainian consulate abroad. Members of migrant families of migrants that temporarily or permanently reside in Ukraine received a right to apply for a long stay. This new visa legislation should enhance the circular migration of foreign citizens in Ukraine. Ukrainian legislation protects migrant rights ? citizens of Ukraine working and residing abroad through national legislation and provisions of bilateral agreemants. At the same time there is the need to expand a network of bilateral agreemants in the field of social security and the protection of rights of Ukrainian citizens migrants residing and working abroad.

Based on official data and sociological studies the article provides an overview of the main features of contemporary migration processes in Ukraine and its key implications for changes in the socio-political situation in the country. The conclusion is that international labor migration from Ukraine is a natural form of citizens’ spatial self-organization in the conditions of the economic crises and unstable political situation in the country and the world. Attention is drawn to the fact that although immigration is gaining momentum in Ukraine (since the mid-2000s it became the host country with a positive balance of international movements), it is unable to compensate for the increasing competential imbalance in the domestic labor market and make up for the loss of national human resources. Low integration potential of the existing system of social and labor relations prevents the successful inclusion into society of returning Ukrainian migrants and arriving in Ukraine foreign labor force. Prevention of mass migration outflows from Ukraine due to improved economic, legal and civil environment in the country, promotion of comprehensive monitoring of citizens entering and leaving the country and their full integration into the internal labor market should be a priority of the national strategy and tactics for the national development of Ukraine.

The paper assesses opportunities and develops proposals for the integration of immigrants, as well as the adaptation of re-emigrants – long-term Ukrainian labour migrants returning home. An analysis of immigration to Ukraine has been carried out on the basis of: the 2001 population census; the current registering of migration processes; and also administrative sources of information. These sources include material from the Ministry of the Interior of Ukraine, the State Migration Service of Ukraine, the State Employment Service of the Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine, the Ministry of Education and Science, Youth and Sports of Ukraine, as well as data from special sampling surveys, including those held under the author’s guidance. The paper considers three specific migration groups in Ukraine: ‘non-traditional’ immigrants; the ‘Soviet Diaspora’; and long-term labour emigrants. An assessment has been made of ‘non-traditional’ immigrants in Ukraine and the prospects for their integration. A bilateral approach was here employed – the comparison of opinions from Ukrainian citizens and from foreigners on the basis of student youth surveys (including foreign students). It has been demonstrated that the frequency of contacts between immigrants and the receiving society is an important integration mechanism. An assessment has been made of the conditions of long-term Ukrainian migrants in recipient countries with the conclusion that these conditions are not significantly different from the conditions of short- and medium-term migrants. Particular attention has been paid to the ‘Soviet Diaspora,’ thus far practically untouched by scholarly publications in Ukraine. It is shown that the Soviet Diaspora in Ukraine (and other former USSR republics) has certain features sharply distinguishing it from ‘diaspora’ in the classical sense. An attempt has been made to define the term, develop the criteria to limit the reference groups and to assess the dimensions of the Soviet Diaspora. An analysis of current Ukrainian immigration policies has been given. Policy recommendations for perfecting Ukrainian state policy in the field of immigration, immigrants’ integration and the reintegration of returning long-term Ukrainian labour migrants have been formulated as well.

This note provides an overview of existing data sources on international migration from and to Ukraine and sets out their main limitations. These sources include population censuses, administrative records, household surveys and data from the state authorities responsible for migration data collection and management. The Ukraine State Department of Citizenship, Immigration and Registration (under the Ministry of Interior) is currently the key authority with respect to the registration of Ukrainian nationals going abroad permanently and for foreign nationals residing in Ukraine. It is also responsible for the issuance of temporary and permanent residence permits and for the granting of citizenship. The Ministry of Social Policy, through its Public Employment Centers, issues work permits. The consular services of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are responsible for issuance of visas outside Ukraine and for the registration of Ukrainian nationals residing abroad. It is planned that most of the tasks in the fields of citizenship policy, immigration, registration and asylum will be performed by one institution ? the recently re-established State Migration Service of Ukraine.

The paper discusses recent developments in Ukrainian migratory corridor, focusing on transit migration, a reality that has emerged since independence. It analyzes push and pull factors underpinning the rise in mobility which followed the downfall of the Soviet Union, traces the different ways that migrants enter Ukraine and examines routes followed by them in entering Europe, transiting through Ukraine. It will be demonstrated that the Ukrainian migratory corridor comprises multiple channels, chains, paths and routes which turn the country into a sort of a ‘migratory highway’ in the very heart of Europe. The paper examines core groups of non-nationals residing in Ukraine and discusses their human rights and safety conditions. It reviews issues pertaining to cooperation between Ukraine and the European Union in the area of migration control, placing emphasis on the effectiveness of current European policies regarding border management there. The present paper argues that the EU and Ukraine should make more efforts to mainstream human rights and security considerations into their bilateral cooperation and add more political will and mutual trust to enable fruitful dialogue on migration matters.

The paper focuses on the role of labor migration in Ukrainian development, particularly its impact upon demographics and the labor market. The author evaluates the real size and composition of the resident population of Ukraine. It is demonstrated that the de facto population is almost 1.5% smaller than its official size. The impact of external labor migration on the unemployment level is studied. It is demonstrated that without labor migration the unemployment level in Ukraine would be almost twice as high as the registered level. Special attention is paid to the entrepreneurial potential of labor migrants and its possible financial effects. It is proved that the main challenge associated with labor migration policy in the country is the underestimation of the possibility of using the entrepreneurial potential of labor migrants and their relatives staying in Ukraine. The potential financial benefits from the entrepreneurial activities of migrants and their relatives exceeds 1 billion hryvnias (around 100 million euros) as of 2010. It is demonstrated that in 10-12 years Ukraine will face a workforce deficit. Ukraine will need employable-age migrants up until 2061, namely 7.9 mln. people. The need to pursue a more proactive policy of immigrant integration is justified. Based on the analysis performed, recommendations for improvements in Ukrainian state policy are developed and justified, including measures in the field of emigration regulation, as well as the attraction and integration of immigrants.

Remittances flowing from Ukrainian migrants working in high-income countries to Ukraine are an increasingly important source of extra income for migrants’ families. Given the increasing size of aggregate remittance inflows, they are also expected to be a potential source of funding for the social and economic development of Ukraine as a whole. If remittances enhance investment in physical and human capital and thus boost productivity, they can help mitigate the possible negative economic effects of rapid population decline and the aging of the Ukrainian population. Yet the potential benefits of remittances are likely to be matched by potential costs. Thus, two main issues are of interest with regard to remittances in Ukraine: • what are their benefits and costs for migrants’ families, local communities, the Ukrainian economy and society; and • how to harness their development potential while limiting any counterproductive side effects. This paper directly addresses these two questions. It does so by reporting first results from an ongoing effort to assess the potential development and unwanted side effects of remittances in Ukraine. These results come from a survey of the empirical literature in Ukraine and other transition economies and are supported, where possible, by the author’s contributions. The purpose of this work is to draw out evidence-based policy implications.

At this stage national refugee-related legislation in Ukraine is relatively precise and transparent. In particular, the Law ?On Refugees and Persons in Need of Complementary or Temporary Protection? is a directly applicable law, since all the procedural issues are precisely and consistently regulated in it, there are practically no provisions that are optional as to their content. The problem remains as regards adjustment of provisions of other laws with provisions of the new Law. In addition, in the course of almost ten years since the moment of Ukraine?s accession to the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, the problem of compliance of Ukraine?s national legislation with its provisions has not been solved. The maximum approximation of national legislation in the area of refugees with the respective legislation of the European Union, in the author?s opinion, is complicated because of differences in the contents of the notion of asylum. In particular, provisions of the Constitution of Ukraine on asylum have been borrowed from the USSR legislation on political emigrants, which is not adjusted to the notion of asylum generally accepted in the international law.

Remittances flowing from Ukrainian migrants working in high-income countries to Ukraine are an increasingly important source of extra income for migrants’ families. Given the increasing size of aggregate remittance inflows, they are also expected to be a potential source of funding for the social and economic development of Ukraine as a whole. If remittances enhance investment in physical and human capital and thus boost productivity, they can help mitigate the possible negative economic effects of rapid population decline and the aging of the Ukrainian population. Yet the potential benefits of remittances are likely to be matched by potential costs. Thus, two main issues are of interest with regard to remittances in Ukraine:  what are their benefits and costs for migrants’ families, local communities, the Ukrainian economy and society; and  how to harness their development potential while limiting any counterproductive side effects. This paper directly addresses these two questions. It does so by reporting first results from an ongoing effort to assess the potential development and unwanted side effects of remittances in Ukraine. These results come from a survey of the empirical literature in Ukraine and other transition economies and are supported, where possible, by the author’s contributions. The purpose of this work is to draw out evidence-based policy implications. Given that data on migration and remittances in Ukraine is incomplete and unreliable, we make use of all existing data sources on private transfers sent to Ukrainian households: data quality is consistently poor, but, we assume that it has similar biases over time. And we focus our analysis on relative changes in remittance inflows over time rather than on their absolute magnitude.

Young people have experienced profound changes in the way Polish national identity is expressed in public since the conservative Law and Justice Party (PiS) gained far-reaching control of Polish politics in 2015. This report exam­ines young people’s political attitudes in conjunction with their views on the arrival of over two million refugees from Ukraine in 2022, and their views on those refugees who have been trying to get into the EU through the Polish- Belarusian border since 2021. Views on both events allow us to better under­stand young people’s sense of Polishness. Moreover, opinions on national his­tory are central to understandings of identity, as are young people’s percep­tions of Poland’s place in Europe. The fears and uncertainties young Poles express are analysed in an original online survey conducted in March 2022 among 2 002 respondents aged 16–34, combined with insights from focus group discussions conducted in May 2022 among a set of young participants and participants aged 65 and older in the cit­ies of Gdańsk and Lublin. Such a combination of methodologies allows unique insights into the reasoning behind the patterns that a survey can identify. The key findings are as follows: - Nearly half of young people state that Poland should let in as many refugees from Ukraine as necessary. The presence of Ukrainians in Poland since the start of the war in Ukraine in 2014 and the resulting personal contacts are an important factor in the welcoming attitude to and support for the Ukrainian refugees who have arrived since February 2022. - There is also overall approval for the political support for Ukraine, in par­ticular when it comes to supplying humanitarian assistance. In addition, nearly 15 % of respondents support the deployment of Polish soldiers to Ukraine. - The welcoming attitude vis-à-vis Ukrainian refugees stands in stark con­trast to the support for the pushbacks of the mostly Muslim refugees who have tried to enter Poland via Belarus since 2021. The relative ethnic and religious homogeneity of Poland that resulted from World War II feeds into fear of others, particularly Muslims. There is, moreover, rather low support for granting those refugees the right to apply for asylum, with only 9 % of young people stating that these people should definitely have the right to apply. - Gender is crucial when it comes to understanding the different views on the refugees coming from Ukraine and the Middle East. Women are more likely to want to see refugees from Ukraine return as soon as it becomes possible to Ukraine, whereas men are more likely to support a hard line on refugees at the border with Belarus. - Despite the current government’s involvement in memory politics, the com­mon Polish-Ukrainian history is practically unknown to young Poles, and even when it is known it is considered largely irrelevant. Ukraine and Be­larus are for young Poles a different ‘Eastern Europe’ than the Central Eu­rope they feel part of. - The informal help that Polish people, including the younger generation, have offered to refugees from Ukraine is hard to quantify. Many offered ac­commodation in their own homes, transportation, or help in settling in, but few would consider this ‘humanitarian aid’ in the early phase of the war. - Resentment and fear are among the key emotions driving the opinions and sentiments of many young people when they talk about their attitudes towards refugees and related changes in Polish society and politics. Young Poles, and particularly young women, are significantly more concerned about welfare issues such as access to childcare, healthcare, and the situa­tion on the job market than people of their grandparents’ generation. These fears and uncertainties underpin assessments of politics and attitudes to­wards ethnic and social diversity in Poland.

Ukraine’s involvement in global migration processes after the fall of the Iron Curtain and dissolution of the Soviet Union has been a simple fact. But one of the negative consequences of the outward labor migration of Ukrainian nationals has been that human trafficking emerged and became increasingly frequent. In the 1990s and the early 2000s, Ukraine was a country of origin and to some extent a country of transit for persons who found themselves in the situation of slavery. Over recent years Ukraine has increasingly become a country of destination for human-trafficking victims, while cases of domestic trafficking within Ukraine are also widespread.

This research explores to what extent regional policies in Turkey and Ukraine secure an economic development of regions and better off local economic and social standards, increasing economic potential and decreasing motivation to migration. The research is carried out through a comparative analysis of what the EU has classified as ‘industrial and enterprise’ and ‘employment and social’ policies, and their effects, in selected regions of Turkey and Ukraine .

According to Ukrainian politicians, in Ukraine the topic of migration became relevant at the parliamentary level during the Orange revolution of 2004, as “in the course of voting it suddenly turned out that some citizens who are in the voting lists in fact do not reside in Ukraine. And society (some people with horror, some with surprise) found out that the country is short of several – in fact many – million citizens”1