

POLICY OPTION  
BRIEF

January **2019**

Roberto Cortinovis

MIGRATION

**Contributing to global responsibility-sharing  
for refugees: the role of EU external funding**



**ReSOMA** identifies the most pressing topics and needs relating to the migration, asylum and integration debate. Building on the identification of pivotal issues and controversies in the ReSOMA Discussion Briefs, **ReSOMA Policy Option Briefs** provide an overview of available evidence and new analysis of policy alternatives. They take stock of existing literature of policy solutions on asylum, migration and integration, highlight the alternatives that can fill key policy gaps and map their support among various stakeholders. They have been written under the supervision of Sergio Carrera (CEPS/EUI) and Thomas Huddleston (MPG).

**Download this document and learn more about the Research Social Platform on Migration and Asylum at: [www.resoma.eu](http://www.resoma.eu)**

LINGUISTIC VERSION

Original: EN

Manuscript completed in January 2019

Unless otherwise indicated, the opinions expressed in this document are attributable only to the author and not to any institution with which he is associated, nor do they necessarily represent the official position of the European Commission.

Reproduction and translation for non-commercial purposes are authorised, provided the source is acknowledged and the publisher is given prior notice and sent a copy.

Contact: [resoma@resoma.eu](mailto:resoma@resoma.eu)



This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation program under the grant agreement 770730

# Contributing to global responsibility-sharing for refugees: the role of EU external funding\*

## 1. INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the need to address the long-term consequences of major displacement situations worldwide, first of all those generated by the Syrian crisis, has fostered a renewed debate among international actors on how to achieve sustainable solutions for the 16.9 million refugees worldwide that currently reside in developing regions (UNHCR 2018a). As testified by the text of the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR), endorsed by the UN General Assembly in December 2018, a consensus has been built among key international stakeholders on the need to move away from a paradigm based on indefinite provision of humanitarian assistance towards the adoption of a development-based approach to displacement.<sup>1</sup>

Specifically, the GCR emphasises the need to strengthen the resilience of refugees and their host communities, underlying the need to mainstream displacement issues into the development programmes and policies of host countries. In this context, predictable

and adequate funding is identified as a key priority for furthering the objectives of the Compact. While needs-driven humanitarian assistance remains a priority, the Refugee Compact underlines the importance of deploying additional development resources, over and above regular development assistance, to improve the socio-economic situation of refugees and their host communities.

Despite being a non-binding document, the Global Compact on Refugees advances a set of new structures and arrangements to strengthen cooperation and solidarity with refugees and host countries. Specifically, the Compact calls for a Global Refugee Forum to be held periodically at the ministerial level starting in December 2019, where states and other actors can make pledges in different forms, including financial, material and technical assistance. In addition, the Compact foresees the activation of so-called Support Platforms, composed of a group of states committed to mobilise contributions and support in

---

<sup>1</sup> See "The Global Compact on Refugees. Final Draft" (as of 26 June 2018). Online: <https://www.un.org/pga/72/wp-content/uploads/sites/51/2018/07/Global-Compact-on-Refugees.pdf>

\*By Roberto Cortinovis ([Centre for European Policy Studies](#))

favour of host countries facing large scale and complex refugee situations.

In light of the momentum raised by the Refugee Compact and the agenda it lays down to foster responsibility sharing for refugees at the global level, it is crucial to reflect on the role that EU external funding can play in implementing the commitments included in the Compact. Addressing this question is particularly relevant considering that EU institutions are currently in the process of negotiating funding priorities for the next Multiannual Financial framework, which will span the period 2021-2027.

Moreover, policy debates on EU priorities for the next financial period follow a period of intense external activism on the part of EU institutions, which in the last few years have mobilised the entire arsenal of EU external funding instruments to deal with the so-called 'refugee crisis'. To that end, new funding mechanisms, such as EUTFs and the Refugee facility for Turkey have been created, often in a very short timeframe, to address a range of issues related to refugee protection in countries of origin and transit. The legacy of those policy initiatives and their relevance for the future EU external

action in the area of refugee protection, however, is far from uncontroversial: many NGOs supporting migrants and refugees' rights have severely criticised the mobilisation of EU external funding in the context of the previously mentioned financial mechanisms. They see it as being motivated by a containment approach, which runs counter to the rationale on which the Global Compact on Refugees is premised, namely furthering solidarity and responsibility-sharing among the international community.

Against the backdrop of ongoing debates on the role of EU external funding in addressing refugee and migration related issues, this Policy brief provides, as a first step, an account of the experience of 'emergency instruments' introduced at the EU level in the aftermath of the 'refugee crisis', which underlies the main issues raised by both civil society actors and researchers in relation to these instruments. In a second step, this brief describes some of the key policy options and recommendations to address refugee situations in third countries put forward by relevant stakeholders in relation to the next phase (2021-2027) of EU external funding.

## 2. THE LEGACY OF EU POLICY RESPONSES TO THE 'REFUGEE CRISIS'

The priority of mobilising development assistance to support the socio-economic conditions of refugees and local communities in the main hosting countries has gained increasing relevance within the EU agenda in the past few years. The 2016 Commission Communication on Forced Displacement and Development, in particular, took stock of debates conducted in international venues by advocating for the adoption of a “resilience” approach to forced displacement: this implies deploying a set of policy initiatives to harness the productive capacities of refugees, by helping them to access education, housing, livelihoods and services, and by supporting interaction between them and their host community (European Commission, 2016).

To achieve that aim, the 2016 Communication stressed the importance of deploying flexible and predictable funding. EU Trust Funds (EUTF) were singled out as promising instruments for integrating different EU financial sources and additional funding from the Member States. In line with the approach laid down in the Communication, the EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis (the ‘Madad Fund’) endowed with a budget of €1.5 billion, was launched in 2014 to address the long-term educational, economic and social needs of Syrian refugees and host communities in neighbouring countries such as Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Tur-

key. In parallel, the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, with a budget of €4.1 billion, was established in the context of the EU-Africa Summit on Migration held in La Valletta in November 2015. The EUTF for Africa targets a wide group of countries across three geographic windows: North Africa, the Sahel, the Lake Chad region and the Horn of Africa. Money from the EUTF for Africa is used to finance resilience-related activities (such as the implementation of Regional Development and Protection Programmes in countries hosting refugees), but also to improve the migration management capacity of third countries, including in the areas of border control, return and readmission (Carrera et al., 2018).

The Facility for Refugees in Turkey was established by means of a Commission Decision in November 2015. In contrast to EUTFs, the Facility is not a funding mechanism, but a coordination mechanism that mobilises resources made available under both the EU budget and additional contributions from Member States integrated into the EU budget. The Facility was endowed with an initial budget of €3 billion for the period 2016-2017. In March 2018, noting that the operational envelope of the first €3 billion tranche of the Facility had been fully contracted before the end of 2017, the Commission adopted a decision on the allocation of a second €3 billion tranche for the period 2018-2019.

EUTFs and the Facility for Refugees in Turkey have been the object of considerable attention by researchers and stakeholders. Specifically, EUTFs have been recognised as promising tools for complementing traditional models of EU external financing, enabling cooperation between a wide range of development actors. The EUTF for Africa, for example, has been recognised as capable of addressing the fragmentation of existing EU and Member states funding streams by providing a rapid and flexible response to emerging needs. Specifically, the value added of the EUTF for Africa has been recognised in the possibility to focus on the targeted use of development assistance to support communities affected by displacement and on strengthening national and sub-national service delivery systems (Castillejo, 2015; Oxfam, 2017). The same arguments can also be used to justify the establishment of the EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey: indeed, the Facility has been presented by the Commission as a coordination mechanism that ensures the optimal mobilisation of relevant existing EU financing instruments, including humanitarian and non-humanitarian assistance, enabling to address the needs of refugees and host communities in a comprehensive and coordinated manner (European Commission, 2018a).

Researchers and stakeholders, however, have also underlined the challenges associated with the adoption and implementation of “crisis instruments”, and specifically the trade-off between the priority of deploying rap-

id and flexible responses in emergency contexts, and the need to conform to established standards of transparency and democratic accountability (Den Hertog, 2016; Cortinovis & Conte, 2016). A first set of concerns involves the reduced level of democratic oversight allowed for by EUTFs: given that these instruments operate outside the EU budget, the EP plays only a negligible role in their establishment and has limited possibilities for oversight. More broadly, an approach based on the use of “extra-budget” instruments (such as is the case of EUTFs) and ‘extra-Treaty’ arrangements (e.g. the EU–Turkey Statement or the Valletta Declaration) to back cooperation with third countries has been associated with a trend towards increased bilateralism and intergovernmentalism in EU migration and asylum policy (Carrera et al., 2018, p. 74). This is particularly problematic in light of the legal and institutional order that the Lisbon Treaty was supposed to consolidate in those areas of EU action, in particular by providing for the role of the EP as “co-legislator” in the decision-making process.

In this regard, NGOs have denounced the fact that an approach that combines non-binding forms of cooperation with third countries with financial instruments that allow the circumvention of established accountability requirements in the use of funds may be used to promote a narrow security-driven agenda (Oxfam, 2017, p. 25). A joint statement of more than a hundred NGOs released in June 2016 expressed deep concerns about the di-

rection taken by EU external migration policy, and specifically about attempts to make deterrence and return the main objective of the EU's relations with third countries (ACT Alliance EU et al., 2016). According to the statement, attempts to replicate the conditionality-based model of the EU-Turkey deal with other key countries of origin and transit of migrants risks cementing a shift towards a foreign policy that serves a single objective, to curb migration, at the expense of European credibility and leverage in defence of fundamental values and human rights.

In the case of the Refugee Facility for Turkey, observers have underlined how its very existence is closely linked at the policy level to the implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement of March 2016, as financial incentives provided through the Facility constituted one of the main conditions for the Turkish government to accept the commitments included in the EU-Turkey Statement. The 'deal' enables the removal to Turkey of asylum seekers arriving at the Greek islands after 20 March 2016 based on the premise that Turkey is a "safe country" for refugees. This assumption, however, has been contested by, among others, legal scholars, NGOs, the UNHCR and also the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, in light of mounting proof of widespread rule of law and human rights violations in the country (Carrera and Guild, 2016; UNHCR,

2016; Council of Europe, 2016). In this regard, the limited number of Syrian refugees returned to Turkey in the framework of the EU-Turkey Statement is a clear demonstration of the legal obstacles that arise when applying the safe third country concept in that specific context (UNHCR, 2018b).

EU efforts to strengthen cooperation with Libya on migration and refugee issues have also been the object of criticism from several sides, including several NGOs and the European Parliament. Since 2015, a set of actions have been launched at the EU level, including in the framework of the EUTF for Africa, to support Libyan authorities on a set of migration related issues, such as Search and Rescue (SAR) operations, border surveillance and an enhanced fight against human smuggling and trafficking (CONCORD, 2018a). In the face of widespread evidence of human rights violations and abuse of refugees and migrants in Libya, including by Libyan national authorities, calls have multiplied on EU policymakers to abandon the current approach based on deterrence and focus instead on protecting human rights and promoting sustainable development in countries facing forced displacement situations (Amnesty International, 2017; Council of Europe, 2018; Danish Refugee Council, 2018; UNHCR, 2018c).

### 3. EU SUPPORT TO GLOBAL REFUGEE POLICY IN THE NEXT MFF 2021-2027

The Commission's structure for the new Multiannual Financial Framework (2021-2027) takes stock of the experience of emergency instruments established during the crisis years (such as the EUTF for Africa and the Facility for Refugees in Turkey) by providing the EU budget with increased flexibility and financial leverage to address complex migration challenges (European Commission, 2018c). The proposal foresees a major restructuring of the external dimension of the EU budget by bringing together 12 existing financial instruments into a broad Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) with a volume of €90 billion.

One of the major changes foreseen by the Commission's proposal to simplify the EU's external spending architecture is the integration of the European Development Fund – currently one of the key financial instruments to provide assistance to African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries – into the EU budget. As underlined by a previous analysis of the Commission's proposal, the amount allocated to the NDICI represents an increase of 11% compared to the resources allocated to the financial instruments and funds that the new external funding instrument is expected to replace (Immenkamp, 2018).

The Commission's proposal recognises stepping up cooperation on migration with partner countries as an essential objective of EU external action. In order to contribute to this priority, the proposal foresees that 10% of the total financial envelope of the new EU external action instrument should be dedicated to addressing the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement and supporting migration management and governance, including the protection of refugees and migrants' rights.

Another key aspect of the proposed Regulation is the attempt by the Commission to inject flexibility in the provision of EU external funding. In this regard, the Commission recognised that, as a consequence of the migration and refugee crisis during 2015-2016, problems were encountered in reallocating funds within the instruments under the EU budget as large portions of funds had been bonded to long-term programmes. In order to address the situation, the new proposal foresees the introduction of a €4 billion Rapid response component with worldwide coverage dedicated to quick response capacity in a number of areas, including strengthening resilience and linking humanitarian and development actions. The Rapid response component would be managed and implemented through simplified procedures, thus allowing for

more flexible and responsive actions. In addition, to further increase the ability of the EU to respond flexibly to unforeseen events, including unexpected migratory pressure, the Commission proposes to create an “emerging challenges and priorities cushion” worth €10 billion.

In March 2019, the Committees on Foreign Affairs and Development of the European Parliament adopted a joint Report on the Commission’s proposal establishing the NDICI (European Parliament 2019). The EP Report includes several amendments to the proposed Regulation. One of the main concerns of the EP Rapporteurs is to balance the need for more flexibility in the deployment of EU external funding with the respect for democratic legitimacy and transparency. To that aim, the EP Report requests the use of Delegated Acts for multiannual programmes to be developed under the new funding instrument, a procedure that would also allow for more political control by the co-legislators when resources under the “emerging challenges and flexibility cushion” are mobilised.

With negotiations among the co-legislations still ongoing, several stakeholders have released their position on the new Commission proposal for the next phase of EU external spending, expressing a set of concerns and recommendations. NGOs have reiterated warnings against the diversion of development aid towards achieving the EU’s external policy priorities in the area of migration control. In this regard,

it has been stressed that the legally ambiguous agreements with third countries based on a logic of conditionality concluded in recent years, such as the EU-Turkey Statement or cooperation with Libyan authorities, do not represent sustainable solutions to be replicated in future EU initiatives (CONCORD, 2018b).

While flexibility and crisis responsive-programming should be considered as an integral part of the EU external action budget toolkit, pursuing those priorities should not lead to a reduction in oversight and transparency or be used to legitimise policies that are based on a narrowly understood migration management concept (Oxfam, 2018). A preliminary analysis of the Commission proposal released by ECRE stresses how the potential gain in predictability and accountability stemming from the integration of the European Development Fund into the EU budget could be offset by the large amount of unallocated money foreseen by the rapid response mechanism and the “flexibility cushion”. In this regard, the experience of EUTFs implemented during the crisis period has shown how faster and rapid procedures run the risk of reducing the quality of intervention and come at the expense of ownership by third countries governments, a key principle of EU development cooperation. Accordingly, ECRE stresses the need to clearly specify the criteria and procedures that would trigger the use of the unallocated reserve, taking into consideration in particular the level of need among refugees and host communities and the

potential of EU funding to improve the rights of displaced persons (ECRE, 2018).

On a broader level, references to the need to address the “root causes of irregular migration” included in the new EU external funding instrument seem to reflect a narrowly understood and conceptually flawed approach to the complex links between development processes and migration phenomena (ECRE, 2018). Against the subordination of EU external action to the imperative of containing migration movements towards Europe, available research points to the role of migration and mobility in enabling access to protection and, more broadly, in providing sustainable solutions for refugees and forced migrants (Long, 2015; Costello, 2019). In this regard, as stated in the Refugee Compact, the use of funding to support refugees and host communities and provide durable solutions should go hand in hand with the commitment by states to ensure access to protection for refugees, through resettlement and complementary pathways of admission.

Criticisms of the EU's strategy of ‘externalising’ responsibility for asylum seek-

ers to third countries does not imply denial that EU external funding has a crucial role to play in addressing forced displacement globally and assist the forcibly displaced and their hosts (UNHCR, 2018d). The new platform for cooperation offered by the GCR represents an opportunity for the EU and its member states to coordinate their actions in support of refugees, thus increasing the impact of EU resources. In this regard, civil society organisations have underlined the importance for the EU of preparing a collective commitment in view of the first Global Refugee Forum in 2019, including in the forms of additional financial assistance (ECRE, 2019). Besides that, the GCR stresses the importance of developing a multi-stakeholder and partnership approach, which requires the elaboration of collective, inclusive and concerted responses to forced displacement situations. Based on this approach, EU funding should be used to mobilise a plurality of actors, including independent civil society organisations, local communities and refugees themselves in the design, monitoring and implementation of actions in support of refugees.

## 4. CONCLUSIONS

As the world's leading donor of humanitarian aid and development assistance, the EU and its Member States have a key role to play in addressing forced displacement situations and providing support and assistance to refugees worldwide. Specifically, and in line with the approach laid down in the GCR, the mobilisation of predictable and additional development funding is crucial for addressing the long-term development needs of refugees and their host communities and achieving durable solutions.

Negotiations of the next MFF 2021-2027 represent a vital opportunity for the EU to consolidate and scale up its engagement in global responsibility sharing for refugees and forced migrants. When assessing relevant policy options for the next phase of EU external funding, EU policymakers should take stock of the issues raised by 'emergency instruments' launched during the past four years, notably EUTFs and the Refugee Facility for Turkey.

Several analyses have underlined how the priority of increasing the speed and flexibility of EU funding that motivated the adoption of new funding mechanisms can put partner countries' ownership, involvement of civil society actors, and accountability at

stake. The limited possibility for the European Parliament to exercise its democratic scrutiny over the use of resources in the case of extra budget instruments (such as is the case of EUTFs) also has important consequences for the EU democratic rule of law as enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty. As stressed by many development NGOs, "breaking down policy silos" should not be to the detriment of established standards of democratic accountability.

Furthermore, civil society organisations have also firmly stressed how the mobilisation of EU resources in the framework of political 'agreements' with countries driven by an overarching containment approach (such as the EU Turkey Statement and the Valletta Declaration), are not aligned with a comprehensive rights-based framework of cooperation and are not conducive to sustainable solutions to complex refugee situations. In light of the previous, negotiations among EU actors on the next MFF, should centre on increasing the transparency and accountability of the EU funding landscape, ensuring at the same time coherence of EU external migration and refugee policy with the humanitarian and development principles enshrined in EU Treaties.

## References

- ACT Alliance EU et al. (2016). "NGOs strongly condemn new EU policies to contain migration." Joint NGO statement ahead of the European Council of 28-29 June. Online: [https://www.ecre.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Final\\_Joint\\_statement\\_110\\_signatories.pdf](https://www.ecre.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Final_Joint_statement_110_signatories.pdf)
- Amnesty International (2017). *Libya's Dark Web of collusion. Abuses against Europe-bound refugees and migrants.* Online: <https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/MDE1975612017ENGLISH.PDF>
- Carrera, S. and E. Guild. (2016). *EU-Turkey plan for handling refugees is fraught with legal and procedural challenges.* CEPS Commentary. Online: <https://www.ceps.eu/publications/eu-turkey-plan-handling-refugees-fraught-legal-and-procedural-challenges>
- Carrera, S., den Hertog, L., Núñez Ferrer, J., Musmeci, R., Pilati, M. and Vosyliute, L. (2018). *Oversight and Management of the EU Trust Funds: Democratic Accountability Challenges and Promising Practices.* Study requested by the CONT Committee of the European Parliament. Online: <https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/EUTrustFundsForEP.pdf>
- Castillejo, C. (2015). *The European Union Trust Fund for Africa: A Glimpse of the Future EU Development Cooperation.* Discussion Paper 22/2016, German Development Institute. Online: [https://www.die-gdi.de/uploads/media/DP\\_22.2016.neu.pdf](https://www.die-gdi.de/uploads/media/DP_22.2016.neu.pdf)
- CONCORD (2018a). *Partnership or conditionality? Monitoring the Migration Compacts and the EU Trust Fund for Africa.* Online: [https://concordeurope.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/CONCORD\\_EUTrustFundReport\\_2018\\_online.pdf](https://concordeurope.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/CONCORD_EUTrustFundReport_2018_online.pdf)
- CONCORD (2018b). *CONCORD's concerns and redlines on the European Commission proposal for a single External Instrument.* Online: [https://concordeurope.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/MFF2021\\_CONCORD\\_reaction\\_SingleExternalInstrument\\_April2018.pdf?d65bd5&d65bd5](https://concordeurope.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/MFF2021_CONCORD_reaction_SingleExternalInstrument_April2018.pdf?d65bd5&d65bd5)
- Cortinovis, R. and Conte, C. (2018). *Migration-related Conditionality in EU external funding.* ReSOMA Discussion Brief. Online: <http://www.resoma.eu/publications/discussion-brief-migration-related-conditionality-eu-external-funding>
- Costello (2019). *Refugees and (Other) Migrants: Will the Global Compacts Ensure Safe Flight and Onward Mobility for Refugees?* International Journal of Refugee Law. Online: <https://academic.oup.com/ijrl/advance-article/doi/10.1093/ijrl/eey060/5288417>
- Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly (2016). *The situation of refugees and migrants under the EU-Turkey Agreement of 18 March 2016, Doc. 14028, 19 April.* Online: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/5836fb994.html>
- Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly (2018). *The situation in Libya: prospects and role of the Council of Europe. Resolution 2215 (2018).* Online: <http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-EN.asp?fileid=24738&lang=en>
- Danish Refugee Council (2018). *EU-Libya migration cooperation: shipwrecked values of humanity.* DRC Policy Brief. Online: <https://drc.ngo/news/eu-libya-migration-cooperation-shipwrecked-values-of-humanity>
- den Hertog, L. (2016). *EU Budgetary Responses to the 'Refugee Crisis': Reconfiguring the Funding Landscape.* CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe, No. 93, May.

- Online: <https://www.ceps.eu/publications/eu-budgetary-responses-%E2%80%98refugee-crisis%E2%80%99-reconfiguring-funding-landscape>
- ECRE (2018). *The price of rights: Asylum and EU external funding*. Online: <https://www.ecre.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Policy-Note-12.pdf>
- ECRE (2019). *Global means global: Europe and the Global Compact on Refugees*. Policy Note #15. Online: <https://www.ecre.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Policy-Note-15.pdf>
- European Commission (2016). *Lives in Dignity: from Aid-dependence to Self-reliance Forced Displacement and Development*. COM(2016) 234 final.
- European Commission (2018a). *Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. Second Annual Report on the Facility for Refugees in Turkey*. COM(2018) 91 final.
- European Commission (2018b). *Commission Decision of 14 March 2018 on the Facility for Refugees in Turkey amending Commission Decision C(2015) 9500 as regards the contribution to the Facility for Refugees in Turkey (2018/C 106/05)*.
- European Commission (2018c). *Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument*. COM(2018) 460 final.
- European Parliament (2019). *Report on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (COM(2018)0460 – C8-0275/2018 – 2018/0243(COD))*
- Immenkamp, B. (2018). *A new neighborhood, development and international cooperation instrument Proposal for a new regulation*. EU Legislation in Progress 2021-2027 MFF Briefing. Online: [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/628251/EPRS\\_BRI\(2018\)628251\\_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/628251/EPRS_BRI(2018)628251_EN.pdf)
- Long, K. (2015). *From Refugee to Migrant? Labor Mobility's Protection Potential*. Migration Policy Institute Report. Online: <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/refugee-migrant-labor-mobilitys-protection-potential>
- OHCHR (2018). *Abuse Behind Bars: Arbitrary and unlawful detention in Libya*. [https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/LY/AbuseBehindBarsArbitraryUnlawful EN.pdf](https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/LY/AbuseBehindBarsArbitraryUnlawfulEN.pdf)
- Oxfam (2017). *An Emergency for Whom? The EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa – Migratory Routes and Development Aid in Africa*. Briefing Note. <https://www.oxfam.org/en/research/emergency-whom-eu-emergency-trust-fund-africa-migratory-routes-and-development-aid-africa>
- Oxfam (2018). *EU risks eroding global role with proposed foreign policy budget*. Online: <https://www.oxfam.org/en/pressroom/reactions/eu-risks-eroding-global-role-proposed-foreign-policy-budget>
- UNHCR (2016). *Legal considerations on the return of asylum-seekers and refugees from Greece to Turkey as part of the EU-Turkey Cooperation in Tackling the Migration Crisis under the safe third country and first country of asylum concept*. Online: <http://www.unhcr.org/56f3ec5a9.pdf>

UNHCR (2018a). *Global Trends. Forced displacement in 2017*. Online: <https://www.unhcr.org/statistics/unhcrstats/5b27be547/unhcr-global-trends-2017.html>

UNHCR (2018b). *Returns from Greece to Turkey - 30 November 2018*. Online: <https://reliefweb.int/report/greece/returns-greece-turkey-30-november-2018>

UNHCR (2018c). UNHCR Position on Returns to Libya - Update II. Online: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/5b8d02314.html>

UNHCR (2018d). UNHCR Recommendations to the European Union EU Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-2027: Addressing forced displacement effectively. Online: <https://www.unhcr.org/publications/euroseries/5ad7602c4/unhcr-recommendations-european-union-eu-multiannual-financial-framework.html>



### ReSOMA - Research Social Platform on Migration and Asylum

is a project funded under the Horizon 2020 Programme that aims at creating a platform for regular collaboration and exchange between Europe's well-developed networks of migration researchers, stakeholders and practitioners to foster evidence-based policymaking. Being a Coordination and Support Action (CSA), ReSOMA is meant to communicate directly with policy makers by providing ready-to-use evidence on policy, policy perceptions and policy options on migration, asylum and integration gathered among researchers, stakeholders and practitioners.

- 🌐 [www.resoma.eu](http://www.resoma.eu)
- 🐦 @ReSOMA\_EU
- ✉ [resoma@resoma.eu](mailto:resoma@resoma.eu)

